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In macroeconomics, it is common to use models that assume fully informed
agents who have all available information at every point in time. Recently,
these models have been challenged by models which are based on the idea that
new information is not always available to every agent (e.g. Mankiw and Reis
2002, Sims 2003, Reis 2006a, 2006b, Mackowiak and Wiederholt 2009, Mankiw
and Reis 2011). This type of models includes sticky-information models and
models of rational inattention. The basic idea distinguishing these new models
from mainstream models is the consideration of information costs which can
be real resource costs, utility losses, or limited capacities (Sims 2005, Mankiw
and Reis 2011).
The two types of models differ in the way how agents form expectations.
In mainstream models, agents use all currently available information and form
rational expectations (full-information rationality) which imply that agents’
expectations are the same as the prediction of the respective model. In models
with information costs by contrast, agents rationally economize on these costs
and frequently form expectations based on outdated information (delayed-
information rationality). Depending on the underlying assumptions about in-
formation, the models predict different inflation dynamics (e.g. Mankiw and
Reis 2002) and have other implications for monetary policy (e.g. Ball et al.
2005, Mankiw and Reis 2011).
In this thesis, I compare the notions of information underlying these two
branches of macroeconomic research empirically. The thesis presents five em-
pirical contributions on the comparison of the competing concepts using dif-
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ferent types of data. Chapters 2 and 3 use survey data on expectations and
analyzes their formation. Chapter 4 compares two models with different as-
sumptions about information using macro data and thereby tests which expec-
tations are relevant for macroeconomic dynamics. Chapters 5 and 6 provide
experimental evidence on the existence and handling of information costs in
expectation formation.
Chapter 2 presents an empirical test of the two different concepts of ratio-
nality underlying the competing types of models: full-information vs. delayed-
information rationality. Survey data on inflation expectations of German con-
sumers are considered. I test different implications of the two forms of ex-
pectation formation taking both an aggregate and disaggregated view on the
data.
The contribution of the essay presented in Chapter 2 is twofold. First,
it directly compares the two different concepts of rationality, full-information
and delayed-information rationality while most previous studies (e.g. Roberts
1997, Thomas 1999, Andolfatto et al. 2008) have considered only one of these
concepts. Second, by considering also disaggregated data the essay seeks to
discover possible rationality biases suspected by the literature (e.g. Bonham
and Cohen 2001, Demery and Duck 2007).
Full-information rationality implies unbiasedness of expectations, the ab-
sence of serial correlation in forecast errors, the efficiency of expectations, and
their orthogonality to any available information. Tests of these hypotheses in-
dicate that inflation expectations of German consumers cannot be described as
full-information rational and provide hints for adaptive patterns. This result
holds for the total sample as well as within population subgroups.
The analysis with respect to delayed-information rationality relies on a
model proposed by Carroll (2003). The results support delayed-information
rationality based on both aggregate and disaggregated data. Delayed-
information rationality is supported based on results from a baseline OLS
model and an error-correction model.
The essay presented in Chapter 3 investigates implications about expec-
tation formation that are derived from rational-inattentiveness models and
sticky-information models. Agents in these models do not collect perfect in-
formation in every period because information is costly. One consequence is
that the lower the cost of information, the more often rational agents will up-
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date their information set. The essay makes use of news coverage as an inverse
proxy for information costs. A testable implication of rational inattentiveness
then is that news coverage and forecast deviation are negatively correlated.
The chapter tests this hypothesis with respect to inflation forecasts and
unemployment forecasts. It uses data on the amount of news about the re-
spective topic (inflation or unemployment) in U.S. newspapers and analyzes
its influences on the differences between expectations of consumers and pro-
fessional forecasters. The essay contributes to previous studies on the relation
between news and forecast accuracy (e.g. Carroll 2003, Badarinza and Buch-
mann 2009) which solely focus on inflation by extending the analysis also to
unemployment. Furthermore, I use a more purposive measure of news cov-
erage and the analysis is done for the representative U.S. consumer and also
for different subgroups. In addition, I control for other variables that could
influence forecast accuracy like macroeconomic variables, major events, and
elections.
The results show that consumers’ inflation forecast of the representative
U.S. consumer is closer to professionals’ forecast when more news about in-
flation is printed in newspapers. This confirms the theoretical prediction of a
negative correlation between news coverage and forecast deviation. But the
effect vanishes partly in a subgroup analysis. Quantitatively, the gap between
consumers’ and professionals’ inflation forecasts is reduced by approximately
one average absolute forecast error if one more article about inflation is pub-
lished in a newspaper per day.
However, the correlation between news about unemployment and unem-
ployment forecast deviation has the opposite sign as predicted by the theory.
The results concerning unemployment indicate a positive effect of news about
unemployment on unemployment forecast deviation. Thus, the theoretical
prediction of a negative correlation between the amount of news and forecast
deviation occurs empirically for inflation but the opposite correlation emerges
in the case of unemployment. Both findings are robust to the inclusion of
macroeconomic variables, major events, and elections.
While Chapters 2 and 3 have considered survey data on expectation forma-
tion, Bredemeier and Goecke take in Chapter 4 a more indirect view on the role
of expectations. The chapter presents an empirical comparison between the
sticky-information and the sticky-price Phillips curves. Both Phillips curves
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differ in the expectation terms they include. In the sticky-price Phillips curve,
inflation depends on current expectations of future inflation while the sticky-
information Phillips curve contains all past expectations of current inflation.
The chapter analyzes which concept is more successful in explaining empirical
inflation dynamics.
The chapter adds to the literature in various respects. First, it exam-
ines whether the finding that a simple sticky-information model matches se-
lected second moments of US inflation reasonably well (Reis 2006b) can also
be achieved using a sticky-price model. Other than previous comparisons of
the two concepts (e.g. Korenok and Swanson 2007, Korenok 2008, Abbott
2010), we take a broad look on inflation dynamics and consider inflation vari-
ance and persistence as well as its relation to dynamics in demand and supply.
Furthermore, our cross-country perspective allows to analyze whether relative
model performances are country-specific.
Our results indicate that the overall empirical performance allows no clear
distinction between the two concepts. However, if one is predominantly inter-
ested in matching unconditional moments of inflation dynamics, sticky prices
should be used. Researchers who focus on co-movements of inflation with
demand will obtain better results applying sticky information. These results
rely on our cross-country perspective since, in the US, model performances are
almost identical.
While Chapters 2 to 4 have used field data, Goecke, Luhan, and Roos
employ data from experiments in Chapters 5 and 6. These chapters provide
experimental evidence on the existence and handling of information costs in ex-
pectation formation. Information costs in the experiment presented in Chapter
5 are monetarized and exogenously given as assumed in rational-inattentiveness
models. Chapter 6 tests the existence of information costs.
Chapter 5 presents the first experimental test of rational-inattentiveness
models in the spirit of Reis (2006a, 2006b). In a laboratory experiment we test
the central feature of rational-inattentiveness models: subjects weigh the costs
against the benefits of information acquisition and rationally ignore available
information if the costs exceed the benefits. In an individual choice experiment,
subjects have to predict the realization of a simple stochastic process in several
periods. In each period, subjects can choose between forecasting without new
information (guessing) and buying perfect information. The lab experiment
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allows us to control the costs and benefits of information perfectly and enables
us to conduct tests against a clear theoretical benchmark.
Our results show clear evidence in favor of sticky-information and rational-
inattentiveness models. Agents behave as if they are able to calculate the
optimal length of inattention. They do not update information in some pe-
riods and therefore they partly stick to old information. In most treatments
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that subjects update their information
as predicted by the rational-inattentiveness models. Simple myopic behavior
is rarely a good description of subjects’ behavior. Furthermore, the results
indicate that the length of inattention increases with rising information costs
as predicted by the theory. These results hold in the aggregate, i.e. they de-
scribe average behavior of all subjects pooled together. Pairwise comparisons
between two treatments to test rational behavior and myopic behavior show
mixed evidence but favors also the rationality approach in comparison to the
myopic approach. Individual behavior is less rational, but deviations from
rationality are not systematic.
Chapter 6 also uses data generated in an experiment. These data are used
to test different assumptions about information costs derived from rational-
expectations and rational-inattentiveness models. The essay contributes to
the literature by giving participants the possibility to choose the amount of
information in our experiment without paying a monetary cost rather than im-
posing information costs directly as for example done by Gabaix et al. (2006),
Kraemer et al. (2006), Huber et al. (2011), and as done in Chapter 5 of this
thesis.
Information acquisition is assumed to be costless in rational-expectations
models but it is considered as costly in rational-inattentiveness models. This
essay provides an empirical test of these two assumptions about information
costs by using data generated in a real-effort experiment. The lab experiment
enables us to control the benefit of information which allows us to analyze
directly the existence of information costs. In an individual choice experiment,
subjects have to perform a forecast. Subjects can gain information in this
real-effort experiment about the variable to be forecasted via a task. For each
correct solution of the task, the range of possible numbers, of the variable that
has to be forecasted, shrinks by a certain amount.
The task in the real-effort experiment consists of simple mathematical prob-
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lems which captures the processing of information. We test whether the effort
of solving the mathematical problems is perceived as costs by the participants.
Given the existence of costs, participants should economize on solving mathe-
matical problems.
We analyze whether subjects acquire all information given different tasks
and different benefits of information. If subjects economize on solving the
simple addition problems, we conclude that they view this task as a cost.
In addition, we test how the time spent to solve the tasks, as a measure of
individual information costs, influences the number of calculations.
Our results show clear evidence for the existence of information costs and
therefore support rational-inattentiveness models. Processing of information
seems to induce costs for the participants and therefore they do not collect all
available information. When considering all treatments, in half of all calcula-
tions subjects do not collect all available information. Furthermore, informa-
tion processing diminishes with rising information costs. A participant, who
needs 10 seconds more for one block of calculations, tends to do 0.6 rounds
less of calculation.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2




Recently, monetary macroeconomic models that build on the assumption of
fully informed agents have been challenged by models which are based on the
idea that new information is not available to every agent at every point of time
(e.g. Mankiw and Reis 2002). These two ideas imply two different types of
rationality: full-information and delayed-information rationality. This essay
provides an empirical analysis of these two kinds of rationality using data on
expectations.1
The first rationality approach considered in this essay is the rational-
expectations hypothesis of Muth (1961) that assumes full information of all
agents at any point in time. The assumption of full information implies that
the expectations are the same as the prediction of the model. In this essay, I
will refer to this idea of rationality as “full-information rationality”.
The second approach of rationality assumes that expectations are based on
incomplete or delayed information. To describe this idea of rationality, differ-
ent terminologies are used in the literature like “economically rational” (Feige
and Pearce 1976), “bounded rationality” (Conlisk 1996), “partial-information
1This essay is based on Goecke (2011b).
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rational expectation” (Demery and Duck 2007), or models of the “sticky infor-
mation” type (Mankiw and Reis 2002). The theory of “inattentiveness” (Reis
2006a, 2006b) and the theory of “rational inattention” (Sims 2003 and Mack-
owiak and Wiederholt 2009) justify delayed and incomplete information, re-
spectively. In this essay, I will refer to this approach of rationality as “delayed-
information rationality”.
Many papers analyze whether inflation expectations can be described as
being rational (e.g. Roberts 1997, Thomas 1999, and Andolfatto et al. 2008).
This is mainly done using aggregate data. But, among others, Figlewski and
Wachtel (1981), Keane and Runkle (1990), Bonham and Cohen (2001), and
Demery and Duck (2007) show that using an average forecast, in contrast to
individual data, can lead to inconsistent estimators in rationality tests. Keane
and Runkle (1990) assert that
“...There are two problems with using consensus forecasts to
test rationality... If forecasters are rational, their forecasts will dif-
fer only because of differences in their information sets. The mean
of many individual rational forecasts, each conditional on a pri-
vate information set, is not itself a rational forecast conditional
on any particular information set... This seemingly minor issue
can produce severe bias2... A second problem with using consensus
forecasts is that this approach can mask individual deviations from
rationality. Hirsch and Lovell (1969) ...found (p.71) that some firms
are consistently optimistic about future sales while others are con-
sistently pessimistic. Averaging expectations, however, can cancel
these biases across firms so that industry mean expectations show
no bias...” (p.717).
Furthermore, Demery and Duck (2007) show that
“...if expectations are formed on a limited information set, the
coefficients estimated from aggregate data may give quite mislead-
ing estimates of the true individual response...” (p.13)
2Keane and Runkle (1990) show that the estimators of parameters from rationality tests
by using aggregated data are biased upwards in comparison to an estimator of parameters
based on disaggregated data.
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because idiosyncratic and common shocks are possibly not separately observed
and the effects of the two shocks conflate. In this case, individuals could react
incorrectly to a common shock in the belief that it was an idiosyncratic shock.
The effects of the idiosyncratic shocks do not average out at the aggregate
level which causes biased estimators.
This essay analyzes whether inflation expectations of German consumers
can be described as rational and if so, by which kind of rationality. The
contribution of this essay to the literature is to test the two different concepts of
rationality, full-information and delayed-information rationality. This is done
by using not only aggregate but also disaggregated data to discover possible
rationality biases.
A further advantage of using disaggregated data, in contrast to merely using
aggregate data, is the possibility to discover how demographic characteristics
influence the inflation expectations process and inflation forecast accuracy.
Gramlich (1983) and Blanchflower and MacCoille (2009) find demographic
effects on inflation expectations and inflation forecast accuracy for the US and
the UK.
A measure of inflation expectations is derived from the Business and Con-
sumer Survey of the European Commission.3 The analysis is done for a rep-
resentative consumer and separately for different demographic groups. Con-
sumers are asked in the survey about their expected direction of change in
the price level. Therefore, the survey provides qualitative data. Since an
economic interpretation of the raw qualitative data, without conversion, as
expected inflation rates is not possible, the data are converted based on the
method proposed by Batchelor and Orr (1988) and Berk (1999) to perform
rationality tests. These methods use the answer probabilities about expected
and perceived inflation of the respondents and weight these probabilities with
a scaling parameter to calculate quantitative inflation forecasts. I choose the
scaling factor such that expectations are on average not biased.
This essay is the first one that deals with rationality of inflation expec-
tations with aggregate and disaggregated data for Germany. The data set
used in this essay has not been applied in the literature on inflation expecta-
tions before and it is the only data set concerning inflation expectations on a
3Cf. European Commission (2008).
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disaggregated level besides British and American data.
I test full-information rationality by testing the hypothesis of serial correla-
tion, efficiency, and orthogonality. Results of full-information rationality tests
indicate that inflation expectations of German consumers cannot be described
as full-information rational and give hints to adaptive patterns. This result
holds for aggregate as well as for disaggregated data. The adaptive pattern
may be due to delayed-information rationality. Therefore, I check this kind
of rationality using the microfoundation of the sticky-information model by
Carroll (2003). I test whether Carroll’s model is supported by the data. The
analysis supports delayed-information rationality based on both types of data.
Delayed-information rationality is supported based on results from a baseline
OLS model and an error-correction model.
The closest papers to this essay are the following ones. Keane and Runkle
(1990) test full information rationality using disaggregated data for the U.S.
but there is no paper testing rationality using disaggregated German consumer
data. A couple of papers use the idea of rational inattentiveness or sticky infor-
mation but it exists no usage of theses ideas to test a special type of rationality.
The closest paper in this direction is Do¨pke et al. (2008a). These authors test
the model derived by Carroll (2003) for four major European countries but
they do not interpret the results as delayed-information rationality. Further-
more no paper analyzes Carroll’s model on a disaggregated level. Finally there
are papers discussing rationality effects for different demographic groups but
there is no study using German data. The closest paper in this direction is the
one by Blanchflower and MacCoille (2009).
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
data of the Business and Consumer survey and presents descriptive statistics.
Section 2.3 presents rationality tests. Section 2.3.1 deals with unbiasedness of
expectations which is an issue for both types of rationality considered. Section
2.3.2 illustrates the results for full-information rationality tests. Evidence for
rationality based on delayed information is presented in Section 2.3.3. Section
2.4 provides the conclusion.
2.2 Data
This empirical analysis is based on data from the Joint Harmonized EU Pro-
gram of Business and Consumer Surveys conducted by the European Com-
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mission (hereafter EC). In the case of Germany, the Gesellschaft fu¨r Kon-
sumforschung (hereafter GfK) performs the survey on behalf of the EC. For
Germany, approximately 2,500 consumers are interviewed every month since
1985. From January 1985 to the end of 1996, only residents of West Germany
completed the survey while since January 1997 the GfK has also queried 500
respondents from East Germany.4 The German data set has the important but
rare characteristic that it contains aggregate as well as disaggregated data. It
is thus possible to analyze the total sample and subgroups separately. To
the best of my knowledge, disaggregated German data has not been used in
the literature on inflation expectations so far and there exists no data set in
the literature on a disaggregated level for other countries except British and
American data.
The composition of respondents is chosen in a way that the aggregate
answers of the total sample can be interpreted as answers of a representa-
tive German consumer. Response data is available for the total sample and
on a disaggregated level. The sample is differentiated in the following cat-
egories: gender, education (primary; secondary; further), age (16-29; 30-49;
50-64; 65+), income (which I group by quartiles), and occupation (ten classi-
fications).5
2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics: EC Index Value
Questions number five and six of the survey are of interest for the analysis of
this essay.6 These questions deal with perceived and expected inflation. The
respondents are asked for their tendency. Therefore, the resulting survey data
is qualitative. Table 2.1 shows the exact wording of both questions and the
possible answers for the respondents.
For each question, the EC calculates an index value B based on the first
five possible answers in the following way. The total percentage value of the
first (risen a lot/increase more rapidly), second (risen moderately/increase at
the same rate), third (risen slightly/increase at a slower rate), fourth (stayed
4Cf. Deutsche Bundesbank (2001), page 38.
5The different occupations are: self employed and professional, self employed farmers,
clerical and office employees, skilled manual workers, other manual workers, total workers,
work full-time, work part-time, other occupations, and unemployed. The group of unem-
ployed individuals includes students, jobless, and retired persons.
6For the relevant part of the survey cf. European Commission (2008), page 34 and 35.
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Question five Question six
“How do you think that consumer
prices have developed over the last
12 months? They have...”
“By comparison with the past 12
months, how do you expect that
consumer prices will develop in the
next 12 months? They will...”
risen a lot increase more rapidly
risen moderately increase at the same rate
risen slightly increase at a slower rate
stayed about the same stay about the same
fallen fall
don’t know don’t know
Table 2.1: Questions five and six of the consumer survey
about the same/ stay about the same), and fifth (fallen/fall) answer categories
are denoted PP , P , E, M , and MM , respectively. The EC calculates the
balance index B by:7
B = (PP + 0.5 · P )− (MM + 0.5 ·M)
The index that results from this calculation is published monthly by the EC
and is the starting point of my analysis. To provide an overview over the data,
Figure 2.1 depicts the aggregate answer percentages given by all respondents
concerning perceived past annual inflation between January 1985 and June
2008. The horizontal axes show the time horizon and the vertical axes show
the percentages of respondents for each possible answer. Figure 2.2 presents
the results of all respondents in the same way as Figure 2.1, but with respect
to expectations of future inflation (question 6).
Graphs in both figures show the effects of the second Gulf War at the
beginning of the 1990’s, the Euro cash introduction in January 2002, and the
three percentage point VAT increase in Germany in January 2007 for expected
inflation and perceived inflation. The events Gulf War and tax increase cause
the answer probabilities “risen a lot/increase more rapidly” to rise. The Euro
7Under additional consideration of a seasonal adjustment. Cf. European Commission
(2008) page 24.
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate answer percentages to question five
cash introduction in 2002 induces the answer probabilities for a higher per-
ceived inflation (“risen a lot”) to rise. The increase in perceived inflation rate
throughout the course of the Euro cash introduction in Germany is a known
phenomenon.8 Concerning inflation expectations (Figure 2.2), the Euro cash
introduction induces the answer probabilities for a rising and stable inflation
expectation to fall and for a lower inflation, no inflation, and deflation in ex-
pectations to rise.
Following the graphical overview for the total sample, Table 2.2 presents
descriptive statistics of the EC index value for inflation expectations and per-
ceived inflation of German consumers on aggregate and disaggregated levels.
It shows the outcome for the EC balance index for expected inflation and per-
ceived inflation for the total sample and different groups from the first quarter
of 1990 to the second quarter of 2008.9 The analysis does not start before 1990
because disaggregated data is only available since January 1990. For reasons
of clarity, only two out of ten different occupations are used throughout the
8Cf. Brachinger (2006) and Hoffmann et al. (2006).
9In the following analysis, data is used that is only available on a quarterly basis. For
uniformity and comparability of the results, the whole analysis is done on a quarterly basis.
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Figure 2.2: Aggregate answer percentages to question six
whole essay. These are “work full-time” and “unemployed”. The results of the
rationality tests in the following sections for “work full-time” individuals are
similar for all excluded occupations.10 Means, standard deviations (SD), and
p-values are presented in Table 2.2. The p-value corresponds to the test of
the hypothesis that inflation expectations are equal. For every profile (gender,
education, age, income, occupation), I compare the inflation expectation of
each group with the highest inflation expectation in the same profile.11 The
same is also done for perceived inflation.
The results for male and female indicate that their mean and standard
deviation are close to one another. The p-values show that no statistically
significant difference exists concerning inflation expectations and perceived
inflation among men and women.
Results for the educational group show that individuals with secondary
education have the lowest expected inflation. Furthermore, perceived inflation
falls with higher education. For expected inflation, the p-values indicate no
10The results of the excluded groups can be found in Appendix 2.A.
11For example 3rd quartile income vs. 1st quartile income because 1st quartile income is
the group with the highest mean inflation expectation in the income profile.
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Inflation expectation Perceived inflation
Group Mean SD p-value Mean SD p-value
Full sample 32.0 12.9 32.9 17.4
Male 32.2 12.8 32.2 17.2 0.66
Female 31.8 13.0 0.86 33.5 17.5
Primary education 32.4 12.8 0.53 35.4 17.2
Secondary education 31.3 13.1 0.26 30.6 17.6 0.10
Further education 33.8 14.2 27.9 18.7 0.01
16-29 years old 29.4 13.1 0.08 29.5 16.8 0.10
30-49 years old 32.4 13.8 0.74 33.6 17.4 0.83
50-64 years old 33.1 12.6 34.0 17.8 0.95
above 65 years 32.9 12.9 0.90 34.2 18.2
1st quartile income 33.7 12.1 35.2 17.2
2nd quartile income 32.9 13.5 0.72 33.6 18.3 0.59
3rd quartile income 32.6 12.5 0.60 32.2 17.6 0.29
4th quartile income 31.1 13.6 0.22 29.5 17.9 0.05
Work full-time 31.8 13.3 0.05 32.1 17.4 0.01
Unemployed 35.9 12.0 39.3 17.0
Balance index about inflation expectations and perceived inflation in Germany. The data covers the time
period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.2: Index values of expected and perceived inflation on a quarterly basis
statistically significant difference between the groups. However, perceived in-
flation of primary educated individuals is significantly higher than perceived
inflation of secondary and further educated individuals using a significance
level of ten percent.
With respect to different age categories, inflation expectations of the
youngest individuals are different from the group of the 50-64 years old. The
youngest individuals have lower inflation expectations. Perceived inflation of
the youngest is different from the oldest group. The perceived inflation is lower
for the 16-29 years old individuals. The difference for all other groups to the
group with the highest value is not significant concerning inflation expectations
and perceived inflation.
Inflation expectations and perceived inflation seem to fall with rising in-
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come. But only perceived inflation of the 4th income quartile agents is statis-
tically significantly different from perceived inflation from agents of the first
income quartile. Otherwise, no statistically significant difference between the
groups is present.
In addition to this, the expected and perceived inflation of the unemployed
are higher compared to all other groups. Inflation expectation and perceived
inflation are statistically different from the “work full-time” individuals. To
summarize, the descriptive statistics indicate some heterogeneity between dif-
ferent groups concerning their inflation expectations and their perceived infla-
tion. The analysis in Section 2.3 will check whether differences are also present
in rationality tests.
2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics: Converted Data
So far, qualitative data and the EC index have been used. In order to be able
to interpret the qualitative data and the EC index value as values of expected
inflation rates, the data have to be converted. The conversion methods of
Batchelor and Orr (1988) and Berk (1999) are used in this analysis to calculate
quantitative inflation expectations from the survey. Both methods end up with





(at + bt − ct − dt) (2.1)
where the parameter at is the value of the inverse cumulative standard normal
distribution of the percentage value of the answer category “fall”, the param-
eter bt of the answer category “fall” plus “stay the same”, ct of the answer
category “fall” plus “stay about the same” plus “increase at a slower rate”,
and so forth. µ′t is a scaling factor. The parameters at, bt, ct, and dt can be
calculated with the percentage values of the different answer categories and
an assumption about the subjective distribution function of the future price
level. Both conversion methods only differ in the determination of the scaling
factor.
The answer proportions to question five of the survey which asks about
perceived inflation, combined as given by the fraction in equation (2.1), and
actual inflation over the last year are used as the scaling factor in the method
of Batchelor and Orr (1988). The method of Berk (1999) works as follows: the
answer categories of question five are aggregated into three categories. These
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three categories and the assumption that perceived inflation is on average
equal to the true past inflation is used to calculate the scaling factor µ′t. The
scaling factor is used to weight the fraction of answer probabilities shown
in equation (2.1).12 For both methods, I assume a normal distribution for
the probability distribution function of the subjective expected inflation rate
which is the common approach in literature (Batchelor and Orr 1988, Berk
1999, Deutsche Bundesbank 2001, Berk 2002, Lyziak 2003, Mankiw et al.
2004, Henzel and Wollmersha¨user 2005, Berk and Hebbink 2006, Do¨pke et al.
2008a, Lein and Maag 2011). Applying these methods leads to expectations
which, on average, underestimate actual inflation.13 However, this does not
falsify rationality since it could also be the conversion method which causes this
bias. In order to ensure that results are not driven by the conversion method
applied, I choose the scaling factor µ′t such that expectations are on average
correct. Otherwise the conversion of the data used in the analysis of this
essay is performed as in Berk (1999).14 As a graphical example for the results
after adjusted conversion, Figure 2.3 shows calculated inflation expectation for
the total sample in comparison to actual inflation. As a consequence of the
conversion method chosen, both time series have the same mean.
Figure 2.3 indicates that the calculated inflation expectations for the total
sample is often close to inflation. Only after the Euro cash introduction in
2002, individuals’ expectations overpredict inflation substantially.
2.3 Analysis
Following the descriptive statistics of the disaggregated inflation expectations,
this section performs rationality tests to answer the question if German infla-
tion expectations can be described as being rational.15 I distinguish between
two kinds of rationality: full-information rationality and delayed-information
12The methods are explained in more detail in Appendix 2.B.
13Graphically results are shown in Appendix 2.C. Inflation is measured as monthly CPI
inflation and calculated as yearly changes. For data details see Appendix 2.D.
14All results are qualitatively the same for the method from Batchelor and Orr (1988).
All omitted results are shown in Appendix 2.E.
15Ideally, an analysis of the expectation formation process of the different demographic
groups would require the usage of group-specific inflation rates but unfortunately this kind
of data is not provided by the German statistical office. Therefore, the general inflation rate
has to be used for the total sample and all demographic groups.
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Figure 2.3: Actual and expected inflation
rationality. The definition of full-information rational expectations follows the
one of Muth in the interpretation of Evans and Gulamani (1984) “Expectations
of agents are said to be rational if they are equal to the true mathematical ex-
pectation conditioned on all relevant information known at the time forecasts
were made...”(page 3). The tests for full-information rationality are based on
Begg (1982).
Delayed-information rationality follows the idea of Feige and Pearce (1976)
“This (...) concept simply emphasizes that an economic agent should con-
sider the trade-off between the benefits and costs of added information when
forecasting...”(page 500) and therefore possibly not to update expectations
with new information in each period. I define expectations which are built
partly on new information and partly on outdated information as rational in
the delayed-information sense. It is analyzed whether inflation expectations
can be described by one of these rationality definitions. For both rationality
concepts, different properties have to be fulfilled by the data. The analysis is
done with aggregate data and at the disaggregated level because of possibly
biased results.
Both types of rationality have to fulfill unbiasedness. Full-information ra-
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tionality and delayed-information rationality predict that forecasts are on aver-
age correct. In the model of delayed-information rationality agents build their
forecast partly based on outdated information but nevertheless these forecasts
must not be biased on average. Furthermore, for full-information rationality,
expectation errors have to be serially uncorrelated, forecasts have to be ef-
ficient, and have to fulfill orthogonality with respect to any other available
information. Under delayed-information rationality, expectations do not have
to fulfill these properties because delayed-information rationality is based on
the idea that not all currently available information is taken into account. But
the concepts of serially uncorrelated errors, efficiency, and orthogonality are
based on the assumption that all available information is used and therefore
these concepts do not have to be fulfilled by the delayed-information rational-
ity approach. In the following sections, I will test these different properties of
rationality.
2.3.1 Unbiasedness
In a first step, I check unbiasedness of inflation expectations which has to hold
for both concepts of rationality. Unbiasedness requires that expectations are
on average correct (e.g. Theil 1966). As explained in the previous section,
the data is converted in a way that expectations are on average correct to
make sure that the results concerning rationality are not biased by the con-
version method. Thus unbiasedness cannot be rejected with the so converted
data. By using this converted data in the following analysis we know that all
later results that possibly indicate irrationality are not due to level biases in
the conversion method. Tests for full and delayed-information rationality are
presented separately in the next two sections.
2.3.2 Full-information Rationality Tests
This section deals with additional properties that have to be fulfilled under
full-information rationality but not necessarily under delayed-information ra-
tionality. The next property that is tested is the one of serially uncorrelated
inflation forecasts following Anderson and Goldsmith (1994). If all available
information is used, as proposed by full-information rationality, no systematic
relationship between current and lagged forecast errors should exist because
lagged forecast errors are known and should be thus included in a rational fore-
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cast. To check serially uncorrelated errors, I estimate the following equation
pit − piet = γ1 + γ2(pit−1 − piet−1) + ψt (2.2)
with OLS. In equation (2.2), and all following equations, pit is the actual in-
flation rate in period t and piet is the expected inflation rate for time t. Fur-
thermore γ1 is a constant and ψt is an error term. I test the null hypothesis
γ2 = 0. If the forecast error of the previous period has explanatory power
for the current forecast error, the parameter γ2 would be significantly dif-
ferent from zero. Thus, the hypothesis of full-information rationality has to
be rejected in this case. The estimated values and standard errors for both
coefficients are presented in Table 2.3.
The results show that the estimated values for the constant are essentially
zero but the estimators for γ2 are significantly different from zero for the total
sample and for all subgroups. These results yield first evidence against full-
information rationality that does not depend on the conversion method.
Furthermore these results indicate some adaptive or delayed pattern in
inflation expectations because γ2 is positive and significantly different from
zero. This is consistent with delayed information processing by individuals.
Under delayed-information rationality the following happens: if an inflation
shock hits the economy, inflation increases unexpectedly i.e. inflation forecast
errors become positive. In the next period, only a fraction of agents in the
economy update and realize the shock in the previous period and their forecast
error and adjust their inflation forecasts. The remaining fraction of agents does
not update. They do not take into account their previous forecast error. Thus,
the forecast error is still positive but is lower than in the first period. Therefore
delayed-information rationality generates positive serial correlation in forecast
errors that is also present in the data. If forecast errors are positive serial
correlated, agents adjust their forecasts insufficiently. Note that the finding of
serial correlation is not evidence for the delayed-information concept but a hint
toward this direction. More formal tests of delayed-information rationality
are performed in the next section. But before doing so, it is checked for
completeness whether the data fulfill the last two properties of full-information
rationality: efficiency and orthogonality.
The next property which is tested is efficiency following Thomas (1999).
Efficiency implies that all available information about the variable of interest
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pit − piei,t = γ1 + γ2(pit−1 − piei,t−1) + ψt
γ̂1 SE γ̂2 SE
Full sample 0.00 0.08 0.80 0.07***
Male 0.00 0.09 0.79 0.08***
Female 0.00 0.09 0.81 0.07***
Primary education 0.00 0.09 0.78 0.08***
Secondary education 0.00 0.09 0.80 0.07***
Further education 0.01 0.09 0.77 0.08***
16-29 years old 0.00 0.10 0.72 0.09***
30-49 years old 0.00 0.09 0.82 0.07***
50-64 years old 0.00 0.09 0.76 0.08***
above 65 years 0.00 0.09 0.70 0.09***
1st quartile income 0.00 0.09 0.79 0.08***
2nd quartile income 0.00 0.10 0.73 0.08***
3rd quartile income 0.00 0.09 0.79 0.08***
4th quartile income 0.00 0.09 0.76 0.08***
Work full-time 0.00 0.09 0.78 0.08***
Unemployed 0.00 0.16 0.58 0.10***
*** indicate statistical significance at 1 percent level. All data concern Germany. Converted inflation
expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI) are taken from the Bundesbank. The data
cover the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.3: Full information rationality test: serial correlation
is used in the forecast. The past realizations of the variable of interest are
available at the moment of forecasting. Thus the information which is present
in lagged values should be included in the forecast. To test efficiency, I run a
regression of the forecast error on inflation up to the third lag of inflation and
test for ρj = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ 4.16
pit − piet = ρ1 +
4∑
j=2
ρjpit−j+1 + ξt (2.3)
16The test for efficiency starts initially with six lags of inflation. To simplify the exposition
of the results, I drop insignificant last lags until I arrive at a process with a significant last
lag. This procedure results for all groups, with the exception of the unemployed, in an
equation with three lags of inflation.
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ρ̂1 SE ρ̂2 SE ρ̂3 SE ρ̂4 SE
Full sample 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.21 0.39 -0.72 0.31**
Male 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.18 0.38 -0.68 0.31**
Female 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.25 0.41 -0.78 0.33**
Primary education 0.38 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.15 0.38 -0.69 0.31**
Secondary education 0.12 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.41 -0.72 0.33**
Further education 0.22 0.31 0.41 0.33 0.12 0.41 -0.67 0.33**
16-29 years old 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.41 -0.78 0.33**
30-49 years old 0.40 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.10 0.42 -0.66 0.34*
50-64 years old 0.38 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.18 0.39 -0.73 0.31**
above 65 years 0.33 0.27 0.43 0.29 -0.23 0.36 -0.41 0.29
1st quartile income 0.45 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.06 0.39 -0.60 0.31*
2nd quartile income 0.38 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.15 0.39 -0.70 0.31**
3rd quartile income 0.36 0.29 0.40 0.31 0.11 0.38 -0.72 0.31**
4th quartile income 0.36 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.22 0.37 -0.73 0.30**
Work full-time 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.31 0.29 0.38 -0.72 0.31**
Unemployed 0.87 0.40** 0.95 0.43** -1.13 0.53** -0.30 0.43
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All data concern
Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI) are taken from
the Bundesbank. The data cover the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.4: Full information rationality test: efficiency
Here ρ1 is a constant and ξt is an error term. Results are presented in Table
2.4.
Using a significance level of ten percent, the results show that at least
one of the three lags of inflation contains information for the forecast error
for the total sample and all subgroups (with the exception of the above 65
years old). Thus, the data do not show efficiency and therefore the concept of
full-information rationality is rejected.
The last property of full-information rationality, orthogonality with respect
to any other available information, requires that all other available information
is used for the forecast in each period. To test for orthogonality I follow
Mankiw et al. (2004). I extend equation (2.3) by also taking into account
the lagged value of the unemployment rate and the lagged value of the three
month interest rate. It is checked whether these additional variables contain
information that can be used to improve the forecast. To test orthogonality, a
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regression is run on the equation
pit − piei,t = δ1 + δ2pii,t−1 + δ3pii,t−2 + δ4pii,t−3 + δ5ut−1 + δ6it−1 + ηt, (2.4)
where δ1 is a constant, ut is the unemployment rate in period t, it is the three
month interest rate in period t, and ηt is the error term. If expectations of
respondents can be described as full-information rational, all estimated coef-
ficients would not be significantly different from zero. Once again, an OLS
regression on equation (2.4) is run for the total sample and all subgroups sep-
arately. The results of the estimated coefficients and the respective standard
errors of this estimation are presented in Table 2.5.
Similar results in comparison to the results of the efficiency test occur.
The estimated parameters for δ4 is significantly different from zero for aggre-
gate and most of the disaggregated data (with the exception of the above 65
years old and the unemployed). The unemployment rate does not contain any
information that can be used to improve the forecast error. The estimators
for the interest rate are only in three cases different from zero by applying
a significance level of 10%. Therefore the null hypothesis of full-information
rationality for German consumers has to be rejected once again for both types
of data.
The analysis up to here shows that German data cannot be described as full-
information rational. Three tests for full-information rationality of inflation
expectations based on both types of data show that the hypothesis of full-
information rationality has to be rejected. The tests also indicate patterns of
delayed information. Whether the expectation data can be described by the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3.3 Delayed-information Rationality Tests
The previous section has shown that inflation expectations cannot be described
by full-information rationality. Furthermore, the test for the hypothesis of
serial correlation indicates some pattern of delay in inflation expectations. In
this section, I conduct tests if the expectations can be described by delayed-
information rationality. I do this once again for aggregate and disaggregated
data to control for a possible bias. Delayed-information rationality is the key
concept in the monetary sticky-information model by Mankiw and Reis (2002).
To check this kind of rationality, I follow Carroll (2003) and his derivation of
a micro foundation for sticky-information models. I reject the hypothesis of
delayed-information rationality if the model of Carroll is rejected by the data.
The basic idea of Carroll’s model is that consumers form their inflation
expectations by adapting expectations published in the media. But not all
consumers have full and current information about the published inflation
forecast as it would be the case under the full-information rationality assump-
tion. In Carroll’s model, just a fraction λ of the population have current
information in any period and build rational inflation forecasts based on this
information set. But the remainder of the population forms their inflation
forecasts based on outdated information. On an aggregate level, this implies
that inflation forecasts depend on forecasts in newspapers in the current pe-
riod (actual information) and on the own previous inflation forecasts.17 If
this pattern is present in the data, the inflation forecasts can be described as
delayed-information rational.
Carroll assumes that the inflation forecasts printed in newspapers are made
by professional forecasters. Following Carroll, the variables of interest are the
inflation forecasts of professional forecasters and past consumer inflation fore-
casts. Professional expectations are given by data from Consensus Economics.
Consensus Economics interviews about 30 banks and research institutions in
Germany, among other things, about their quantitative inflation forecasts.18
17For a derivation see Carroll (2003).
18The survey data are available from the second quarter of 1994 to the second quarter
of 2008. Therefore the analysis refers to this time horizon. Based on the survey data, pro-
fessional forecasts for the next year on a quarterly basis are calculated. For Germany the
following institutes and firms are interviewed by Consensus Economics: IW-Cologne Insti-
tute, Bayerische LBank, Delbruck & Co, DIW- Berlin, Commerzbank, DekaBank, Dresdner
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The mean of all answers is used as professional inflation expectations. Con-
sumer inflation forecasts are again taken from the Business and Consumer
Survey.
Baseline Model
Consumers should assume that forecasts from professional forecasters are bet-
ter than their own ones because professionals have experience, are trained to
do forecasts, and spend a lot of time making forecasts whereas standard lay-
men do not. If the predominance of professional forecasts concerning accuracy
holds, consumers should not build forecasts on their own but just adopt the
forecasts of professionals. Predominance of professional forecasts exists in the
case of Germany. Their mean squared forecast error is lower in comparison to
the total sample and all subgroups, based on the adjusted conversion method.
The mean squared forecast error for the different demographic groups and the
professionals are shown in Table 2.6.
The results show that the forecast errors of all demographic groups exceed
the professional forecast error. Consumers’ errors are more than twice the
size of the professionals’ forecasts. Therefore the assumption that consumers
should adopt the professional forecasts is a good description of German reality.
Carroll (2003) shows that inflation forecasts of U.S. consumers are influ-
enced by their own inflation forecast of the previous quarter and the profes-
sional forecast of the current quarter and does not find any other significant
determinant. Based on the findings of Carroll, this section presents results of
the analysis if this result also holds for German consumers or whether delayed-






t−1 + τ t (2.5)
Where piet are the consumer’s inflation expectations, pi
Pro
t are the professional
forecasts for period t, and τ t is an error term. The results of an OLS regression
are presented in Table 2.7.
Bank, DZ Bank, FAZ Institute, Helaba Frankfurt, Lehman Brothers, UBS Warburg, West
LB, WGZ Bank, Bank Julius Baer, Bankgesellschaft Berlin, BHF Bank, Deutsche Bank,
HSBC Trinkaus, HWWA, HypoVereinsbank, Invesco Bank, JP Morgan, MM Warburg, Mor-










16-29 years old 1.31
30-49 years old 1.39
50-64 years old 1.16
above 65 years 0.95
1st quartile income 1.09
2nd quartile income 1.11
3rd quartile income 1.17
4th quartile income 1.05
Work full-time 1.11
Unemployed 1.75
All data concern Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate
(CPI) are taken from the Bundesbank. Data for professional forecasters are taken from Consensus
Economics. The data cover the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.6: Mean squared forecast errors
The results show that the adjusted R2 is very high for the total sample and
all different demographic groups. α̂1 and α̂2 are significantly different from zero
for all groups (with the exception of α̂1 for the third quartile income group).
The findings for the different groups indicate only quantitative differences.
The estimated coefficient α̂1 is located between 0.16 and 0.39. A value of 0.25
would indicate that one-fourth of all agents have an up-to-date forecast. For a
specific agent this means that he updates his information set on average once
a year (1/0.25 = 4 quarters). Following this interpretation, this implies that
consumers update their inflation expectations from professional expectations
between every half (1/0.39 = 2.56 quarters) and every one and a half year






i,t−1 + τ t
α̂1 SE α̂2 SE Adj. R
2 p-value
Full sample 0.18 0.08** 0.84 0.09*** 0.95 0.60
Male 0.18 0.07** 0.84 0.09*** 0.96 0.66
Female 0.20 0.08** 0.83 0.09*** 0.94 0.58
Primary education 0.17 0.07** 0.85 0.08*** 0.96 0.66
Secondary education 0.21 0.09** 0.82 0.10*** 0.94 0.51
Further education 0.23 0.08*** 0.78 0.09*** 0.92 0.82
16-29 years old 0.29 0.10*** 0.73 0.11*** 0.91 0.74
30-49 years old 0.17 0.07** 0.85 0.09*** 0.95 0.76
50-64 years old 0.18 0.08** 0.83 0.10*** 0.95 0.71
above 65 years 0.33 0.10*** 0.70 0.10*** 0.91 0.68
1st quartile income 0.16 0.07** 0.85 0.09*** 0.96 0.80
2nd quartile income 0.39 0.12*** 0.63 0.09*** 0.87 0.79
3rd quartile income 0.17 0.10 0.84 0.07*** 0.94 0.73
4th quartile income 0.24 0.08*** 0.76 0.09*** 0.93 0.87
Work full-time 0.16 0.08** 0.86 0.09*** 0.96 0.75
Unemployed 0.25 0.09** 0.76 0.11*** 0.87 0.91
All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using a Newey-West procedure
with four lags. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. All
data concern Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI)
are taken from the Bundesbank. Data for professional forecasters are taken from Consensus Economics.
The data cover the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.7: Delayed-information rationality test: baseline model
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et al. (2008a). They show that a representative German consumer updates
his expectations between every three quarters and every one and a half year
depending on specification.
The theory assumes that individuals obtain their macroeconomic view from
the media with a given probability. Furthermore, the media are assumed to
represent professional forecasters’ view. The theory predicts that consumers
build their forecasts based on only two sources: professionals’ forecast (periods
with an information update) and their own lagged forecast (periods without
an information update). Because the expectation process only depends on
two sources, the influence of these two sources can be interpreted as weights.
Because weights add up to one, the theory predicts that both coefficients add
to one if the influence of both sources is estimated. The p-value in Table 2.7
corresponds to the test of the hypothesis that the sum of α̂1 and α̂2 is equal
to one. The p-values show that no statistically significant difference exists
between the sum of the estimated coefficients and one for all groups.
P-values from a test of a pooled regression against varying slopes for the
different categories are as follows: gender 0.10; education 0.02; age 0.11; in-
come 0.02; occupation 0.00. The hypothesis of poolability of the data has to
be rejected, at least at a significance level of 10%, for almost all categories.
Only for the age category, poolability cannot be rejected. The rejections of
poolability represent a further argument in favor of using disaggregated data.
In summary, the results show that the inflation expectations of consumers
are influenced by professional expectations and their own past inflation expec-
tations. Therefore the results support delayed-information rationality based
on aggregate and disaggregated data.
Error-correction Model
The previous section has shown that, by using an OLS regression, consumer in-
flation expectations are influenced by professionals’ inflation expectations and
lagged values of consumers’ inflation expectations and therefore consumers’
inflation forecasts support the idea of delayed-information rationality. It is
also possible that a stable long-run relationship between the consumers’ and
professionals’ expectations exists. If a long-run relationship exists, an error-
correction model is the appropriate econometric model to distinguish between
the long run and the short run influence of professionals’ forecasts on con-
29
sumers’ inflation expectation. This is done by the following error-correction
model:
4piet = β1piet−1 + β24 piProt + β3piProt−1 + φt (2.6)
The long-run relationship between the consumer forecast piet and the pro-
fessional forecast piProt is given by −β3/β1 and the short-run relationship by
β2. Carroll’s model assumes that consumers update their inflation expecta-
tions from professionals’ forecasts. Therefore the model predicts a long-run
relationship of one. An estimation of the error-correction model delivers the
results presented in Table 2.8.
4piei,t = β1piet−1 + β2 4 piProt + β3piProt−1 + φt
β̂1 SE β̂2 SE β̂3 SE Long p-value
Full sample -0.12 0.06* 0.60 0.19*** 0.13 0.07** 1.17 0.50
Male -0.11 0.06* 0.59 0.17*** 0.13 0.06** 1.14 0.55
Female -0.13 0.07* 0.63 0.23*** 0.16 0.07** 1.17 0.49
Primary education -0.10 0.06* 0.55 0.17*** 0.12 0.06** 1.14 0.55
Secondary education -0.14 0.07* 0.68 0.24*** 0.16 0.08** 1.20 0.44
Further education -0.22 0.08*** 0.21 0.27 0.23 0.09*** 1.04 0.82
16-29 years old -0.22 0.08** 0.78 0.28*** 0.23 0.09** 1.07 0.74
30-49 years old -0.12 0.06* 0.51 0.21** 0.13 0.06** 1.11 0.68
50-64 years old -0.13 0.06** 0.49 0.20** 0.15 0.07** 1.10 0.66
above 65 years -0.28 0.10*** 0.55 0.28* 0.30 0.11*** 1.08 0.62
1st quartile income -0.13 0.06** 0.35 0.19* 0.14 0.07** 1.07 0.75
2nd quartile income -0.36 0.10*** 0.52 0.35 0.37 0.12*** 1.04 0.80
3rd quartile income -0.14 0.07** 0.35 0.22 0.16 0.07** 1.09 0.69
4th quartile income -0.17 0.08** 0.76 0.22*** 0.18 0.08** 1.03 0.88
Work full-time -0.10 0.05* 0.52 0.16*** 0.11 0.06* 1.10 0.69
Unemployed -0.18 0.08** 0.95 0.32*** 0.19 0.08** 1.05 0.86
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance to the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. All data concern
Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI) are taken from
the Bundesbank. Data for professional forecasters are taken from Consensus Economics. The data cover
the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.8: Delayed-information rationality test: error-correction model
The results show that a long-run relationship between consumers’ forecasts
and professionals’ forecasts exists and therefore provides further evidence in
favor of delayed-information rationality. The column titled “Long” presents
evidence for the long-run relationship. The last column presents the p-value
for the test of the null hypothesis that the long-run relationship is one. It
can be seen that this proposition of the theory cannot be rejected at any
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Figure 2.4: Impulse response of the unemployed and further educated individ-
uals on a permanent shock of one on professionals’ inflation forecast
usual significance level. The error-correction model also indicates a significant
short-run relationship between consumers’ and professionals’ forecasts (with
the exception of three groups). Thus beside the short-run dependence of pro-
fessional and consumers forecasts, there also exists a long-run relationship.
Furthermore, the results about the short-run effect show differences between
the subgroups. The differences, the values are between 0.21 and 0.95, indicate
the importance of taking into account the analysis not only based on aggregate
data but also based on disaggregated data. Figure 2.4 illustrates the impor-
tance graphically by presenting the impulse responses to a permanent shock
on professionals’ inflation forecasts of one percentage point. The figure shows
the impulse responses for two population subgroups. The black dashed line
represents the response of further educated individuals (short run effect of 0.21
percentage points) while the grey dotted line belongs to the unemployed (short
run effect of 0.95 percentage points). The figure indicates that unemployed in-
dividuals’ expectations reach their long run reaction after about 10 periods
whereas, for further educated individuals, it takes about 20 periods.
It can be summarized that a short-run and long-run relationship between
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consumers’ inflation expectations and professionals’ inflation expectations ex-
ists for each group. This result further supports delayed-information rational-
ity once again based on aggregate and disaggregated data.
2.4 Conclusion
This essay tested empirically for two different kinds of rationality that are used
in monetary models, full-information rationality (Muth 1961) and delayed-
information rationality (Mankiw and Reis 2002). The analysis was done with
a unique German data set. To take into account the possibility of biases of the
results, aggregate and disaggregated data were used in the analysis. Rational-
ity tests indicated that the inflation expectations of German consumers could
not be described as full-information rationality based on aggregate as well as
based on disaggregated data. The analysis indicated delayed-information ra-
tionality based on both types of data. Delayed-information rationality was
supported in a baseline model and an error-correction model.
In summary, the results of this empirical investigation showed that the as-
sumption of full-information rational inflation expectations in economic models
cannot be supported by aggregate as well as disaggregated German data. The
approach of delayed-information rationality on the other hand is supported by
both types of data in the German case.
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Appendix
2.A Further Results: Omitted Groups
Inflation expectation Perceived Inflation
Group Mean SD p-value Mean SD p-value
Full sample 32.0 12.9 32.9 17.4
Work full-time 31.8 13.3 0.05 32.1 17.4 0.01
Unemployed 35.9 12.0 39.3 17.0
Self employed 31.2 14.1 0.03 31.5 17.5 0.01
Farmers 29.6 17.5 0.01 28.9 22.6 0.00
Office employees 31.3 13.6 0.03 30.7 17.7 0.00
Skilled manual workers 33.0 12.7 0.16 35.2 17.3 0.15
Other manual workers 32.5 13.4 0.11 36.0 17.5 0.25
Total worker 32.9 12.7 0.14 35.3 17.0 0.15
Other occupations 31.5 13.0 0.03 32.4 17.8 0.02
Work part-time 32.3 14.1 0.10 33.5 18.0 0.05
Table 2.9: Index values of expected and perceived inflation on a quarterly
basis, all occupations19
pit − piei,t = γ1 + γ2(pit−1 − piei,t−1) + ψt
γ̂1 SE γ̂2 SE
Full sample 0.00 0.08 0.80 0.07***
Work full-time 0.00 0.09 0.78 0.08***
Unemployed 0.00 0.16 0.58 0.10***
Self employed -0.01 0.15 0.53 0.10***
Farmers -0.05 2.47 -0.02 0.12
Office employees 0.00 0.09 0.80 0.07***
Skilled manual workers 0.00 0.10 0.73 0.09***
Other manual workers -0.01 0.11 0.69 0.09***
Total worker 0.00 0.09 0.74 0.08***
Other occupations 0.00 0.09 0.79 0.08***
Work part-time 0.00 0.13 0.64 0.10***
*** indicate statistical significance at 1 percent level. All data concern Germany. Converted inflation
expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI) are taken from the Bundesbank. The data
cover the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.10: Full information rationality test: serial correlation, all occupations
19Total worker is an occupation category chosen by the European Commission and not
the sum of all occupations. The raw data for the farmers contain many observations that










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Skilled manual workers 1.01




All data concern Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate
(CPI) are taken from the Bundesbank. Data for professional forecasters are taken from Consensus
Economics. The data cover the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.






i,t−1 + τ t
α̂1 SE α̂2 SE Adj. R2 p-value
Full sample 0.18 0.08** 0.84 0.09*** 0.95 0.60
Work full-time 0.16 0.08** 0.86 0.09*** 0.96 0.75
Unemployed 0.25 0.09** 0.76 0.11*** 0.87 0.91
Self employed 0.57 0.14*** 0.43 0.10*** 0.72 0.94
Farmers -0.08 0.01*** 0.59 0.06*** 0.94 0.00
Office employees 0.18 0.09** 0.84 0.10*** 0.95 0.65
Skilled manual workers 0.26 0.08*** 0.74 0.09*** 0.92 0.89
Other manual workers 0.28 0.07*** 0.71 0.07*** 0.92 0.81
Total worker 0.24 0.07*** 0.75 0.08*** 0.93 0.87
Other occupations 0.20 0.08** 0.83 0.09*** 0.94 0.49
Work part-time 0.31 0.09*** 0.68 0.11*** 0.86 0.83
All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using a Newey-West procedure
with four lags. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. All
data concern Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI)
are taken from the Bundesbank. Data for professional forecasters are taken from Consensus Economics.
The data cover the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.14: Delayed-information rationality: baseline model, all occupations
4piei,t = β1piet−1 + β2 4 piProt + β3piProt−1 + φt
β̂1 SE β̂2 SE β̂3 SE Long p-value
Full sample -0.12 0.06* 0.60 0.19*** 0.13 0.07** 1.17 0.87
Work full-time -0.10 0.05* 0.52 0.16*** 0.11 0.06* 1.10 0.67
Unemployed -0.18 0.08** 0.95 0.32*** 0.19 0.08** 1.05 0.97
Self employed -0.56 0.12*** 0.63 0.56 0.57 0.15*** 1.01 0.22
Farmers -0.38 0.10*** -0.11 0.05** -0.08 0.02*** -0.21 0.00
Office employees -0.12 0.06* 0.56 0.21*** 0.14 0.07** 1.14 0.73
Skilled manual workers -0.24 0.09*** 0.50 0.24** 0.23 0.09** 0.97 0.28
Other manual workers -0.25 0.09*** 0.54 0.25** 0.24 0.09*** 0.96 0.32
Total worker -0.22 0.08*** 0.48 0.22** 0.21 0.08** 0.97 0.29
Other occupations -0.12 0.07* 0.68 0.21*** 0.15 0.07** 1.25 0.95
Work part-time -0.31 0.10*** 0.48 0.35 0.29 0.11*** 0.95 0.29
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance to the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. All data concern
Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI) are taken from
the Bundesbank. Data for professional forecasters are taken from Consensus Economics. The data cover
the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.15: Delayed-information rationality: error-correction model, all occu-
pations
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2.B Data Conversion and Correction
Quantitative data is needed to do rationality tests. Therefore the qualitative
data from the EC must be converted into quantitative data. For the compu-
tation, the probability approach of Batchelor and Orr (1988) and Berk (1999)
is used. The basis for both approaches is the work of Carlson and Parkin
(1975). Carlson and Parkin designed a probability method to convert qualita-
tive into quantitative data for survey questions with three response categories.
Batchelor and Orr (1988) extend the probability method for survey questions
with four and five response categories. Berk (1999) combines both approaches.
These conversion methods have been applied by many researchers (including
among others Berk 1999, Mankiw et al. 2004, Berk and Hebbink 2006, Do¨pke
et al. 2008a, Lein and Maag 2011) and a lot of institutions (European Central
Bank, Bundesbank, Centre of European Economic Research).
In the EC survey, consumers have to choose between six answers categories.
The fractions of the answer “don’t know” are divided into the other response
categories in equal parts to get data from only five answer categories. This
procedure does not change the results and is the common approach in the
literature.20 Thus the Business and Consumer Survey can be interpreted as a
survey with five response possibilities and the probability methods of Batchelor
and Orr and Berk can be applied.
The basic idea of these conversion methods is that the inflation expectation
of an individual is based on a subjective distribution function of the future
price level. The mean of the distribution function is the inflation expectation
of each individual. The subjective distribution functions can be aggregated to
the expectations distribution function f(xt+1) that is presented as normally
distributed in Figure 2.5. Where ±δ is the just noticeable difference of the
inflation around zero and ± is the just noticeable difference of the inflation
around the perceived inflation µ′t.
The mean of the distribution function µt can be interpreted as expected
future inflation piet . Based on a distribution assumption, the expected inflation
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Figure 3: Quantification for surveys with five answer possibilities
and ± is the just noticeable difference of the inflation around the perceived
inflation µ′t.
The mean of the distribution function µt can be interpreted as expected
future inflation. Based on a distribution assumption, the expected inflation
can be calculated by:
µt =
µ′t(at + bt)
(at + bt − ct − dt) (1)
The parameter at is the standardized value of the percentage answer of
”fall”, the parameter bt of the answers ”fall” plus ”stay the same”, ct of the
10
Figure 2.5: Quantification for surveys with five answer possibilities: expecta-
tion distribution
The parameter at is the standardized value of the percentage answer category
“fall”, the parameter bt of the answer category “fall” plus “stay the same”, ct of
the answer category “fall” plus “stay about the same” plus “increase at a slower
rate”, and so forth. The parameters at, bt, ct, and dt can be calculated with
the percentage values of the different answers categories and an assumption
about the distribution function. Equation (2.7) is the same as equation (2.1).
The difference between both conversion methods mentioned above is the
calculation of perceived past inflation µ′t. For the method from Batchelor and
Orr the answer proportions out of question five, that asks about the perceived
inflation, and the inflation over the last year are used as a measurement of
the perceived past inflation. The answer proportions out of question five are
combined as given by the fraction in equation (2.7).21. For the method from
Berk the answer categories of question five are aggregate into three categories.
These three categories and the assumption that the perceived inflation of the
consumers is on average equal to the true past inflation is used to produce a
21For more details cf. Batchelor and Orr (1988).
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measurement for the perceived past inflation.22. In order to ensure that results
are not driven by the conversion method applied, I adjust the scaling factor
such that expectations are on average correct.
A problem with the conversion method occurs because it is not always possi-
ble to calculate a value for the parameters at, bt, ct, and dt because of undefined
values of the distribution function. There are three cases in which equation
(2.7) cannot be calculated and therefore the data has to be corrected:23
• The value of the aggregate distribution function is zero.
• The value of the aggregate distribution function is one.
• The denominator is zero.
If the value of the aggregate distribution function is zero, the value of the
inverse of the normal distribution approaches minus infinity. In this case I
added 1/(2n + 1) to the response category that is equal to zero. Whereas n
is the number of respondents in the corresponding category. This procedure
can be justified by the fact that the survey only approximates the represen-
tative consumer or consumer group. In addition to this, the change of the
correction is negligible. The lowest number of respondents is in the category
“further education” in which 159 individuals are interviewed. If the aggregate
distribution function in this group is zero, the data are corrected by adding
1/(2n + 1) = 0.003 to this category. This value is very close to the value of
zero.
If the value of the aggregate distribution function is one, the value of
the inverse of the normal distribution approaches plus infinity. If this oc-
curs 1/(2n + 1) is subtracted from the aggregate distribution function. The
third case is only a theoretical one. It does not appear in the data used in this
essay.
22For more details cf. Berk (1999).
23For the correction of the data I am following mainly Henzel and Wollmersha¨user (2005).
40
2.C Further Results: Graphs
Figure 2.6: Actual and expected inflation: Berk’s conversion method not ad-
justed
Figure 2.7: Actual and expected inflation: Bachelor and Orr’s conversion
method not adjusted
2.D Inflation Data
Monthly CPI data are taken from the Bundesbank. The series is seasonally
adjusted and named USFB99. Based on this series, inflation is calculated as
twelve month percentage growth changes.
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2.E Further Results: Bachelor and Orr Conversion
Method
pit − piei,t = γ1 + γ2(pit−1 − piei,t−1) + ψt
γ̂1 SE γ̂2 SE
Full sample 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.08***
Male 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.08***
Female 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.08***
Primary education 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.08***
Secondary education 0.00 0.08 0.73 0.09***
Further education 0.01 0.08 0.70 0.09***
16-29 years old 0.00 0.08 0.73 0.09***
30-49 years old 0.00 0.08 0.75 0.08***
50-64 years old 0.00 0.08 0.73 0.08***
above 65 years 0.00 0.08 0.75 0.08***
1st quartile income 0.00 0.08 0.73 0.08***
2nd quartile income 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.08***
3rd quartile income 0.00 0.08 0.73 0.09***
4th quartile income 0.00 0.08 0.73 0.09***
Work full-time 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.08***
Unemployed 0.00 0.08 0.77 0.08***
Self employed 0.00 0.08 0.71 0.09***
Farmers 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.08***
Office employees 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.08***
Skilled manual workers 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.08***
Other manual workers 0.00 0.08 0.77 0.08***
Total worker 0.00 0.08 0.75 0.08***
Other occupations 0.00 0.08 0.73 0.08***
Work part-time 0.00 0.08 0.74 0.08***
*** indicate statistical significance at 1 percent level. All data concern Germany. Converted inflation
expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI) are taken from the Bundesbank. The data
cover the time period from the second quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.16: Bachelor and Orr’s conversion method: full information rationality
test: serial correlation
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ρ̂1 SE ρ̂2 SE ρ̂3 SE ρ̂4 SE
Full sample 1.11 0.19*** -0.34 0.20 0.18 0.26 -0.42 0.21**
Male 1.10 0.19*** -0.34 0.20 0.17 0.26 -0.41 0.21**
Female 1.13 0.19*** -0.34 0.20 0.18 0.26 -0.43 0.21**
Primary education 1.16 0.20*** -0.37 0.21* 0.18 0.26 -0.43 0.21**
Secondary education 0.99 0.19*** -0.29 0.20 0.17 0.26 -0.40 0.21*
Further education 1.08 0.19*** -0.31 0.20 0.20 0.25 -0.45 0.20**
16-29 years old 1.00 0.19*** -0.28 0.20 0.18 0.25 -0.43 0.20**
30-49 years old 1.18 0.20*** -0.38 0.21* 0.18 0.26 -0.43 0.21**
50-64 years old 1.14 0.19*** -0.34 0.20* 0.16 0.25 -0.41 0.20**
above 65 years 1.19 0.19*** -0.36 0.20* 0.16 0.24 -0.43 0.20**
1st quartile income 1.26 0.20*** -0.38 0.21* 0.17 0.27 -0.46 0.21**
2nd quartile income 1.17 0.19*** -0.37 0.20* 0.18 0.25 -0.42 0.20**
3rd quartile income 1.11 0.19*** -0.35 0.20* 0.19 0.25 -0.43 0.20**
4th quartile income 1.06 0.19*** -0.32 0.20 0.16 0.25 -0.40 0.20**
Work full-time 1.10 0.19*** -0.34 0.20* 0.18 0.26 -0.42 0.21**
Unemployed 1.39 0.21*** -0.36 0.22 0.00 0.28 -0.37 0.22
Self employed 0.97 0.19*** -0.34 0.21 0.20 0.26 -0.37 0.21*
Farmers 1.16 0.19*** -0.34 0.20 0.04 0.26 -0.31 0.21
Office employees 1.07 0.19*** -0.31 0.20 0.17 0.25 -0.42 0.20**
Skilled manual workers 1.17 0.20*** -0.40 0.21* 0.21 0.26 -0.43 0.21**
Other manual workers 1.38 0.21*** -0.39 0.22* 0.19 0.28 -0.52 0.22**
Total worker 1.20 0.20*** -0.39 0.21* 0.20 0.26 -0.44 0.21**
Other occupations 1.11 0.19*** -0.33 0.20 0.17 0.25 -0.43 0.20**
Work part-time 1.19 0.20*** -0.32 0.21 0.21 0.27 -0.52 0.21**
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All data concern
Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI) are taken from
the Bundesbank. The data cover the time period from the second quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16-29 years old 0.56
30-49 years old 0.63
50-64 years old 0.59
above 65 years 0.57
1st quartile income 0.65
2nd quartile income 0.59
3rd quartile income 0.58






Skilled manual workers 0.63




All data concern Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate
(CPI) are taken from the Bundesbank. Data for professional forecasters are taken from Consensus
Economics. The data cover the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.







i,t−1 + τ t
α̂1 SE α̂2 SE Adj. R
2 p-value
Full sample 0.29 0.10*** 0.69 0.14*** 0.96 0.71
Male 0.30 0.09*** 0.67 0.14*** 0.96 0.66
Female 0.28 0.10*** 0.70 0.14*** 0.96 0.76
Primary education 0.29 0.10*** 0.69 0.14*** 0.96 0.70
Secondary education 0.29 0.09*** 0.70 0.13*** 0.96 0.78
Further education 0.31 0.10*** 0.67 0.15*** 0.96 0.67
16-29 years old 0.33 0.08*** 0.64 0.12*** 0.97 0.54
30-49 years old 0.32 0.08*** 0.65 0.12*** 0.96 0.56
50-64 years old 0.27 0.10*** 0.71 0.15*** 0.96 0.78
above 65 years 0.23 0.11** 0.76 0.15*** 0.96 0.89
1st quartile income 0.30 0.11*** 0.68 0.16*** 0.95 0.70
2nd quartile income 0.28 0.10*** 0.70 0.14*** 0.96 0.74
3rd quartile income 0.31 0.11*** 0.67 0.15*** 0.96 0.65
4th quartile income 0.29 0.09*** 0.69 0.13*** 0.97 0.69
Work full-time 0.31 0.09*** 0.67 0.13*** 0.96 0.62
Unemployed 0.30 0.09*** 0.68 0.14*** 0.94 0.70
Self employed 0.30 0.08*** 0.69 0.12*** 0.96 0.72
Farmers 0.38 0.09*** 0.57 0.14*** 0.95 0.40
Office employees 0.30 0.09*** 0.68 0.13*** 0.96 0.68
Skilled manual workers 0.33 0.10*** 0.64 0.14*** 0.96 0.60
Other manual workers 0.34 0.07*** 0.62 0.11*** 0.95 0.37
Total worker 0.33 0.09*** 0.63 0.13*** 0.96 0.53
Other occupations 0.27 0.10*** 0.72 0.15*** 0.96 0.77
Work part-time 0.31 0.09*** 0.67 0.13*** 0.96 0.63
All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using a Newey-West procedure
with four lags. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. All
data concern Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI)
are taken from the Bundesbank. Data for professional forecasters are taken from Consensus Economics.
The data cover the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.20: Bachelor and Orr’s conversion method: delayed-information ratio-
nality test: baseline model
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4piei,t = β1piet−1 + β2 4 piProt + β3piProt−1 + φt
β̂1 SE β̂2 SE β̂3 SE Long p-value
Full sample -0.19 0.10* 0.42 0.15*** 0.20 0.09** 1.02 0.56
Male -0.21 0.10** 0.40 0.15*** 0.21 0.09** 1.01 0.66
Female -0.18 0.10* 0.43 0.15*** 0.19 0.09** 1.04 0.44
Primary education -0.19 0.10* 0.40 0.16** 0.20 0.09** 1.02 0.57
Secondary education -0.19 0.10* 0.43 0.15*** 0.20 0.09** 1.04 0.57
Further education -0.23 0.10** 0.42 0.15*** 0.23 0.09** 1.00 0.39
16-29 years old -0.26 0.10** 0.36 0.14** 0.26 0.09*** 0.97 0.15
30-49 years old -0.23 0.10** 0.44 0.15*** 0.23 0.09** 0.98 0.30
50-64 years old -0.17 0.10* 0.40 0.16** 0.18 0.09** 1.05 0.71
above 65 years -0.14 0.10 0.40 0.16** 0.15 0.09* 1.10 0.95
1st quartile income -0.18 0.10* 0.42 0.17** 0.19 0.09** 1.04 0.69
2nd quartile income -0.21 0.10** 0.36 0.16** 0.21 0.09** 1.02 0.49
3rd quartile income -0.18 0.10* 0.44 0.15*** 0.19 0.09** 1.02 0.58
4th quartile income -0.17 0.10* 0.46 0.14*** 0.18 0.09* 1.02 0.62
Work full-time -0.21 0.10** 0.43 0.15*** 0.21 0.09** 1.00 0.37
Unemployed -0.20 0.10** 0.46 0.18** 0.21 0.09** 1.03 0.79
Self employed -0.22 0.10** 0.43 0.15*** 0.22 0.09** 1.01 0.32
Farmers -0.35 0.11*** 0.30 0.17* 0.32 0.10*** 0.93 0.04
Office employees -0.19 0.10* 0.45 0.14*** 0.19 0.09** 1.02 0.57
Skilled manual workers -0.25 0.10** 0.39 0.16** 0.24 0.09** 0.98 0.30
Other manual workers -0.31 0.10*** 0.44 0.16** 0.28 0.09*** 0.91 0.07
Total worker -0.26 0.10** 0.40 0.16** 0.25 0.09*** 0.96 0.20
Other occupations -0.16 0.10* 0.39 0.15** 0.17 0.09* 1.06 0.76
Work part-time -0.23 0.10** 0.41 0.16** 0.23 0.09** 0.98 0.32
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance to the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. All data concern
Germany. Converted inflation expectation data are used. Data for the inflation rate (CPI) are taken from
the Bundesbank. Data for professional forecasters are taken from Consensus Economics. The data cover
the time period from the first quarter 1990 to the second quarter 2008.
Table 2.21: Bachelor and Orr’s conversion method: delayed-information ratio-
nality test: error-correction model
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Chapter 3
Information Stickiness and the
Influence of News on
Expectation Accuracy
3.1 Introduction
Two kinds of models that include agents with staggered information updat-
ing are used for monetary economic analysis. These models are rational-
inattention and sticky-information models (e.g. Mankiw and Reis 2002, Sims
2003, Moscarini 2004, Reis 2006a, Reis 2006b, and Mackowiak and Wieder-
holt 2009). Agents in these models do not collect perfect information in every
period. One reason for this staggered updating behavior is that information
gathering, filtering, and processing is costly. The higher the cost of informa-
tion, the less often will agents update their information set. A hypothesis that
can be derived from these models is that news coverage and forecast accuracy
are positive correlated. The idea is as follows: the more news, the less time
have to be spend to find the information, therefore the lower information cost,
the more often agents update, the better the forecast. The aim of this essay
is to test the hypothesis of a negative correlation between news coverage and
forecast deviation, as an inverse measure of forecast accuracy.1 This is done
with respect to inflation forecasts and unemployment forecasts.
This essay analyzes the influence of the amount of news in U.S. newspa-
1This essay is based on Goecke (2011a).
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pers on the differences between expectations of consumers and professional
forecasters. Consumers’ forecast deviation is measured as the absolute devia-
tion of professionals’ and consumers’ forecasts. High forecast accuracy is given
by a low forecast deviation. The effect of the amount of news about inflation
in a given year on quarterly inflation forecast accuracy has been tested by
Carroll (2003) using his microfoundation of sticky-information models.2 This
essay contributes to the literature by extending the existing analysis in several
respects.3 First, I examine whether the correlation between news and con-
sumers’ inflation forecast accuracy is unique to inflation or whether it exists
also a correlation between news about unemployment and consumers’ unem-
ployment accuracy. Second, my approach does not have a timing problem with
respect to data measurement as in the analysis by Carroll (2003). The tim-
ing problem occurs by the fact that Carroll explains, at least partly, current
forecast differences by the amount of news articles in the future. I get rid of
the problem by measuring the amount of news as rolling windows. To check
the robustness of the results, the analysis is done for the representative U.S.
consumer on a yearly, quarterly, and monthly basis and also for different sub-
groups. In addition to that I also check for other variables that could influence
forecast accuracy like macroeconomic variables, major events, and elections.
A further contribution to the existing literature is that inflation news is
represented in this essay not only by an index news variable that measures
the relative amount of news but also by the absolute amount of news. By
measuring news as absolute data, it is possible to give economic interpretation
about by how much the average forecast accuracy tends to improve if one more
article about the associated macroeconomic variable is published.
2For another approach of a microfoundation of sticky-information models see Reis
(2006b).
3Previous studies in this area that differ from Carroll’s and my analysis are as follows:
Doms and Morin (2004) measure news coverage by the amount of U.S. newspaper articles
that deal with recessions and find that consumers update their expectations more frequently
during times of high news coverage. Badarinza and Buchmann (2009) use European data and
show that consumers’ forecast improve during times of high news coverage. Maag and Lamla
(2009) use German data in a Bayesian learning model and they find no influence of news
coverage on German consumer forecast accuracy. Roos (2007) finds a positive correlation
between news coverage and forecast accuracy based on a survey among German students.
Abel et al. (2007) show that information costs lead to inattention in a stock market context.
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The results show that consumers’ inflation forecast of the representative
U.S. consumer is closer to professionals’ forecast if more news about inflation
is printed in newspapers. This result does not change in almost all robustness
checks. But the effect vanishes partly in a micro analysis. The gap between
consumers’ and professionals’ inflation forecasts is reduced by approximately
one average absolute forecast error if one more newspaper article is published
each day. The correlation between news about unemployment and unem-
ployment forecast deviation has the opposite sign as predicted by the theory.
The results concerning unemployment indicate a positive effect of news about
unemployment on unemployment forecast deviation. Thus, the theoretical
prediction of a negative correlation between the amount of news and forecast
deviation occurs for inflation but the opposite correlation emerges in the case
of unemployment.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 deals with
the impact of news on forecast accuracy that would be expected theoretically.
Section 3.3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 3.4 presents em-
pirical results. Finally Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model of News Coverage and Forecast Accuracy
Rational-inattention models predict a positive correlation between news cover-
age and forecast accuracy. In these models agents do not update their expec-
tations correctly because of noisy information. They choose the precision of
information but filtering the noise is costly. Concerning the influence of news
coverage on forecast accuracy, Sims (2005) mentioned:
”If there are enough other semi-public filterers of monetary
news (TV, newspapers, investment clubs, lunchtable conversation),
the signal processing noise in them may partially cancel out at the
aggregate level...” (p. 21)
meaning that more filterers lead to less signal noise and therefore in an
improved forecast accuracy. Therefore, I conclude that the concept of rational
inattention predicts a positive correlation between news coverage and forecast
accuracy.
Another model that predicts a positive correlation between news cover-
age and forecast accuracy that this essay follows mainly is the one of sticky
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information in the seminal paper of Mankiw and Reis (2002). In the sticky-
information literature agents do not have correct forecasts in every period
because they do not update their information set in each period. They update
only sporadically because of costly information. Recently, a growing literature
emerges using the idea of sticky information (e.g. Mankiw and Reis 2007,
Do¨pke et al. 2008a, Coibion 2010, Dixon and Kara 2010, Dupor et al. 2010,
Korenok et al. 2010). The probability of updating is given exogenously in
the simplest version of these sticky-information models. In more sophisticated
models, the probability of updating depends negatively on the cost of plan-
ning. Part of these cost occurs due to acquiring, absorbing, and processing
information (see Reis 2006b). Agents have to spend time finding information,
for example. If more news is available, information cost decreases because
of falling search cost. Agents have to spend less time on getting information
about inflation if the information is in a leading article on the front page of
a newspaper in comparison to a small article in the business section. Agents
update more often with falling information cost, therefore forecast accuracy
improves with more information. Thus, sticky-information models also predict
a positive correlation between news coverage and forecast accuracy.
The aim of this essay is to test the hypothesis of a positive correlation
between news coverage and forecast accuracy as predicted by the theory.
Carroll (2003) tests the hypothesis that more news coverage and better
forecasts should be correlated with the following equation:4
pidevt = α1 + α2pi
News
t + εt, (3.1)
where piNewst represents the amount of articles concerning inflation and pi
dev
t de-
notes the inflation forecast deviation between professionals piProt and consumers
piCont . The forecast deviation, as an inverse measure of forecast accuracy, is
calculated in this essay by:
pidevt = |piProt − piCont |
3.2.1 Carroll’s Timing Problem
Carroll (2003) analyzes equation (3.1) and finds the estimator of the constant
α̂1 to be significantly positive and that the amount of news concerning inflation
4For a justification of this specification see Appendix 3.A.
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has a significantly negative influence on the level of inflation forecast deviation
for the representative U.S. consumer. One innovation in this analysis is a
robustness check of Carroll’s results that has to be made because of a timing
problem in Carroll’s analysis. The timing problem occurs as follows: he uses
the amount of inflation news in a total year to explain the inflation expectations
of consumers in each quarter of the same year. This implicitly assumes that the
amount of news at the end of the year also influences consumer’s expectations
built in the first quarter. To me, this seems to be unreasonable.5 I measure the
amount of news as rolling windows. The rolling windows are constructed in a
way that the news variable measures the number of articles that are available
at the time the forecast is made. Furthermore, I check the robustness of the
results by measuring news more precisely on a yearly, quarterly, and monthly
basis. So that for example, measuring news on a quarterly basis means that
the news variable contains information about the current month, in that the
forecast deviation pidevt is measured, and the two previous months. These three
months do not have to be equal to the quarters of a year as shown graphically
in Figure 3.1.
With this approach I check whether Carroll’s results can be confirmed or
not. Therefore I change equation (3.1) by explicitly using different frequencies.
I measure the amount of news in the last year by counting the number of
articles about news in the last twelve month (piNews,12mt ), in the last quarter by
using the last three month (piNews,3mt ), and monthly (pi
News,1m
t ). The forecast
deviation is measured on a quarterly (pidev,qt ) or monthly (pi
dev,m
t ) basis. I
analyze the following equations,
pidev,qt = α1 + α2pi
News,12m
t + εt, (3.2)
pidev,qt = α1 + α2pi
News,3m
t + εt, (3.3)
pidev,mt = α1 + α2pi
News,1m
t + εt, (3.4)
3.2.2 News Coverage and Unemployment Forecasts
The basic idea of the theory is that in times of higher news coverage the cost of
producing good forecasts is lower for consumers. This should hold in general
5Carroll (2001) discusses the timing problem of his model with respect to the influence
of professionals’ inflation forecasts on consumers’ inflation forecast but not with respect to
the influence of news coverage on forecast accuracy.
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Figure 3.1: Quarterly rolling windows
and not only for inflation forecasts. Thus, I apply this idea to unemployment.
I test the impact of unemployment news coverage on unemployment forecast
accuracy. To test this, a similar analysis as explained in the previous section
is done for news coverage and expectations about unemployment, using the
following equation to take into account once again the timing issue:
udev,qt = β1 + β2u
News,12m
t + τ t, (3.5)
udev,qt = β1 + β2u
News,3m
t + τ t, (3.6)
udev,mt = β1 + β2u
News,1m
t + τ t, (3.7)
where udevt is the deviation between consumers’ and professionals’ forecast
about the future unemployment rate and uNewst represents the amount of arti-
cles concerning unemployment.
3.2.3 Evidence at the Micro Level
A further robustness check of Carroll’s results is done by taking into account
the correlation between news coverage and forecast accuracy on a disaggre-
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gated level. The importance of an analysis about the effect of news on con-
sumers’ inflation forecasts on a micro level is presented by Carrillo and Emran
(2011). They show that news about inflation influences consumers’ price ex-
pectations but the effect is stronger for specific demographic groups than for
others. Therefore, I split up the data into different demographic groups. These
groups are constructed using gender, education (low; middle; high), age (under
34 years; 35-53 years; above 53 years), and income (first; second; third; fourth
quartile).6
3.2.4 Influence of Macroeconomic Data, Major Events,
and Elections
The next innovation is to extend the analysis by taking into account other vari-
ables that could influence forecast accuracy, beside the effect of news coverage:
macroeconomic data, major events, and elections.
If agents forecast a macroeconomic variable, past and current values of this
variable itself and other variables that influence the variable of interest could
have an effect on the variable and therefore on the forecast and possibly on
forecast accuracy. In the case of inflation I check for lagged inflation, the unem-
ployment growth rate, and the current and lagged growth rate of a monetary
aggregate. I do not take into account the current inflation rate because of pos-
sible multicollinearity that may occur based on the high correlation between
current and lagged inflation.
Concerning the effect of major events on forecast accuracy, Eisensee and
Stro¨mberg (2007) show that major events, like Olympic Games and Football
World Cups, crowd out other news. This suggests that forecast accuracy could
be worse in times of major events because news coverage concerning other
topics should be lower and the attention of agents is pointed to the major
events. The equations that are estimated will also incorporate an interaction
term of major events and news to take into account interaction effects.
Considering national elections, Berlemann and Elzemann (2006) show that
a link between inflation forecasts and election outcome expectations exists.
Furthermore, Roos (2005) shows that before national elections the influence
6Individuals with no high school diploma belong to the least educated group, individuals
with high school diploma but without a college degree belong to the education group of the
middle category, and individuals with a college degree belong to the most educated group.
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of professionals on consumers’ expectations is higher than during other times.
The idea is that consumers pay more attention to professional forecasts before
elections.
Furthermore I also take into account the lagged forecast deviation. There-
fore the equation that will be used to test the effect of inflation news by
including all the above-mentioned variables changes to:
pidevt =α1 + α2pi
News




+ α5pit−1 + α6∆ut
+ α7Electiont+1 + α8∆M1t + α9∆M1t−1 + α10pidevt−1 + εt,
(3.8)
where ME is a dummy for major events (the dummy is one if there is a Football
World Cup tournament or Olympic Games, otherwise zero), pit−1 is the lagged
annual inflation rate (based on the comparison between the consumer price
level in a specific month and the consumer price level in the same month
in the previous year), ∆ut is the unemployment growth rate, Election is a
dummy for a presidential election (one if there is an election, otherwise zero),
and ∆M1 represents the growth rate of the monetary aggregate M1.
To test for variables that could influence the forecast accuracy of unemploy-
ment I include a variable for major events and the corresponding interaction
term, an election variable, the change in the unemployment rate, and a mea-
sure based on the OECD leading indicator. I include the change in the unem-
ployment rate because a more volatile unemployment rate may induce higher
forecast deviation. The OECD variable is included to check for economic ac-
tivity. Thus the following equation will be used for the unemployment case:
udevt =β1u
News





+ β5∆ut + β6∆ut−1 + β7OECDt + β8OECDt−1 + τ t,
(3.9)
where all variables are defined as above and OECD measures the economic
activity. This equation is estimated by an ordered logistic regression because
the depending variable is a discrete variable with three outcomes that have a
natural order.7
7udevt is measured as the difference between professionals’ and consumers’ unemployment
forecast. Professionals’ unemployment forecast is available as quantitative data but con-
sumers’ unemployment forecast is only available as qualitative data. Therefore it is not
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3.3 Data
To answer the question whether and in what direction the amount of news
influences the deviation between consumers’ and professionals’ forecasts con-
cerning inflation and unemployment, three variables are needed: a measure
for the amount of news, consumers’ forecasts, and professionals’ forecast. All
variables are needed with respect to inflation and unemployment.
3.3.1 Inflation Data
A news index is calculated as a measure for the amount of news about inflation
following Carroll (2003). The news index is based on the amount of inflation
news on the front page of the New York Times and the Washington Post. All
articles from these two newspapers are available via the database LexisNexis
from January 1980 onwards on a daily basis. All other newspapers would
lead to shorter samples. To calculate the news coverage variable I search for
articles that are printed on the front page and that include the word root
”inflation”. Thus it is searched for ”inflation” and for example ”inflationary”
as well. Carroll counts the number of inflation news articles in each newspaper
for each year. He calculates a news index by dividing the amount of inflation
news articles in each year by the maximum number of news articles in any
year. This index is calculated for both newspapers. Finally, both individual
indices are aggregated into one news index by calculating the mean of both
indices. This index is used for his analysis.
I calculate the news variable as rolling windows. The amount of news
measured on a yearly basis is not as in Carroll’s case the amount of news in
the current year but the amount of news in the previous twelve months. I also
calculate the news variable more precisely on a quarterly and monthly basis.
Otherwise, the news index variables are calculated using the method described
above.
Professional forecasts for inflation over the next 12 month are taken from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (hereafter SPF). The SPF has been
conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia on a quarterly basis
possible to calculate an unemployment deviation without any rescaling. Details about the
calculation of the unemployment deviation as discrete variable with three outcomes are
presented in Section 3.3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Inflation and news index
since the third quarter of 1981. The questionnaire is distributed just after
the middle of the second month of each quarter and has to be answered in
the following couple of weeks. The mean of the one-year-ahead forecasts for
consumer prices is used as professionals’ inflation expectation.
The last variable that is needed for the inflation analysis is consumers’
inflation expectations for the next 12 months. To calculate consumers’ ex-
pectations, micro data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers is used. The
University of Michigan has conducted the consumer survey on a monthly basis
since January 1978. One question in the survey asks how much inflation the
respondent expects over the next year.8 After data correction, the means of the
answers from the total sample, which is weighted in a way that is equal to the
representative U.S. consumer, is used as inflation expectation of consumers.9
For illustrative purposes, Figure 3.2 presents the inflation rate and the news
8The exact wording of the question is: ”During the next 12 month, do you think that
prices in general will go up, or go down, or stay where they are now?” The majority of the
respondents answer ”go up”. If the respondents expect the prices to go up/down, they are
asked: ”By about what percent do you expect prices to go (up/down) on the average, during
the next 12 month?”
9Details of the data correction are presented in Appendix 3.B.
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Figure 3.3: Consumers’ and professionals’ inflation forecasts
index on a quarterly basis over time. The graph indicates that the amount of
news decreases over time. The inflation rate varies strongly due to the recession
at the end of the sample period. Figure 3.3 illustrates quarterly consumers’
and professionals’ forecasts over time. The graph shows that consumers’ fore-
casts are most of the time higher than professionals’ forecasts. Both forecasts
move closely together until the end of the 1980’s. After 1990 the gap between
both time series gets bigger. In 2009 the biggest deviation occurs during the
recession.
3.3.2 Unemployment Data
The variable that accounts for the amount of news that deals with unemploy-
ment is calculated similarly to the one of inflation news coverage. An index
variable is calculated based on the amount of articles that are printed on the
front page that include the word ”unemployment” in the New York Times
and the Washington Post during the same time horizon. The index is once
again calculated on a yearly, quarterly, and monthly basis by using the method
of rolling windows. The quarterly news index concerning unemployment and
the U.S. unemployment rate over time are shown in Figure 3.4. The figure
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Figure 3.4: U.S. unemployment and news index
indicates a high correlation between these two variables.
Professional forecasts for the unemployment rate over the next 12 month are
again taken from the SPF. Consumers’ forecasts are taken from the Michigan
Survey of Consumers. Unfortunately, consumers are only asked about their
expected direction of the evolution of the unemployment rate and they are
not asked for a quantitative forecast.10 To analyze the effect of news coverage
on the unemployment forecast accuracy, I take the consumer forecasts from
the survey so that the variable consists of values ”more”, ”about the same”,
and ”less”. To compare both variables, I rescale the professionals’ forecast by
comparing their current forecast with the current value of unemployment. If
their current forecast of the unemployment rate in 12 months uet is more than
one fourth of the standard deviation of unemployment σu above the current
value ut, the forecast is scaled as ”more”.
11 If their forecast is more than one
10The exact wording of the question is: ”How about people out of work during the coming
12 months–do you think that there will be more unemployment than now, about the same,
or less?”
11The quantitative professional forecast deviation from the current unemployment rate is
low therefore the threshold is chosen in the way described above to receive variation in the
resulting variable.
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fourth of the standard deviation of unemployment below the current value, the
forecast is scaled as ”less”. In all other cases forecasts are rescaled as ”about
the same”:12
”more”, if uet − ut> 0.25 · σu
”about the same” if − 0.25 · σu<uet − ut < 0.25 · σu
”less” , if uet − ut>−0.25 · σu
Afterwards a dummy udevt is calculated that indicates whether consumer and
professionals expect the same evolution of unemployment. If they forecast the
same, the dummy is zero. If they forecast the opposite (”more” vs. ”less”), the
dummy is two and otherwise one. The dummy variable udevt is the dependent
variable.
3.4 Estimation Results
The time horizon of the analysis ranges from the second quarter of 1982 to the
first quarter of 2010. Following the argumentation in Section 3.2, a negative
relationship between the amount of news and the deviation between consumers’
and professionals’ forecasts would be expected. The results of inflation forecast
deviation with different timing and based on the calculation of the independent
variables as rolling windows are presented in Table 3.1.
The results show indeed a clear finding in favor of the hypothesis that
inflation news influences inflation forecast deviation negatively. All estimated
coefficients of the influence of news are statistically significantly different from
zero and negative. This result is independent of the time choice of the news
variable and in this specification the timing problem does not occur because
the variable in this essay is measured as rolling windows.
Because of the index structure of the news variable, it is not possible to
get a proper economic interpretation of the estimated coefficients. To have the
possibility of an economic interpretation, I also use the total number of news
articles in this context in addition to the index value. The results are presented
in Table 3.2. The results show that all estimated coefficients of the influence of
news are once again statistically significantly different from zero and negative.
12The results of the analysis do not change at any significant amount if the threshold is set














Constant 1.50*** 1.41*** 1.23***
(0.20) (0.18) (0.11)
R2 0.28 0.23 0.11
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01







News Year Abs -0.0027***
(0.0005)
News Quarter Abs -0.0089***
(0.0017)
News Month Abs -0.0185***
(0.0032)
Constant 1.4787*** 1.3649*** 1.2253***
(0.1851) (0.1722) (0.1085)
R2 0.26 0.21 0.11
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.2: Effect of news coverage: news measured in absolute terms as rolling
windows and different timing
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The estimators seem to be quite small in magnitude. But the estimated effect
of news on a quarterly basis (−0.0089) indicates that one additional article in
three months, in one of the two newspapers, narrows the forecast gap by 0.0089.
Thus one additional article a day, in one of the newspapers, narrows the gap by
0.89 if it is assumed that a quarter consists of 100 days for simplicity. This is
remarkable because the average forecast deviation is only 0.81. Similar results
occur by using the other two measurements. Thus one additional article a day
reduces the difference between professionals’ and consumers’ inflation forecasts
by about the size of one average absolute forecast error.
As a robustness check I test whether the results also hold on the micro
level. A micro analysis delivers a deeper understanding of the influence of
news with respect to different demographic groups. This approach discovers
whether all demographic groups are affected by news in the same way. The
analysis is done for demographic groups separated by gender, education, age,
and income. Standard errors are presented in parentheses under the estimated
values and the column ”Obs.” in Table 3.3 presents the number of observations
in the respective group over the whole sample period. The results in Table 3.3
indicate that the negative influence of news coverage on forecast deviation does
not hold for all demographic groups. The effect of the amount of news is not
statistically significantly different from zero for men and the rich. A further
result is that the amount of news has a stronger effect on older people (35
years and above) in comparison to younger people. This result is also found
by Carrillo and Emran (2011).
Another robustness check is to take into account macroeconomic variables,
major events, and elections which could influence forecast accuracy in addition
to the effect of news coverage. The theoretical predictions of the different
influences are explained in Section 3.2.4. The results of an OLS regression are
presented in Table 3.4.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 3.4 display the estimation results of
equation (3.8) without the interaction term between major events and news
by using news measured on a yearly basis (Column (1)), on a quarterly basis
(Column (2)), and on a monthly basis (Column (3)). The estimators show,
that the negative influence of news on forecast deviation for all specifications
is still highly statistically significant and negative. Beside the news variable
and the constant, no other variable has explanatory power for the forecast
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pidevi,t = α1 + α2pi
News
t + εt Obs.
α̂1 α̂2
Full sample 1.41*** -2.19*** 152,056
(0.18) (0.43)
Male 0.76*** -0.47 70,167
(0.20) (0.56)
Female 1.67*** -1.45*** 81,889
(0.18) (0.43)
Low education 2.21*** -1.76** 13,822
(0.26) (0.70)
Middle education 1.74*** -2.88*** 79,244
(0.20) (0.48)
High education 0.88*** -1.19** 57,879
(0.17) (0.45)
under 34 years 1.20*** -0.97** 36,074
(0.16) (0.39)
35-53 years old 1.30*** -1.69*** 67,796
(0.17) (0.42)
above 54 years 1.29*** -1.54* 50,797
(0.25) (0.81)
1st Quartile Income 2.03*** -1.79*** 38,107
(0.21) (0.49)
2nd Quartile Income 1.46*** -2.19*** 36,997
(0.21) (0.53)
3rd Quartile Income 0.92*** -1.11** 34,994
(0.17) (0.43)
4th Quartile Income 0.49*** 0.28 32,938
(0.14) (0.42)
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.3: Effect of news coverage: micro level, news measured quarterly as
rolling windows
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Estimated equation: pidevt = α1 + α2pi
News




+ α5pit−1 + α6∆ut +
α7Electiont+1 + α8∆M1t + α9∆M1t−1 + α10pidevt−1 + εt


















News Year -2.10*** -1.95*** -0.65**
(0.55) (0.53) (0.27)
News Quarter -2.17*** -2.00*** -0.82***
(0.58) (0.56) (0.29)
News Month -2.11*** -2.05*** -0.58**
(0.42) (0.42) (0.23)
ME -0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.26 0.35 0.09 -0.00 0.08 -0.25*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.22) (0.25) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.13)
News Year*ME -0.83 0.18
(0.64) (0.52)
News Quarter*ME -0.92 0.12
(0.83) (0.61)
News Month*ME -0.68 0.76
(0.78) (0.51)
pit−1 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
∆ut 0.30 0.41 0.44 0.32 0.42 0.45 0.07 0.01 0.08
(0.26) (0.25) (0.31) (0.27) (0.26) (0.32) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14)
Electiont+1 0.28 0.20 0.15 0.29 0.18 0.14 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07
(0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.21) (0.20) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.08)
∆M1t -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
∆M1t−1 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
pidevt−1 0.65*** 0.67*** 0.74***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.07)
Constant 1.34*** 1.28*** 1.12*** 1.28*** 1.23*** 1.11*** 0.56*** 0.49*** 0.36***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09)
R2 0.35 0.31 0.17 0.35 0.32 0.17 0.59 0.58 0.61
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01







News Year Unemployment 4.25***
(1.36)
News Quarter Unemployment 6.75***
(1.97)
News Month Unemployment 5.69***
(1.05)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.12 0.07
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.5: Effect of unemployment news coverage on unemployment forecast
accuracy
deviation.
Columns (4), (5) and (6) present results for the same analysis but with an
interaction term between major events and news coverage. The basic results
do not change: news coverage still has a negative influence on inflation forecast
deviation.
Columns (7), (8), and (9) consider the results for regressions of news cov-
erage, all other variables used before, and last period’s forecast deviation on
the current deviation by using yearly, quarterly, and monthly measurement
of news coverage. The results show that the previous forecast deviation has a
positive influence on the forecast deviation in the current period for all types of
news measurement. The higher the forecast deviation in the previous period is,
the higher the forecast deviation in the current period. Concerning the effect
of news coverage, the effect on forecast accuracy is still significantly negative.
Also the constants are still statistically significant. Almost all other variables
are statistically insignificant. All in all, the result of a negative influence of
news coverage on forecast deviation appears robust.
The same analysis is done with respect to unemployment. All results are
calculated by using an ordered logistic regression. The ordered logistic regres-
sion is used because the dependent variable is a discrete variable with three
outcomes. Furthermore, the dependent variable has a specific order - the higher
the dependent variable the higher the forecast disagreement. The results from
the estimations of equation (3.5) to equation (3.7) are presented in Table 3.5.
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The results show a positive effect of news coverage about unemployment
on unemployment forecast disagreement. The positive effect occurs indepen-
dently of whether news is measured on a yearly, quarterly, or monthly basis.
The correlation between news about unemployment and forecast deviation
has the opposite sign in comparison to the correlation between news cover-
age about inflation and inflation forecast deviation. In the unemployment
case, more news tends to increase consumers’ forecast deviation. Consumers’
unemployment expectations deviate more from professionals’ unemployment
expectation if more articles about unemployment are printed.
I check the robustness of this result by also taking into account the variables
”major events” and ”elections”. The results, presented in columns (1), (2),
and (3) in Table 3.6, show that the positive effect of news coverage on forecast
deviation remains when taking into account major events and elections.
An explanation for the phenomenon of a positive correlation between news
coverage and forecast deviation could be that articles about unemployment are
printed more often in periods of higher unemployment variance. Forecasts are
more difficult in periods of higher unemployment change and therefore a higher
forecast deviation occurs. To control for this, the current and lagged change of
the unemployment rate are included in the regression. To control also for eco-
nomic activity I include the OECD composite leading indicator. The results,
presented in columns (4), (5), and (6) in Table 3.6, show that the positive effect
of news coverage on forecast disagreement survives if unemployment change
and the OECD indicator are also considered.
There are a couple of possible explanations why more news about unem-
ployment and unemployment forecast deviations are not negatively correlated
as in the inflation case. Forecast deviation is defined as the difference between
consumers’ and professionals’ forecasts. Maybe, in the case of unemployment,
the articles about unemployment do not mention professionals’ forecasts and
therefore a negative correlation cannot occur. A second explanation could be
that consumers feel more familiar with unemployment than inflation. Maybe
consumers read professionals’ forecast but they think they can do a better
unemployment forecast on their own, based on their private information. But
these two explanations only give a hint why there is no negative correlation
between news coverage about unemployment and forecast deviation. Why the
data indicates a positive correlation remains a task for further research.
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News Year Unemployment 3.93*** 6.86***
(1.49) (2.16)
News Quarter Unemployment 5.23*** 5.55**
(2.03) (2.51)
News Month Unemployment 5.19*** 3.65***
(1.10) (1.31)
ME -2.18 -3.62* -1.24 -0.59 -4.23 -0.94
(1.92) (2.01) (1.07) (2.35) (2.64) (1.09)
News Year Unemp*ME 8.09* 3.68
(4.54) (6.03)
News Quarter Unemp*ME 15.03** 16.73**
(6.21) (8.44)
News Month Unemp*ME 8.67** 8.41**
(3.94) (4.08)
Electiont+1 0.70 1.14 -0.09 -0.77 0.71 -0.64
(1.01) (1.18) (0.54) (1.50) (1.55) (0.67)
∆ut 4.29** 3.65** 3.29***
(1.76) (1.75) (1.04)
∆ut−1 -1.20 -1.61 2.42**
(1.65) (1.65) (1.01)
OECDt -0.23 0.19 -0.11
(0.68) (0.64) (0.78)
OECDt−1 0.68 0.14 -0.13
(0.64) (0.57) (0.74)
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.22 0.10 0.22 0.22 0.20
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.6: Effect of unemployment news, major events, elections, unemploy-
ment variance, and economic activity on unemployment forecast accuracy
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All in all, the investigation shows that news coverage concerning inflation
improves forecast accuracy independently of the measurement of the news
variable and independently of the model that is used. The effect vanishes
partly in a micro analysis. Concerning unemployment, the results show that
more news coverage worsens forecast accuracy.
3.5 Conclusion
This essay analyzed the influence of the amount of news in U.S. newspapers
on the differences between expectations of consumers and professionals with
respect to two main macroeconomic variables: inflation and unemployment.
Rational-inattention and sticky-information models predict that news coverage
and forecast deviations are negatively correlated.
In a first step, this analysis is a robustness check of Carroll’s analysis by
using more specific measurement of the variables (rolling windows and differ-
ent timing), by checking the results on a micro level, and by incorporating
macroeconomic variables and the own lagged forecast error. The results show
evidence in favor of Carroll’s finding of a negative correlation between news
coverage and forecast disagreement in the context of inflation. The negative
effect survives in almost all specifications and models. The effect only van-
ishes for men and the rich in a micro analysis. One additional article about
inflation a day reduces the difference between professionals’ and consumers’
inflation forecasts by approximately one average absolute forecast error.
In a second step, the analysis is extended by applying this approach to
data concerning unemployment. The results are different to the one found
with respect to inflation. A rise in the number of articles on unemployment
worsens consumers’ unemployment forecasts. This result holds independently
of the measurement of the news variable. The positive correlation between
news coverage and forecast deviation also remains by controlling for major




Carroll (2003) develops a theoretical model that is based on the idea that
acquiring, absorbing, collecting, and processing information, which is needed
for a rational forecast, is costly for economic agents. But utility gains from
improved forecasts are not infinite.
A good knowledge about the future leads to better choices. With better
knowledge, an individual makes more adequate choices and therefore higher
utility is gained. Thus, an individual should collect and process information
until their marginal cost is equal to their marginal benefits. Inflation expecta-
tions will be formed on a limited but optimally chosen information set. Buiter
(1980) refers to this point by stating:
“In accordance with normal usage in economics, the term ra-
tional (or optimal) expectations ought to be reserved for forecasts
generated by a rational, expected utility maximizing decision pro-
cess in which the costs of acquiring, processing and evaluating ad-
ditional information are balanced against the anticipated benefits
from further refinement of the forecast...” (p. 35).
Such economizing on information may lead agents not to process all avail-
able information to make their forecast. With costly information acquisition
and processing however, a level of inattention and therefore a deviation of the
realized inflation forecasts from the realized inflation in the future is rational.
Thus there are two different kinds of rational forecasts. The first one is
the mathematically rational forecast that is based on all available information.
The second one is the realized rational forecast that is the forecast that is made
by individuals on the basis of, rationally chosen, imperfect information.
In Carroll’s model, agents receive their information from newspaper arti-
cles. The variables of interest in this essay are the deviation of consumers’
inflation forecasts and forecasts written in newspapers with respect to infla-
tion and unemployment.13 Articles in newspapers that contain forecasts are
assumed to depict professionals’ forecasts. Therefore a pool of professionals’
13Both of these forecasts will not be equal to the future value because of shocks.
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forecast is used as proxy for forecasts printed in newspapers. The absolute
deviation between consumers’ and professionals’ forecasts is called forecast
accuracy.
Consumers should assume that forecasts from professional forecasters are
better than their own ones because professionals have experience, are trained
to do forecasts, and spend a lot of time making forecasts whereas standard lay-
men do not. If the predominance of professional forecasts concerning accuracy
holds, consumers should not build forecasts on their own but just adopt the
forecasts of professional forecasters. But there are still costs for the consumer
to get this information. Presumably, consumers therefore do not read and re-
member the forecasts of professionals every period. Some consumers know the
current professional forecast, others not. Consumers that do not adopt cur-
rent professionals’ forecast stick to their own past forecast. Thus, the average
consumer forecast looks as if it follows an autoregressive process.
Empirically, it can be verified that consumers should adopt professionals’
forecast. Forecast errors are calculated by the squared differences between con-
sumer price inflation and the inflation forecasts of professionals and consumers.
The mean of the squared forecast error of U.S. consumers is 2.9 compared with
1.5 for professionals. Consumers’ squared forecast error is almost twice as high
as professionals’ squared error.14 Thus consumers should adopt professionals’
inflation forecasts. Empirically, the influence of professional forecasts and the
autoregressive behavior of consumer forecasts is well documented. Several re-
searchers (among others Carroll 2003, Do¨pke et al. 2008a, and Do¨pke et al.
2008b) have shown empirically that the inflation expectations of consumers
are influenced by professionals’ forecasts and their own past inflation forecast.
Concerning the effect of news on forecast accuracy, Carroll’s approach can
be summarized as follows: The difference between consumers’ forecasts and
professionals’ forecasts is the variable of interest. Consumers receive informa-
tion about the view of professional via the mass media. But there are still
costs for the consumer to get this information by spending time reading the
newspaper, finding the article about inflation and keeping the inflation fore-
cast of professionals in mind. With more news articles, the costs of getting
the information are lower and therefore more individuals adopt professionals’
14It is not possible to compare consumers’ and professionals’ forecast error about unem-
ployment because consumers’ forecasts are qualitative.
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forecasts. The hypothesis from this theory is that the deviation between pro-
fessionals’ and consumers’ forecasts should narrow with a rising amount of
articles. Carroll (2003) writes: “...we should expect that when there are more
news stories people should be better informed...“ (p. 287).
This essay tests empirically if the hypothesis of a positive correlation be-
tween news coverage and forecasts accuracy holds for inflation and unemploy-
ment. High forecast accuracy is given by a low forecast deviation. Thus, news
coverage and forecast deviation are predicted to be negatively correlated. I
calculate the inflation forecast deviation between professionals piProt and con-
sumers piCont by:
pidevt = |piProt − piCont |
The hypothesis whether the level of deviation falls if more inflation news is
available is checked by the following baseline equation:
pidevt = α1 + α2pi
News
t + εt
Where the variable piNewst represents the amount of articles concerning in-
flation.
3.B Data Correction
Consumer data is corrected in the following way. Respondents, whose infla-
tion expectations are smaller than -10 percent or bigger than 50 percent, are
excluded to correct the data for participants that possibly do not understand
the question. This procedure follows the method applied by the University
of Michigan for calculating mean values of the inflation expectations (Curtin
1996). The respondents also have the possibility to answer that they expect
the prices to be unchanged over the next 12 months. If this answer is given,
it is imaginable that respondents are confused between unchanged prices and
unchanged inflation. To take into account this potential misinterpretation,
the people are asked since March 1982 whether their answer ”stay the same”
corresponds to the price level or the growth rate of the price level. Asking this
question reveals that one third to one half of the respondents in each month
that answer ”stay the same”, mean the inflation rate and not the price level.
Without this check the calculated means of the inflation expectation would be
biased. To avoid this problem my analysis starts in March 1982. Finally the
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data is weighted to be representative for the U.S. citizens following again the
methods used by the Michigan University (Curtin 1996).
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Chapter 4
Sticky Prices vs. Sticky
Information - a Cross-Country
Study of Inflation Dynamics
4.1 Introduction
Mankiw and Reis (2002) proposed sticky information as an alternative to the
workhorse of monetary analysis, the sticky-price approach. The basic idea of
sticky information is that information spreads slowly through the economy.
Mankiw and Reis argue that this approach is favorable to the sticky-price ap-
proach because it is able to predict certain empirical observations that cannot
be generated by sticky prices: hump-shaped responses of inflation to monetary
impulses, contractionary disinflations, and the acceleration phenomenon.
Reis (2006b) examines the second-moment performance of the sticky-
information Phillips curve in the otherwise simple Mankiw and Reis (2002)
model. In this model, the sticky-information Phillips curve represents the mon-
etary side of the economy, while the model is closed by exogenous stochastic
processes on the real side. Reis finds that even such a simple sticky-information
model matches selected second moments of US inflation reasonably well.
In this essay, we examine whether the finding of Reis is unique to a sticky-
information model or whether it can also be achieved using a sticky-price
model.1 We contribute to the literature on the horse race between sticky in-
1This essay is based on Bredemeier and Goecke (2011).
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formation and sticky prices methodologically in several respects. While certain
previous studies have focussed on selected properties (e.g. Korenok and Swan-
son 2007, Korenok 2008, Abbott 2010), we take a broader look on inflation
dynamics and consider inflation variance and persistence as well as its relation
to dynamics in demand and supply. Considering only some properties of the
inflation process may be misleading as we find that improving a model’s fit
to e.g. inflation persistence worsens its ability to predict e.g. responses to
demand shocks.
Furthermore we do not only consider US inflation dynamics, but also those
in five more countries, the UK, Germany, France, Canada, and Japan. Our
motivation to take this cross-country perspective is to test whether relative
model performances are country-specific. We find that some moments which
are important for the identification of our two models (predominantly inflation
persistence and its reaction to demand innovations) differ substantially across
countries. It is therefore interesting to evaluate how the models cope with these
differences. The unique cross-country perspective further distinguishes our
study from the existing literature on the horse race between sticky information
and sticky prices.
Finally, we compare the model performances both in moment-based and
likelihood evaluations. Considering the models from both points of view reveals
the interesting fact that, in many cases, one model is supported in the moment-
based evaluation and the other in the likelihood-based comparison. Relying
on only one perspective may therefore be misleading.
We compare the two Phillips curves in the framework of the Mankiw-Reis
model which allows a comparison on a leveled playing field. For a fair compar-
ison, the two Phillips curves should be applied in models which are otherwise
identical. Furthermore, the estimation of the rest of the model should be
separable from the estimation of the Phillips curve. Otherwise, parameter
estimates for the other equations would be influenced by the specific Phillips
curve chosen. The Mankiw-Reis model fulfills these criteria. When we estimate
the models, we make use of the separability of the model and first estimate
the real side of the economy and then the Phillips curves. This ensures that,
when comparing models, both have not only the same equations but also the
same parameter estimates on the real side of the economy and are exposed to
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the same sequence of shocks.2
Although the Mankiw-Reis model is very stylized in the way the model is
closed, it seems sophisticated enough to capture inflation dynamics well. In
our empirical analysis, we can reject equality between moments generated by
the estimated models and empirical moments at 99% significance in only 2%
of the cases.
Our empirical procedure is a simulation-based moment evaluation. We esti-
mate stochastic processes governing the dynamics of the output gap and solve
for inflation as a rational-expectations equilibrium response to innovations in
these variables. For a set of selected second moments of inflation, we generate
distributions of model moments by repeated simulations of the models.
We compare the empirical performance of the two models on the ground of
the absolute difference between model moments and empirical moments, the
number of moments for which equality of empirical and model moment can be
rejected, and the likelihoods of the two models given the empirical moments.
We perform two comparisons of sticky prices and sticky information. In the
first comparison, we regard calibrated versions of the two models, whereas we
consider estimated models in the second comparison.
Our results do not clearly support one of the two competing models. In the
baseline calibration, the models perform similarly in the US, Germany, France,
Canada, and Japan. Only in the UK, sticky information is clearly supported by
the data. Under the estimated parametrization, sticky prices perform slightly
better in the UK and Germany, while sticky information is supported by French
data, and both models perform similarly in the US, Canada, and Japan.
The unique cross-country perspective of our study furthermore reveals that
both models systematically generate very smooth inflation and have difficul-
ties in countries where inflation persistence is relatively low compared to the
US. A similar result is found with respect to cross-correlations which empir-
ically differ from the US observations. The finding of a country-dependent
model performance is a new insight as no previous study in the literature has
compared sticky information and sticky prices in a cross-country perspective.
Our broad view on the inflation process reveals that sticky prices perform
2These features distinguish our work from most previous studies comparing Phillips
curves empirically. For more details on previous comparisons of sticky prices and sticky
information, see the literature overview at the end of this section.
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rather well in matching unconditional moments of the inflation process, while
being less successful with inflation reactions to changes in demand. For sticky
information, we observe a trade-off in the empirical fit. Calibrations which are
successful in generating empirical cross-correlations of inflation with supply
and demand have a worse fit in unconditional moments and vice versa.
To sum up our results, the overall empirical performance allows no clear
distinction between the two concepts. However, if one is predominantly inter-
ested in matching unconditional moments of inflation dynamics, sticky prices
should be used. Researchers who focus on co-movements of inflation with de-
mand may obtain better results applying sticky information. These results
rely on our cross-country perspective since, in the US, model performances are
almost identical.
A number of previous papers have compared sticky prices and sticky infor-
mation empirically for one specific economy. In line with our results, evidence
from the literature is also mixed and does not clearly favor one of the models.
In this literature, Mankiw and Reis (2002), Kiley (2007), and Korenok
(2008) work with similar model approaches than we do, but these studies are
different from ours in other respects. Mankiw and Reis (2002) consider impulse
responses of inflation qualitatively. They conclude that sticky information
matches the shape of observed impulse responses better than sticky prices.
Our study evaluates the empirical performance quantitatively and also targets
unconditional moments of inflation dynamics.
Similarly to the Mankiw-Reis model, Kiley (2007) works in models which
consist of a Phillips curve and reduced-form equations for the rest of the econ-
omy. His evaluations are based on the predictive power of the different Phillips
curves for inflation where expectations that enter the Phillips curves are ob-
tained from a reduced-form system for marginal cost. By contrast, we approach
the inflation process in a broader way also considering higher moments of in-
flation and use model-consistent rational expectations. In the results of Kiley
(2007), the sticky-price model fits better than the sticky-information model.
A modeling strategy similar to ours is used by Korenok (2008) who deter-
mines the rational-expectations solution in a model which consists of a Phillips
curve and an exogenous stochastic process for unit labor costs. His analysis
differs from ours in the estimation method and the focus of the model eval-
uation. Korenok (2008) uses a Bayesian full information likelihood approach
76
and estimates both sides of the model jointly whereas we apply a two-step
procedure. The model evaluation of Korenok (2008) is based on a likelihood
evaluation in a bivariate model with inflation and unit labor costs, while we
also distinguish between the relations to demand and supply, respectively. The
results of Korenok (2008) favor the sticky-price model.
Opposed to our closed-form expectations approach, Coibion (2010), Ciobˆıcaˇ
(2010), and Dupor, Kitamura, and Tsuruga (2010) perform single equation
evaluations of the competing Phillips curves determining the expectation terms
outside the model. Coibion (2010) estimates different Phillips curves with US
data using instruments for the output gap and expectations determined from
VARs or survey data, respectively. He performs two regression-based tests to
compare the competing Phillips curves. In his results, the sticky-information
Phillips curve is statistically dominated by the new Keynesian Phillips curve.
Ciobˆıcaˇ (2010) basically repeats the analysis of Coibion (2010) with Romanian
data and comes to the same conclusion. Dupor et al. (2010) compare sticky
prices and sticky information in a nested model and obtain predicted series of
a real marginal cost measure and inflation from a VAR. They, too, find that
sticky prices dominate sticky information empirically.
A third group of papers compare the different Phillips curves within com-
plete DSGE models. Therein, expectations are rational but the choice of the
Phillips curve affects the estimates for the other parts of the model. Andre´s,
Lo´pez-Salido, and Nelson (2005) use a model without capital accumulation
which, next to the Phillips curve, encompasses an IS relation and equations
for money demand and money growth. They estimate the model using Max-
imum Likelihood for US data. In their estimation results, sticky information
has the higher likelihood.
Korenok and Swanson (2007) use a calibrated DSGE model with different
Phillips curves. They base their model evaluation on impulse response anal-
yses and on evaluating the joint distribution of inflation and the output gap.
They find that, for a standard level of stickiness, the sticky-information model
performs better than the standard sticky-price model.
Abbott (2010) uses the same model as Korenok and Swanson (2007) and fo-
cuses on the reaction of inflation to monetary innovations. The results confirm
the results of Korenok and Swanson (2007) and also support sticky information
relative to the standard sticky-price model.
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Paustian and Pytlarczyk (2006) consider sticky-price and sticky-
information variants of the Smets and Wouters (2003) DSGE model which
they estimate with Bayesian techniques for the Euro Area. Based on the pos-
terior odds ratio, they conclude that the sticky-price model dominates the
sticky-information model.
Laforte (2007) considers sticky-price and sticky-information pricing in a
smaller DSGE model which he estimates with Bayesian techniques for US
data. In his results, sticky information has the higher posterior odds than
sticky prices.
Some studies also allow for lags of inflation in the Phillips curves. It can
be summarized as a general result, that, when allowing for lags, a sticky-price
Phillips curve with sufficiently many lags of inflation fits best (see e.g. Kiley
2007, Korenok and Swanson 2007, and Abbott 2010) although there is often
no sticky-information Phillips curve with backward-looking parts included in
the comparisons. Kiley (2007) and Dupor et al. (2010) also allow for combina-
tions of sticky prices and sticky information which dominate the pure versions
further confirming the impression that both concepts have empirical support.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents
models and our empirical strategy. The results of the analysis can be found in
Section 4.3. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Models and Empirical Strategy
4.2.1 Models
Phillips curves. We compare the concepts of sticky information and sticky
prices which result in different Phillips curves. For the following empirical
analysis, we use only the two Phillips curves and close the models identically
in the simple way proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002).






yt + Etpit+1, (4.1)
where pit denotes inflation, yt is the log output gap and Et is the expectations
operator based on the information set of period t.3 The parameter α is a
measure of real rigidities that measures the dependency of an individual firm’s
3This particular form of the Phillips curve results from the sticky-price model used in
78
optimal price on the output gap. The parameter λ denotes the fraction of
prices changed in every period and is a measure of nominal rigidity.









(1− λ)j Et−1−j (pit + α∆yt) , (4.2)
where ∆ is the difference operator, i.e. ∆yt = yt−yt−1. Here, λ is a measure of
price rigidity which measures the fraction of firms receiving new information
in each period.
The main difference between the two Phillips curves (4.1) and (4.2) is
the presence of different expectation terms. As equation (4.1) states, in the
sticky-price model, inflation depends on current expectations of future inflation
because this is the information used by firms that currently change prices. The
sticky-information Phillips curve (4.2) contains all past expectations of current
inflation reflecting that a fraction of firms change prices based on obsolete
information of different age.
Closing the Models. A Phillips curve represents a relationship between
two endogenous variables, inflation pit and the log output gap yt. In order to
close the model, a second relationship between these two variables is needed.
Assuming that natural output is equal to labor productivity, the log output
gap yt can be written as
yt = mt − pt − at,
where mt is log nominal income, pt is the log price level, and at is the log labor
productivity. We follow the empirical analysis of Mankiw and Reis (2002), Reis
(2006b), and Mankiw and Reis (2011) and use their assumptions regarding mt
and at: we assume that these variables are exogenous to inflation and that
they follow independent stochastic processes.
While Reis (2006b) finds that first-order auto-regressive processes are suf-
ficient for quarterly US data, processes of higher order describe the growth
rates of nominal income and productivity in other countries more adequately.
We therefore allow the growth rates ∆at and ∆mt to follow auto-regressive
processes of up to order eight. Given such processes, we write ∆mt and ∆at
Mankiw and Reis (2002). Similarly, the following sticky-information Phillips curve stems
from the same paper.
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While assuming that productivity follows an exogenous stochastic process as
in (4.3) is standard in the literature, assuming this also for nominal income is
rather unusual. Mankiw and Reis (2011) justify this assumption by describing
how monetary policy can ensure that nominal income follows such a process.
Throughout the model, we will refer to ∆m and ∆a as changes in demand and
supply, respectively.
Modeling the dynamics of nominal income and productivity in this way
implies ignoring any structural relationships governing these dynamics. How-
ever, estimating (4.4) captures any structure in the data which does not in-
clude feedback from inflation to nominal income. Structural relations that are
missed by the assumptions (4.3) and (4.4) are missed in both models equally.
Furthermore, our modeling strategy ensures that the model can be estimated
recursively and hence the choice of the Phillips curve does not influence esti-
mates for other equations of the model. The Mankiw-Reis model seems sophis-
ticated enough to capture inflation dynamics well. In our empirical analysis,
we can reject equality between moments generated by the estimated models
and empirical moments at 99% significance in only 2% of the cases.
Solving the Models. Both, the sticky-information model (SI) and the
sticky-price model (SP), consist of a Phillips curve and the exogenous stochas-
tic processes for nominal income and productivity growth described above.
Shocks to ∆mt and ∆at are thus the only driving forces for dynamics in the
models. The solution for inflation is a moving average of past shocks to nom-












where z = SI, SP . We solve for the coefficients γSIi and ξ
SI





respectively, using the method of undetermined coefficients, see Appendix 4.A.
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4.2.2 Empirical Strategy
Our first empirical analysis starts from the empirical exercise reported in Reis
(2006b). He considers the Mankiw and Reis (2002) model with sticky infor-
mation for the U.S., i.e. the model consists of equations (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4)
where the parameters in (4.3) are such that the process is white noise and
(4.4) is AR(1). He determines a sequence of model-predicted inflation rates by
combining the estimated empirical innovations to nominal income and produc-
tivity with the MA coefficients of inflation (4.5) for a chosen parametrization
α = 0.11 and λ = 0.25. He calculates the second moments of this sequence and
compares them to the empirically observed counterparts. His informal judge-
ment about the accuracy of the model is based on the absolute differences
between empirical and model moments.
The quantitative analysis of Reis is augmented in several respects in this es-
say. First, we consider five more countries, the UK, Germany, France, Canada,
and Japan. Second, we also consider a sticky-price Phillips curve and compare
the two concepts. We third extend the analysis methodologically by com-
paring not only absolute deviations between model moments and empirical
observations but also evaluating the statistical properties of these differences.
We generate a distribution of model moments by repeated simulation. Using
this distribution, we perform a t-test of significant difference to the empirical
moments for each model moment. Furthermore, we evaluate the likelihoods
of the two models as the joint density of the empirical moments in the joint
distribution of model moments. We determine the probability distribution of
the empirical moments by a bootstrapping method.
In the empirical analysis, we simulate the model on a quarterly basis as
described in the previous section but evaluate the dynamics of annual changes,
i.e. we target the dynamics of ∆4pt = pt − pt−4.4 The reason to use annual
changes lies in potential measurement errors in quarterly seasonally adjusted
data which are extenuated by considering annual changes. Using quarterly
changes, second moments of inflation dynamics in some countries differ sub-
stantially from what is observed in the US. For annual changes, moments
are much more similar across countries. For example, the autocorrelation of
quarterly inflation in Japan is only one third of the US value, while the auto-
4Throughout the essay, we use ∆4 as 1− L4 where L is the lag operator.
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correlation of annual inflation rates is almost the same in the two countries.
Inflation persistence is an important moment for the identification of the mod-
els which systematically predict very smooth inflation. We therefore want to
avoid measurement error in this important moment and use annual changes.
As Reis (2006b), we take a broad perspective on the inflation process. Our
set of considered moments therefore includes unconditional moments of infla-
tion dynamics (standard deviation and autocorrelation) as well as measures of
the co-movements with supply and demand (cross-correlation with leads and
lags of nominal income and labor productivity).
In order to relate our results to those of Reis (2006b), we use the same data
and sample period in the case of the US. For comparability to Reis (2006b),
we also start with a given benchmark parametrization, α = 0.11 and λ =
0.25. Later on, we also estimate α and λ for each model and country using
the method of simulated moments (Davidson and MacKinnon 2004, Chapter
7). We then repeat the comparison of the two models under the estimated
parametrization. A detailed description of our empirical strategy can be found
in Appendix 4.B. The appendix also contains the results of a Monte Carlo
study in which we check the reliability of the estimation procedure.
In our analysis, we use quarterly data on nominal income, labor produc-
tivity, and consumer price indices. Most of our data stems from the OECD
and the respective national statistical offices. Data sources and details are
described in Appendix 4.C.
4.3 Results
Our empirical analysis starts with an estimation of the auto-regressive pro-
cesses for nominal income and productivity growth for the six countries in our
sample. In 7 of the 12 cases, higher-order processes are needed to describe the
dynamics in productivity and nominal income growth in the various countries.
The estimated auto-regressive processes are reported in Appendix 4.D.
4.3.1 Results under Baseline Calibration
Table 4.1 presents the results of the model comparison under the baseline
parametrization. For each country and moment, the following information is
reported in the table: the first line in each cell presents the two moments
predicted by the sticky-information model (S.I.) and the sticky-price model
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(S.P.) as well as the observed value from the data. The numbers reported in
round brackets are the standard deviations of the respective model moments.
The numbers in square brackets represent the p-values of a test of equality
between the respective model moment and the empirical counterpart.
We evaluate the empirical performance of the models by different measures
which can be found at the bottom of the table. The first measure is the number
of moments which are closer to the empirical moment in absolute terms than
the moment of the competing model. We then count the moments for which
we can reject that they are equal to the empirical moment at the 5% level.
The third measure of performance is the model’s likelihood given the empirical
moments, Πx∈Xf(x). Since this joint density is in general a very small number,
the table reports the common logarithm.
First, the results confirm our view that the Mankiw-Reis model is suf-
ficiently sophisticated for our analysis. The models match most considered
moments well with not more than two (out of 16) rejected moments per coun-
try in the US, Germany, France, and Japan. From the six rejected moments
in Canada, only two are also rejected at the 1% significance level. Although
the models are less successful in matching UK inflation dynamics, we regard
the overall performances as sufficiently good to draw conclusions from these
results. We now compare the two models’ performances country by country.
For the US, absolute deviations between model and empirical moments
are small. A similar results is also observed by Reis (2006b) who considers
quarterly inflation and finds that, with the exception of the autocorrelation,
predictions of the sticky-information model do not differ from the empirical
counterpart by much. Focussing on annual inflation, we find that this re-
sult also holds for the autocorrelation of inflation. However, this finding is
not unique to the sticky-information model, the sticky-price model performs
similarly.
Considering only absolute differences does not exploit the statistical prop-
erties of the moments. For this reason, we also present standard deviations as
well as p-values of a t-test of significant difference between the respective model
moment and the empirical counterpart. The results confirm Reis’ judgement
that the sticky-information model fits the data remarkably well. No model
moment is significantly different from the data moments at the 5% level. But






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparing the two competing models for the US, sticky prices perform
slightly better than sticky information. The number of moments closer to the
data is equal for both models and, in both models, no moment is rejected.
Considering the models’ likelihoods, sticky prices perform slightly better than
sticky information.
For the UK, the sticky-information model performs better than the sticky-
price model. The sticky-information model produces moments that are closer
to the data in five out of eight cases. For sticky information, two moments are
rejected at the 5% level and, for sticky prices, four moments are rejected. As a
result of this disability to generate certain data moments, both joint densities
are low with sticky information performing better.
For Germany, the results do not allow a clear discrimination between the
models. A moments-based evaluation supports sticky information, while sticky
prices dominate in a likelihood comparison. The sticky-information model pro-
duces five moments that are closer to the data. This finding is confirmed when
considering the statistical properties of the moments. For sticky prices, two
moments are significantly different from the data moments, while no moment
is rejected for sticky information. However, the likelihood is higher for sticky
prices than for sticky information in the case of Germany.
A similar picture arises for France. In a moments-based evaluation, sticky
information is more successful than sticky prices. The absolute distance to the
empirical moments is lower for sticky information in six out of eight cases. For
both models, only one moment is rejected. A likelihood comparison, by con-
trast, supports sticky prices as the likelihood of the sticky-information model
is effectively zero. This is driven by the standard deviation of inflation which
is strongly rejected for the sticky-information model.
Also for Canada, moments-based evaluation and likelihood comparison
show different results. Sticky prices match more moments closer in absolute
terms but the number of rejected moments is equal. However, the likelihood
is higher for sticky information.
Sticky prices are slightly better in the case of Japan. Sticky information
matches more moments closer to the data but has one more rejected mo-
ment. Considering the likelihood of the models, sticky prices are supported by
Japanese data.
Leaving the country-by-country comparisons of overall model perfor-
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mances, it is also interesting to elicit how the two models perform in situations
where moments empirically differ substantially from the US benchmark. One
of such moments is the Canadian autocorrelation which is considerably lower
than in the other countries. Both models overpredict this moment substan-
tially though equality to the empirical moment can only just not be rejected
at 5% significance. Another interesting constellation is given by the negative
cross-correlations of inflation to changes in demand in the UK and Canada.
In the UK, sticky information can generate two out of three negative signs,
while sticky prices are successful in one case. Neither model can generate a
negative sign for Canada. Finally, models are more successful with respect
to the unusual positive cross-correlations of inflation with changes in supply
which are observed in France and Japan. Here, both models predict the signs
correctly, while they are also successful in matching the negative relations to
supply in the other countries.
All in all, our results do not allow a clear discrimination between the two
models. In only one country, we find clear evidence in favor of one model. In
the UK, sticky information dominates both in moment and likelihood-based
comparisons. Considering the other five countries, evidence is mixed. In
moments-based evaluations, sticky information performs better in Germany
and France but worse in Canada. For the US and Japan, model performance
is similar. In likelihood comparisons, sticky prices perform better in four coun-
tries (US, Germany, France, and Japan). The results also show that it is valu-
able to consider the inflation process broadly. While sticky information is less
successful in matching unconditional moments of inflation dynamics (3 vs. 2
rejected moments), it performs better with respect to the inflation reactions
to changes in demand (4 vs. 8 rejected moments). The latter finding is in line
with Mankiw and Reis (2002) who demonstrated qualitatively that sticky in-
formation generates empirically superior inflation responses to demand shocks
compared to the sticky-price alternative.
4.3.2 Estimation Results
This section presents the results from our estimation procedure of the Phillips
curve parameters. We estimate the parameters α and λ by matching our
two models to the observed second moments of inflation using the method
of simulated moments. The results are summarized in Table 4.2. The table
87
reports the point estimates for the parameters α and λ as well as their standard
deviations (in brackets) for each country and model.
SI SP
α λ α λ
US 0.2480 0.2604 0.2455 0.2558
(0.0097) (0.0070) (1.8260) (0.8151)
UK 0.1066 0.0890 0.0019 0.2526
(0.0966) (0.0714) (0.0113) (0.6056)
Germany 0.2785 0.0105 0.0305 0.2446
(0.0831) (0.0022) (0.0907) (0.3189)
France 18.2122 0.0325 0.2406 0.2377
(19.9889) (0.0355) (0.9102) (0.4041)
Canada 3.1487 0.0353 0.0689 0.2377
(1.3804) (0.0161) (0.0447) (0.0676)
Japan 6.5188 0.0261 0.0394 0.2251
(1.9556) (0.0083) (0.1325) (0.3388)
Table 4.2: Estimated values for α and λ from the method of simulated moments
estimation
For the sticky-price model, our estimates for the parameter λ, measuring
nominal rigidity, are close to those used in common calibrations (λ ≈ 0.25,
e.g. Mankiw and Reis 2002). Concerning real rigidities, measured by α, the
estimated values differ substantially across countries. For sticky prices, our
estimates lie somewhat above the values discussed in the literature, which
range from 0.11 (Reis 2006b) to 0.17 (Chari et al. 2000), in two countries, the
US and France.5 The estimates for the other countries are lower.
For the sticky-information model, our results are different. Except for the
US, informational rigidities, λ, are lower than those found in the literature
(Khan and Zhu 2002, Carroll 2003, Do¨pke et al. 2008b). The estimated
5In the Mankiw and Reis (2002) version of the two Phillips curves we use, α is a com-
bination of the mark-up power of monopolistic firms θ, the labor-supply elasticity of real
wages ψ, and the income elasticity of real wages σ, α = σ+ψ1+θψ . Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2000) offer a quantification of these structural parameters which results in the stated value
α = 0.17.
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real-rigidity parameter α lies very close to the baseline in the UK whereas our
estimates are higher for the other five countries. For France, we find a very high
point estimate for α which is associated with a very high standard deviation.
The problem of an imprecisely estimated degree of real rigidity when both
Phillips-curve parameters are estimated jointly is a known phenomenon in the
literature (see Khan and Zhu 2002, Do¨pke et al. 2008b).
4.3.3 Results under Estimated Parametrization
We repeat the model comparison using the estimated parametrization. The
results are presented in Table 4.3. The table is the counterpart to Table 4.1
and is arranged conformably. Note that the estimation is based on a mo-
ment distance such that the moment-based performance tends to improve as
compared to the baseline parametrization (at 1% significance, only 2 of the
96 model moments can be rejected). However, we also observe trade-offs in
the empirical performances of the models. In particular, sticky information
becomes more successful in matching unconditional moments of inflation dy-
namics when using the estimated parametrization but at the costs of the fit to
the empirical cross-correlations. In contrast to the moment-based evaluations,
the models’ likelihoods are non-targeted measures in the estimation.
The model predicted moments are very similar to those from the baseline
parametrization in case of the US. As a consequence, all model evaluations
show similar results as under the baseline parametrization. The two competing
models perform almost identically.
For the UK, model moments change substantially when using the estimated
parameters. Sticky information predicts the standard deviation of inflation
substantially better than under the baseline. This however forces the model
to perform worse with respect to other moments (the cross-correlation with
changes in supply and demand) which results in six rejected moments at the
5% level. This is put into perspective when recognizing that only one of those
moments is also rejected at the 1% level (see the reported p-values in the
table). The sticky-price model gains with respect to the cross-correlations of
inflation with demand and loses concerning other moments. All in all, sticky































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For Germany, no moment is rejected under the estimated parametrization.
Sticky prices match more moments closer and the model has the higher likeli-
hood.
Considering France, sticky information wins the horse race under the esti-
mated parametrization. The sticky-information model performs considerably
better than under the baseline calibration whereas the performance of sticky
prices does not change much. Sticky information has the higher density and
matches more moments more closely.
Concerning Canada, sticky information is not better than sticky prices.
Using the estimated parameters, both models improve as less moments are
rejected, but at the cost of lower overall likelihoods. Comparing the model
performances, no clear evidence occurs.
Also, the results for Japan allow no clear discrimination between models.
For both models, no moment is rejected but sticky price match six moments
closer. By contrast, sticky information has the higher likelihood.
Also, under the estimated parametrization we want to draw special atten-
tion to the unusual moments which the models failed to generate under the
baseline calibration (see Section 4.3.1). Also here, both models substantially
overpredict the relatively low Canadian inflation persistence. This indicates
that the two models systematically generate too much inflation smoothness.
This result is in line with those of previous studies. In Coibion (2010), the
poor performance of the sticky-information approach is partly driven by the
fact that predicted inflation is excessively smooth. Also in the study of Paus-
tian and Pytlarczyk (2006), the origin of the poor fit of sticky information
is the inability of the model to match the autocorrelation of inflation. With
respect to the negative correlations of inflation with movements in demand
(UK and Canada), the sticky-price model is rather successful under the esti-
mated parametrization. The model now predicts four of the six negative signs
correctly while still generating all the positive signs in the other countries. In
this respect, the sticky-information model performs even worse than under the
baseline calibration, a consequence of the improved fit in the unconditional
moments of inflation dynamics (see above).
All in all, the comparison of the estimated models shows weak support
for one of the competing models in three countries. Sticky prices perform
slightly better in the UK and Germany, while sticky information is supported
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by French data. Performances of the two models are very similar in the other
three countries.
4.4 Conclusion
This essay has provided an empirical cross-country comparison of the sticky-
price and sticky-information Phillips curves on the basis of second moments of
inflation. The analysis contributed to the literature on the horse race between
the two concepts methodologically in several respects. We compared the model
performances both in moment-based and likelihood evaluations. In addition,
we took a broad look on inflation dynamics considering inflation variance and
persistence as well as its relation to dynamics in demand and supply. Finally,
our cross-country perspective allowed to test whether model performances are
country-specific.
We performed two comparisons of sticky prices and sticky information.
In the first we compared calibrated versions of the two models, whereas we
considered estimated models in the second comparison. Our results do not
clearly support one of the two competing models. Relative model performances
depend on the calibration, the country, and on which moments of the inflation
process one focuses.
In the baseline calibration, the two models perform similarly in most coun-
tries. Only in the UK, sticky information is clearly supported. When compar-
ing the estimated models, our results indicate that sticky information performs
better in France, while sticky prices dominate in the UK and Germany and
both models perform similarly in the US, Canada, and Japan.
The cross-country perspective of our essay revealed that both models’ per-
formances worsen where inflation dynamics deviate from US observations. Our
broad view on the inflation process allowed disentangling the model perfor-
mances. We find that sticky prices match unconditional moments of inflation
dynamics better while sticky information is more successful in matching co-




We determine the model solution by a guess-and-verify approach. We guess
that inflation is a moving average of past shocks, see equation (4.5).
4.A.1 Sticky Information
We start from the Sticky-information Phillips curve (4.2). In this appendix,
we solve for the coefficients on ∆mt, the solution for the coefficients on ∆at is
equivalent except for the opposite sign. We solve for coefficients on ∆mt using
the method of undetermined coefficients. First, we consider ∆at+i = 0 ∀i. Our



























Thus expressions for the log output gap and the log output gap growth are
needed. Using the definition of the output gap, the MA representation of







and the assumption of ∆at+i = at+i = 0 ∀i gives an expression for the log
output gap growth:




























































































































Because (4.9) must hold for all possible realizations of εmt−j−k, we can use ε
m
t =
1, εmt−u = 0 ∀u > 0 to determine the coefficient γSI0 . Under this realization,




















For a general k, we use the realization εmt−k = 1, ε
m
























































We start from the following representation of the Sticky-price Phillips curve
(4.1),
pt = θpt−1 + (1− θ)2
∞∑
i=0
θiEt (mt+i − at+i) , (4.10)
which is equation (A13) from Mankiw and Reis (2002) extended with a non-
constant log productivity at. In this appendix, we solve for the coefficients on
innovations to nominal income, the solution for the coefficients on innovations
to productivity is again equivalent except for the opposite sign.
We solve for coefficients on ∆mt using the method of undetermined coef-
ficients. For convenience, we assume ∆at+i = 0 ∀i. Our guessed solution for







We also use the MA representation of nominal income growth (4.4). Eliminat-





























































Using matching coefficients as described in the preceding section (use the re-
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alization εmt = 1, ε
m
t−u = 0 ∀u > 0 in (4.14)) yields for γSP0 :











































and for γSPj (using ε
m
t−j = 1, ε
m


























⇔ γSPv = (θ − 1)
v−1∑
j=0


































































































Using this, (4.15) becomes
γSPv = (θ − 1)
v−1∑
j=0
























4.B Empirical Strategy: Formal Description
Model Comparison. In detail, our empirical procedure under a certain
parametrization, α and λ, proceeds as follows: for each country c and model
z, the analysis consists of a complete model parametrization and a repeated
model simulation and proceeds as follows:
1. In the parametrization phase, we first estimate processes for nominal in-
come growth and productivity growth from the data. In any country and
for both time series, we start with estimating the parameters of an AR(4)
process by OLS. If the coefficient on the last lag is not significantly differ-
ent from zero, we drop that lag and re-estimate an auto-regressive process
of order 3. We drop insignificant lags until we arrive at a process with
a significant last lag (sequential t-testing).6 Having found such an auto-
regressive process, we invert it into its MA representation. We collect
the values for the coefficients {χci} and {ωci} and the innovation variances
σ2m,c and σ
2
a,c governing the dynamics of nominal income growth and pro-
ductivity growth for this country in Ωc =
{{χci}∞i=0 , σ2m,c, {ωci}∞i=0 , σ2a,c}.
The model is now completely quantified, the parametrization is described
by αc,z, λc,z, and Ωc.
7
2. Using the values for the coefficients {χci} and {ωci} and the parameters
α and λc, we calculate the coefficients {γc,zi } and {ξc,zi } in the MA rep-
resentation of inflation (4.5).
3. Combining the sequence of residuals, derived from estimating (3) and
(4) in step 1, with the MA coefficients from (4.5) derived in step 2,
6Concerning Canada and Japan, we use eight lags in the processes for ∆at and ∆mt as
we found that estimation precision on subsequent stages improves substantially.
7In the comparison of the calibrated models, αc,z = 0.11, λc,z = 0.25 ∀c, z. In the
comparison of the estimated models, αc,z and λc,z refer to the estimated parameters.
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we calculate a sequence of quarterly inflation rates ∆pt predicted by
model z for country c. We then calculate selected second moments of
corresponding annual changes. Specifically, we calculate the following







These moments can be compared to the empirical moments on the basis
of absolute deviations. This, however, ignores the statistical properties
of the moments and thus does not allow inference.
4. In order to evaluate the statistical properties of the model moments, we
simulate the model 10,000 times. In each simulation, we draw sequences
of innovations {εm,ct } and {εa,ct } from normal distributions with mean zero
and variances σ2m,c or σ
2
a,c and feed them into the model. Combining the
innovations {εm,ct } and {εa,ct } and the MA coefficients of inflation {γc,zi }
and {ξc,zi }, we generate a sequence of inflation rates {pic,zt } as predicted
by the respective model z given Ωc.
For each simulation, we calculate the standard deviation of inflation, its
auto-correlation, and its cross-correlations to current values, leads, and
lags of nominal income and productivity growth. We thus generate a
distribution of model moments by simulation. The resulting distributions
are well approximated by normal distributions. For each moment x ∈ X,
we then estimate a density function f c,zx (x|α, λc,Ωc) from the 10,000
generated observations using Maximum Likelihood. We use the function
f c,zx (x|α, λc,Ωc) to test for difference between empirical moment xc,data
and model moment xc,z. To determine the standard deviations of the
empirical moments we use the method of moving blocks bootstrap (Efron
and Tibshirani 1998, Chapter 8.6).
Estimation. For each country c and model z, we estimate the degrees of
rigidity, α and λ, using the method of simulated moments described by David-
son and MacKinnon (2004, Chapter 9.6). Our vector of moments X is the same
as used in the model evaluation. The function to be minimized is a weighted
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”true” value Mean estimator 5% quantile 95% quantile
SI: α 0.1100 0.1669 0.0567 0.3317
SI: λ 0.2500 0.1756 0.0861 0.2934
SP: α 0.1100 0.0643 0.0210 0.1179
SP: λ 0.2500 0.2403 0.2157 0.2658
Table 4.4: Monte Carlo study, estimated α and λ for both models
average of the squared differences between empirical and model moments,
Q (α, λ,Xc,z, Xc) =
1
n
· [Xc,z (α, λ,Ωc)−Xc]′ ·W · [Xc,z (α, λ,Ωc)−Xc] ,
where n is the number of observations for each moment. The vector of mean
model moments Xc,z (α, λ,Ωc) is determined as described in steps 2 and 3
above. Xc is the vector of empirical moments. The weighting matrix W is the
covariance matrix of Xc,z (α, λ,Ωc) −Xc and is determined by bootstrapping
from the innovations to nominal income and productivity using the method
of moving blocks bootstrap (Efron and Tibshirani 1998, Chapter 8.6). The
estimators αc,z and λc,z are the solution to minα,λQ (α, λ,X
c,z, Xc). We com-
pare the models under the estimated parametrization repeating the described
above using αc,z and λc,z.
Monte Carlo Study. We check the reliability of the estimation procedure in
a Monte Carlo study using 10,000 simulated data sets of length 80 (the length
of our US data set). These data sets stem from simulations of the respective
models under a pre-determined parametrization. The results (Table 4.4) of
the Monte Carlo study confirm our confidence in the estimation procedure, no
estimator is significantly biased.
4.C Data
For our empirical analysis, data on inflation, productivity, and nominal income
is needed. We have quarterly data on these three variables for a sufficiently
long period for the following six countries: the US, the UK, Germany, France,
Canada, and Japan. However, the period for which we have complete data
varies considerably between the different countries.
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For inflation and nominal income, we use CPI inflation and nominal GDP
per capita, respectively, for all countries. Concerning labor productivity which
we use as a measure of natural output, our variable of choice is output per work-
ing person which we have for five countries. For reasons of data availability,
we use productivity per working hour for Germany.
The longest sample is available for the US. For comparability with Reis
(2006b), we use the same US sample. For Canada, the shortest sample in our
data set, only data from the first quarter of 1981 is available for all three vari-
ables. All data is taken from the OECD, Datastream, and national statistical
offices.8 Table 4.5 provides sources and details on the data used.
Country 
 
Nominal GDP CPI Productivity Sample period 
US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Table 
1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product 
[Billions of dollars]; Seasonally 
adjusted at annual rates 
Bureau of Labor Statistics; Series Id: 
CUUR0000SA0; Not Seasonally 
Adjusted Area: U.S. city average Item: 
All items; Base Period:  1982-84=100 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics; 
Output per Person; 
Nonfarming Sector; 
1992=100 
1960 to 2003 
UK Office for National Statistics UK; 
ABMI; Gross Domestic Product; 
Chained volume measures; 
Seasonally adjusted; Constant 2003 
prices 
 
OECD; Index 2005=100 Office for National 
Statistics UK; A4YM; 
Output per Worker; 




1959 to 2008 
Germany Bundesamt für Statistik; before 1990 
West Germany; linear extrapolation 
of growth rate in 1990Q1  
OECD; Index 2005=100 Bundesbank; Productivity 
per hour; Seasonally 
adjusted; Index 1995=100 
1970 to 2008 
France INSEE National Institute of Statistics 
and Economic Studies 
OECD; Index 2005=100 National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic 
Studies; GDP per 
employed person 
 
1978 to 2008 




1981 to 2008 
Japan DSI Data Service; Seasonally 
adjusted 









OECD: OECD.stat: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=750101 
Table 4.5: Sample periods, data sources, and details
4.D Nominal Income and Productivity Processes
Table 4.6 reports the estimated auto-regressive processes for nominal income
and productivity growth for the six countries in our sample. The order of the
processes has been determined by sequential t-testing. In 5 of the 12 cases, it is
sufficient to use not more than one lag to describe the dynamics in productivity
8In the first quarter of 1990, a linear extrapolation for nominal income growth is used
for Germany in consideration of the re-unification.
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and nominal income growth in the various countries. Growth in nominal in-
come can be described as an AR(1) process for the United States. For the UK,
nominal income growth seems to be i.i.d. For Germany, France, Canada and
Japan, growth of nominal income is best described by auto-regressive processes
of higher order. Productivity growth can be described as i.i.d. with positive
mean for the US, the UK, and Germany. French, Canadian, and Japanese
growth rates show some significant auto-regressive components.
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nominal income growth
cons · 102 t− 1 t− 2 t− 3 t− 4 σ2m · 104




Germany 0.3154 0.0371 0.1489 0.1373 0.3667 0.8875
(0.1573) (0.0775) (0.0760) (0.0759) (0.0747)
France 0.1309 0.4798 0.3985 0.2772
(0.0904) (0.0863) (0.0851)
Canada 0.3257 0.5301 -0.0450 0.3057 -0.2561 0.2933
(0.1112) (0.0966) (0.1059) (0.1058) (0.1097)
Japan 0.0516 0.1445 0.2882 0.2282 0.1731 1.0226
(0.1197) (0.0808) (0.0823) (0.0858) (0.0886)
productivity growth







France 0.2822 -0.0258 0.2329 0.1834
(0.0626) (0.0913) (0.0885)
Canada 0.2198 0.1285 -0.0762 0.2828 -0.0487 0.2043
(0.0848) (0.0971) (0.0967) (0.0953) (0.0987)
Japan 0.2129 0.4923 0.2305 -0.0006 -0.2848 3.0287
(0.1580) (0.0955) (0.1061) (0.1059) (0.1042)
Table 4.6: Estimated coefficients and shock variances for productivity and
nominal income growth processes
Notes: For Canada and Japan, the coefficients on the lags 5 to 8 are: Canada, nomi-
nal income: 0.0196 (0.1091), 0.0144 (0.1056), 0.0626 (0.1040), -0.1057 (0.0906). Canada,
productivity: 0.0191 (0.0993), 0.0851 (0.0963), -0.0284 (0.0931), -0.1208 (0.0909). Japan,
nominal income: 0.0939 (0.0889), 0.0976 (0.0872), -0.0201 (0.0834), -0.1056 (0.0832). Japan,
productivity: -0.2175 (0.1043), 0.2186 (0.1057), 0.1175 (0.1052), -0.3015 (0.0955).
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Chapter 5
Rational Inattentiveness in the
Lab: the Effect of Information
Costs on Forecasting
5.1 Introduction
Mankiw and Reis (2002) proposed the sticky-information Phillips curve as an
alternative to the standard sticky-price Phillips curve which has some unde-
sirable implications (Ball 1994, Mankiw and Reis 2001). In sticky-information
models subjects make choices in every period, but they do not update their
information set before each choice. As a consequence subjects form their ex-
pectations partly on the basis of out-dated information. A microeconomic
justification for this behavior is provided by rational-inattentiveness models
(e.g. Sims 2003, Reis 2006a, Reis 2006b). This essay presents the first experi-
mental test of rational-inattentiveness models.1
The basic idea in these models is that gathering and/or processing informa-
tion is costly. These costs occur in reality by spending time finding information
or by having mental effort doing calculations. The theory assumes that infor-
mation is a normal good and that information costs can be monetized. Given
information costs, it may be rational for agents not to use all available infor-
mation in each period to form forecasts. Rational agents will update their
information only if the benefit from an improved current and future forecast
1This essay is based on Goecke et al. (2011b).
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exceeds the information costs.
The empirical evidence with respect to the validity of sticky-information
models is mixed. Support for the sticky-information Phillips curve is reported
in Mankiw and Reis (2007), Do¨pke et al. (2008a), and Dupor et al. (2010)
while Korenok (2008), Carrillo (2010), Coibion (2010), and Korenok et al.
(2010) find that the sticky-information models fit the data rather poorly. One
problem that typically plagues these studies using aggregate data is that sub-
jects’ expectations are hard to measure and that their individual information
sets are unobservable. Testing rational-inattentiveness models with micro data
from the field is practically impossible as the costs and benefits of information
cannot be measured.
We use a laboratory experiment to test the central implication of rational-
inattentiveness models that subjects weigh the costs against the benefits of
information acquisition and rationally ignore available information if the costs
exceed the benefits. The lab experiment allows us to control the costs and
benefits of information perfectly and enables us to conduct tests against a clear
theoretical benchmark. In an individual choice experiment, subjects have to
predict the realization of a simple stochastic process in several periods. In
each period, subjects can choose between forecasting without new information
(guessing) and buying information. Information that can be bought is perfect,
meaning it provides the true value of the process in the current period.
We analyze whether subjects acquire information as predicted by the the-
oretical model. We choose the costs and benefits of new information such that
expected payoffs are maximized by not buying information in every period.
Our first test is to check whether subjects’ average duration of inattentiveness
equals the theoretically optimal one given values of information costs, benefits,
process length, and the process itself. We then vary the costs of information
holding the benefits constant in order to find out whether the chosen frequency
of information updating depends on the cost parameter. By varying other
parameters of the model, we check whether a myopic heuristic explains the
information updating pattern better than the rational-inattentiveness model.
While there does not exist an experimental test of rational-inattentiveness
models in the spirit of Reis (2006a, 2006b) in the literature, our essay is closely
related to Ro¨theli (2001). Ro¨theli reports an experiment in which subjects
can acquire costly information to uncover deterministic relationships between
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three variables and the outcome of two prospects. Like in our experiment, it is
possible to determine the optimal amount of information to be acquired as a
function of costs and benefits of information and the length of the experiment.
In his experiment, the majority of subjects do not acquire information effi-
ciently. Many subjects underestimate the value of information, especially for
the revelation of the causal structures in the model. Other subjects detect the
causal structure but fail to implement their insights in the cost-minimizing way.
In contrast to our experiment, Ro¨theli (2001) does not answer the question of
how subjects respond to changes in the relative costs of information.
Given the macroeconomic research question, our essay is also related to
other experiments on macroeconomic topics (see Ricciuti 2008 and Duffy 2008
for surveys). Our essay is particularly related to experimental studies on the
Phillips curve (Adam 2007, Pfajfar and Zakelj 2009).
Our results show clear evidence in favor of sticky-information and rational-
inattentiveness models. Agents behave as if they are able to calculate the
optimal length of inattention. They do not update information in every pe-
riod and therefore they stick partly to old information. Thus, an adaptive
forecast behavior emerges because without new information the current fore-
cast is based on the previous one. In most treatments we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that subjects update their information as predicted by the
rational-inattentiveness models. Simple myopic behavior as used for example
in models by Feldstein (1985) and Lovo and Polemarchakis (2010) is rarely a
good description of subjects’ behavior. Furthermore, the results indicate that
the length of inattention increases with rising information costs as predicted
by the theory. These results hold in the aggregate, i.e. they describe aver-
age behavior of all subjects pooled together. Pairwise comparisons between
two treatments to test rational behavior and myopic behavior show mixed ev-
idence but favors also the rationality approach in comparison to the myopic
approach. Individual behavior is less rational, but deviations from rationality
are not systematic.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. The theoretical back-
ground is described in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the design and the
hypotheses that are tested. The experimental procedure is described in Sec-




Rather than implementing a specific inattentiveness model from the theoretical
literature, we designed a simple stylized model that captures the main idea
of the rational-inattentiveness literature and allows us to derive the optimal
information updating frequency easily. The essence of rational inattentiveness
is that subjects weigh the benefits of new information against the costs of
its acquisition. If the costs are higher than the expected benefits, they may
rationally decide not to get the available information.
As our experiment is motivated by the macroeconomic literature about
the Phillips curve, we chose a forecasting task to test inattentiveness. In
the sticky-information Phillips curve models, subjects must form expectations
about future prices and sometimes do so based on outdated information sets.
We model a situation where subjects forecast realizations p of a stochastic
process. The stochastic process is a random walk in which the variation εt is
drawn from a discrete uniform distribution:
pt = pt−1 + εt (5.1)
with εt ∈ {x0, x1, ..., xn} and prob(xi) = 1n∀i.
The initial value p0 of the stochastic process is given. The initial value is 0
in every treatment. All possible realizations of the random walk over the whole
forecast horizon were shown in a table that was part of the instructions. The
corresponding probabilities qjt of each realization j in each period t were also
presented in the table. Therefore, forecasting the realizations of the stochastic
process reduces to guessing one of the possible values. The best forecast in
every period t is the realization in period t with the highest probability q∗t .
The probability of a correct forecast is one in periods in which information is
bought. The more periods a participant does not update his information the
more realizations of the random walk are possible and therefore all probabili-
ties, including q∗t , decrease. If εt is drawn from a set that is symmetric around
zero, εt = 0 yields the highest probability at any point in time, therefore
Et−1pt = pt−1 is the best forecast in this case.
In each period t, subjects choose whether they would like to observe the
current realization of the random variable pt at fixed costs c or to guess the
current realization. Observing the realization is equivalent to guessing cor-
rectly. In each period a correct guess generates a payoff of b, an incorrect
107
guess generates a payoff of 0. Observing the realization generates a certain
payoff b − c, while guessing results in an expected payoff b · q∗t . The certain
payoff stays unchanged within a treatment but the expected payoffs decline
in the number of periods until the next information update. This tradeoff
between information costs and declining expected payoffs of guessing implies
a deterministic optimal updating frequency.
Given a finite number of forecasting periods N , a risk neutral agent aiming
to maximize expected payoffs will choose the updating frequency T :2
T ∗ = arg max (Π (T )) (5.2)
with










+ ΨN modT . (5.3)
The expected payoff contains the safe element (b− c) which is earned when-





from guessing that value of p which has the highest probability q∗t in period
t in which no information is acquired. T − 1 is the length of inattentiveness
between two updating periods resulting from the decision to update informa-
tion every T periods. Within a finite number of N periods, not every updating
frequency T is feasible without a remainder (N modT ). In those remaining
periods, ΨN modT delivers the maximal expected payoff.
A rational, payoff-maximizing agent will determine T ∗ by computing and
comparing expected payoffs in equation (5.3) for different updating frequencies
T . It is difficult to provide a closed-form general solution to the problem of
finding the optimal T ∗ because of the complication that any given N is not
divisible by all potential T . It is however clear that the optimal T ∗ exists
and depends on the costs c, the length of the round N , and the number n of
possible realizations of εt which determines q
∗
t . For a given set of parameters,
the expected payoff of every possible T can be computed thus revealing the
optimal one.
Alternatively, agents may not behave in such a strict payoff-maximizing
way, but might use some heuristics. A plausible heuristic might be myopic
behavior by which agents do not take into account that updating information
2For details of the derivation see Appendix 5.A.
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in the current period affects future expected values. Myopic subjects might
perform a stepwise optimization rather than a complete one. Agents that only
consider the current period make the decision whether to update in the current
period or not but they do not take into account the periods after the current
period. If they update, they receive the certain payoff b − c. If they do not
update, they receive the expected payoff q∗1b. Thus, agents who only consider
the current period base their information updating decision on the comparison
between b− c and q∗1b. If they consider the current and the first future period,
they make the decision whether to update in the second period (the first future
period) or not after no update in the first period. Once again, they do not take
into account the periods after an information update in the second period. If
they update in period two, they receive the certain payoff b− c in the second
period and the expected payoff from the first period q∗1b. If they do not update
in the second period, they receive the expected payoff from the first period q∗1b
and the expected payoff from the second period q∗2b. Doing the comparison, the
expected payoffs from the first period cancel out. Thus, agents who consider
the current period and the first future period base their information update
decision on the comparison between b− c and q∗2b. Similar comparisons occur
for agents who consider only the next three, four, five, and so forth periods.
This leads to a simple decision rule: myopic subjects are inattentive for the
next t period if the expected payoff in that period exceeds the net benefit of
acquiring information:
q∗t b > b− c (5.4)
5.3 Design and Hypotheses
The main question of our experiment is whether subjects’ behavior in the
given forecasting task is best predicted by rational-inattentiveness behavior
or by myopic behavior. We test the null hypothesis that subjects behave
rationally inattentive. By varying the variables q∗t , c, and N we generate
different predictions of the updating frequency T that allow us to test our null
hypothesis against the alternative.
To keep the forecasting task as simple as possible, we at first limit εt to two-
realizations −1 and +1, with a commonly known initial value of p0 = 0. The
resulting probabilities for all possible realizations are summarized exemplarily
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for periods 0 to 4 in Table 5.1.3 The probability of any given realization
declines the further the respective period lies in the future.
The complexity of the random walk that has to be forecasted is our first
treatment variable. To analyze how a higher number of possible realizations
affects subjects’ behavior, we implement a second stochastic process where
εt ∈ {−2,−1, 0,+1,+2}. If subjects are rationally inattentive, they should
update their information set more frequently in the treatment with the five-
realizations process than in the treatment with the two-realizations random
walk. This is due to the higher variance of the five-realizations process. The
five-realizations process can reach more values in a given forecast horizon than
the two-realizations random walk. If participants have a forecast horizon of
two, meaning that they do not update for two periods in a row, the five-
realizations process can have nine realizations in the second period and the two-
realizations process can only have three realizations. Thus, the probabilities
for a specific realization in the five-realizations random walk decrease more for
a given forecast horizon in comparison to the two-realizations random walk.
Participants should update more often the lower the probabilities and therefore
the lower the expected payoff of guessing ceteris paribus. With this variation
we determine the impact of q∗t on the updating frequency. Table 5.2 presents
the probabilities for realizations of the five-realizations random walk in the
first four periods.4
Values of p








1 0.500 0 0.500
2 0.250 0 0.500 0 0.250
3 0.125 0 0.375 0 0.375 0 0.125
4 0.063 0 0.250 0 0.375 0 0.250 0 0.063
Table 5.1: Probability distribution: two-realizations random walk
The payoff for correct predictions is fixed at b = 30. In order to analyze
the impact of information costs, our second treatment variable is c. The costs
3The complete table, summarizing the probabilities for up to 20 periods, can be found
in Appendix 5.B.
4Again, the complete table can be found in Appendix 5.B.
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Values of p








1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
2 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.2 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.04
3 0.048 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.152 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.048
4 0.056 0.083 0.109 0.13 0.136 0.13 0.109 0.083 0.056
Table 5.2: Probability distribution: five-realizations random walk
can be either lower than the payoff at c = 20 and c = 26, or higher than the
payoff at c = 35. This last parameterization was chosen to analyze whether
subjects comprehend the fact that buying information might create a loss in
the current period but increases the expected payoffs in future periods.
Our third treatment variable is the number of forecasting periods N . We
implement two process durations, N = 12 and N = 20. The calibration is
such that the length of the process should hardly affect the updating frequency.
These three treatment variables constitute a 2×3×2 design that is summarized
with the respective treatment numbers in Table 5.3.
Process= et∈{−1,1} ηt∈{−2,−1,0,+1,+2}
N = 12 20 12 20
b = 30 1 2 7 8
c = 20
b = 30 3 4 9 10
c = 26
b = 30 5 6 11 12
c = 35
Table 5.3: Treatment numbers
Within the framework of these 12 treatments we test the hypothesis of
rational-inattentiveness behavior:
Hypothesis 1: Subjects are rationally inattentive and choose the
optimal length of inattentiveness.
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With the parameterization in treatments 1-12, we can calculate the pre-
dicted updating frequencies and the resulting length of inattentiveness between
information purchases resulting from our competing behavioral models. Equa-
tions (5.2) and (5.3) deliver the optimal updating frequencies that maximize
the overall expected payoffs in each treatment. These optimal spans of inat-
tentiveness are contained in the columns labeled “Rational” in Table 5.4 (page
117). To test hypothesis 1 we compare these theoretical predictions to the
update frequencies observed in the experiment. This test includes variations
in all three treatment variables.
Corollaries about the effect from variations in either q∗, c, or N on the
length of inattention based on rational inattentiveness can be derived from
hypothesis one. These corollaries can be interpreted as a check for internal
consistency of the theory of rational inattentiveness. The theoretically pre-
dicted reactions of a rationally inattentive agent to changes in q∗, c, or N are
presented in corollaries 1.a to 1.d.
With rational behavior, the length of inattention...
Corollary 1.a: ... does not decrease in c.
Corollary 1.b: ... will be lower or equal in the 5-realizations process than
in the 2-realizations process.
Corollary 1.c: ... does not increase in N .
Corollary 1.d: ... is smaller than N .
We test Corollaries 1.a − 1.d by using pairwise comparisons between re-
spective treatments and a regression approach.
Rejecting these hypotheses might be evidence in favor of heuristic behavior
but it is not a sufficient test. Likewise to the rational behavior, the myopic
heuristic delivers point predictions for our 12 treatments (equation (5.4)) as
well as predicted reactions to changes in single treatment variables. The point
predictions of the durations of inattentiveness for the myopic can be found
in the corresponding columns of Table 5.4 (page 117). By using the point
predictions of the myopic approach we test the hypothesis of myopic behavior:
Hypothesis 2: Subjects are myopic and decide to update their information
according to equation (5.4).
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A subject using the myopic heuristic will take into account the interval of
possible realizations of p, as well as the payoff and the costs but will not alter
his update frequency when the number of periods changes. Thus, corollaries
about the effect from variations in either q∗, c, or N on the length of inattention
in the case of myopic behavior can be derived from hypothesis two.
With myopic behavior, the length of inattention...
Corollary 2.a: ... does not decrease in c.
Corollary 2.b: ... will be lower or equal in the 5-realizations process than
in the 2-realizations process.
Corollary 2.c: ... does not increase in N .
Corollary 2.d: ... is equal to N if c > b.
The corollaries 1.a − 1.c (rational inattentiveness) and 2.a − 2.c (myopic
behavior) are identical. Only corollaries 1.d and 2.d are different.
5.4 Procedure
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and was
conducted at the RUBex laboratory at the Ruhr-University Bochum in winter
2010. The 46 participants were students from economics and other fields of
the Ruhr-University of Bochum.
Upon arrival in the lab, subjects were randomly seated at workstations
separated by blinds. The instructions (see Appendix 5.C for details) contained
complete lists of probabilities for the respective processes for up to 20 periods.
Instructions were read aloud and subjects were encouraged to ask questions at
any point of the experiment. A comprehension test was conducted to assure
that all participants had understood how to use the probability tables and how
to calculate probabilities after an information purchase (see Appendix 5.D for
details). A calculator was provided via the software.
We implemented a within-subjects design with respect to changes in in-
formation costs and the number of periods. We decided to test the impact
of the process between subjects. This enables us to test corollaries 1.a, 1.c,
1.d, 2.a, 2.c, and 2.d within subjects but compare the impact of forecasting
complexity between subjects. We decided against a test within subjects of the
113
corollaries 1.b and 2.b as this would have increased the time in the lab to more
than two hours. Furthermore, a change of processes (or several changes) could
have confused participants and might have resulted in mistakes from using the
wrong probability table. Each subject therefore completed either treatments
1-6 or treatments 7-12. We randomly ordered the treatments but kept the
order constant in all sessions.
One of the six treatments was chosen randomly at the end of the experiment
and participants were paid for the sum of their accumulated payoffs in that
treatment. As the maximal payoff in a 12 period treatment is 360 and in a 20
period treatment is 600, we normalized the payoffs by dividing the payoff by
the number of periods in that treatment. The conversion rate was 2.5 euros
per normalized payoff point to get the profit of the participants measured in
C=.
As a frequency of information updates higher than predicted by theory
might indicate risk aversion, a standard Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion
test was conducted at the end of the experiment and paid separately (see
Appendix 5.E for details).5
One session lasted on average 80 minutes, the average payoff (including a
4 euros show up fee) was 24.83 euros, the maximal payoff was 47.8 euros, and
the minimal payoff was 8 euros.
5.5 Results
We test the main hypotheses 1 and 2 described in Section 5.3 by comparing the
theoretical predictions with the behavior observed in the experiment. Further-
more, we extend the analysis by testing the corollaries 1.a− 1.d and 2.a− 2.d
by doing a pairwise comparison between specific treatments and a regression
analysis. Figure 5.1 shows a participant’s updating behavior in treatments
seven until twelve. The x-axes show the number of periods in each treatment
(12 or 20 depending on the process length). The y-axes indicate whether the
participant bought information in the respective period or not. The value is
one if the participant did not buy information and two if the participant up-
5The Holt and Laury test indicates that the majority of our participants are risk neutral
or slightly risk averse. Risk neutrality has to be rejected for all subjects pooled together. We
conclude that the low level of risk aversion in our sample is negligible because the results do
not change significantly by taking into account the risk aversion. See Section 5.5 for details.
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Figure 5.1: Updating behavior of an agent forecasting a five-realizations ran-
dom walk
dated his information set by buying new information. Figure 5.1 demonstrates
that the participant bought information in each period in treatment 7 and 8
(information costs: 20). In treatment 9 he bought five times information and
he bought ten times information in treatment 10 (information costs: 26). In
the treatments with the highest information costs (treatment 11 and 12) he
bought twice and once information respectively (information costs: 36). We
calculate the mean length of inattentiveness for each participant based on the
number of periods in that the participant bought information and the length
of the process. To test the hypotheses and corollaries described in Section 5.3
we aggregate the mean length of inattentiveness over all participants.
5.5.1 Point Estimator Analysis
Table 5.4 presents results for the test whether agents choose a length of inatten-
tiveness that conforms to the rational-inattentiveness approach (test hypothe-
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sis 1) or the myopic approach (test hypothesis 2).6 For this purpose, the differ-
ences between the length of inattentiveness predicted by the two approaches
and the means of the length of inattentiveness chosen by the participants in the
experiment are compared. Table 5.4 consists of two parts for the two random
walks. The first rows (titled ”Process”) describe the possible realizations of the
error of the random walk. The second rows (titled ”N”) present the length of
the random walk. The columns ”No.” present the treatment numbers (as also
shown in Table 5.3) and columns ”Model” show the parametrization in the
treatments. The value of the rational length of inattention is given in columns
”Rational” and the value for myopic behavior in columns ”Myopic”. A 12 and
20 indicates no update at all. Columns ”Results” show the aggregated mean
values of the chosen length of inattentiveness in each treatment and the corre-
sponding standard errors in parenthesis. To test hypothesis one, we compare
the prediction from the rational-inattentiveness model (”Rational”) with the
inattention intervals observed in the lab (”Results”) using t-tests. A star next
to the theoretical values indicates that both numbers are statistically different
from each other at a significance level of 5%. We cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that subjects update their information rationally in most treatments,
with the exception of treatment seven, eight, and twelve.7
To test myopic behavior, we do the same exercise by comparing the values
predicted by the myopic approach with the means from the experiment. A c
next to the theoretical value indicates that both numbers are statistically dif-
ferent at a 5% level. The results show that myopic behavior cannot be rejected
only in treatment number two. Therefore, the results are only consistent with
myopic behavior in one treatment. We cannot find myopic behavior as used
for example in the model by Feldstein (1985) where the optimal level of social
security is derived with agents that only optimize on the basis of the current
period or the model used by Lovo and Polemarchakis (2010) where agents in
a monetary model plan consumption only for the current period and a few
periods in advance.
6Another alternative behavior could be that participants split the period in parts of the
same length and use the resulting numbers as update frequency. We do not test this behavior
because a high number of factors of the process length exists and therefore no clear results
can be found.
7The results do not change significantly if only risk neutral agents are considered.
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Process= et ∈ {−1, 1}
N = 12 20
Model: No. Rational Myopic Results No. Rational Myopic Results
b = 30 1 2 4c 2.53 2 2 4 4.26
c = 20 (0.32) (1.28)
b = 30 3 4 12c 2.92 4 2 20c 4.08
c = 26 (0.72) (1.24)
b = 30 5 6 12c 5.85 6 6 20c 8.09
c = 35 (0.97) (1.68)
Process= ηt ∈ {−2,−1, 0,+1,+2}
N = 12 20
Model: No. Rational Myopic Results No. Rational Myopic Results
b = 30 7 0∗ 0c 1.71 8 0∗ 0c 2.32
c = 20 (0.33) (0.77)
b = 30 9 2 4c 1.95 10 2 4c 1.85
c = 26 (0.44) (0.37)
b = 30 11 6 12c 5.75 12 6∗ 20c 9.36
c = 35 (0.75) (1.48)
A * indicates statistical difference between means and rational prediction at a significance level of 5%. A c
indicates statistical difference between means and myopic prediction at a significance level of 5%. Cells
contain the numbering of the treatment, the predictions of the length of inattentiveness of the
rational-inattentiveness and the myopic approach. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 5.4: Point estimator tests for rational-inattentiveness and myopic pre-
dictions
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5.5.2 Pairwise Comparison Analysis
To test the corollaries 1.a − 1.d and 2.a − 2.d we apply pairwise comparisons
between two treatments. The results are presented in Table 5.5. The first
column of Table 5.5 shows the number of the treatments that are compared
to each other. The second column presents the means and the corresponding
standard errors (in parenthesis) of the data observed in the experiment. The p-
values of the t-tests of equal, lower, or higher means are presented in the third
column. The fourth and fifth columns indicate whether rational and myopic
behavior predict equal length of inattention between the two treatments (=),
lower length of inattention <, or higher length of inattention >.
The results of the tests for corollaries 1.a and 2.a (different information
costs) are presented in the first part of Table 5.5.8 The corollary of the rational
approach cannot be rejected by all comparisons. The comparison between
treatment 3 vs. 5 and 4 vs. 6 show that the predictions of the myopic approach
have to be rejected based on a significance level of 10%. Therefore we cannot
reject corollary 1.a but we can reject corollary 2.a.
The second part of Table 5.5 presents the results for a pairwise comparison
between mean lengths of inattentiveness from treatments that differ only in
the type of the process (corollaries 1.b and 2.b). The results show that it is not
possible to reject any prediction of both approaches using a significance level
of 5%. Therefore corollaries 1.b and 2.b cannot be rejected.
The third part of Table 5.5 presents the results of a pairwise comparison
between the mean lengths of inattentiveness from treatments that only differ
in the process length (corollaries 1.c and 2.c). With the exception of the
comparison between treatment 11 and 12, no prediction of the two approaches
can be rejected. The pairwise comparison indicates that a longer process does
not tend to increase the time of inattentiveness. Therefore corollaries 1.c and
2.c can only be rejected based on one comparison.
The fourth part of the table presents results of a pairwise comparison be-
tween each treatment and the respective length of the process in that treat-
ment and shows the results of the t-test whether the length of inattentiveness
is smaller than the process length (corollary 1.d). The results show that all
8Pairwise comparisons by considering only risk neutral agents are not possible because
the samples in these case are to small.
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means are smaller than the respective process length as predicted by the ra-
tional theory. Therefore corollary 1.d cannot be rejected.
The results of the tests for corollary 2.d (myopic behavior predicts that the
length of inattention is equal to the length of the process if c > b) are presented
in the last part of Table 5.5 and show that corollary 2.d can be rejected based
on all comparisons.
All in all, the results of the pairwise comparisons favor the idea of rational-
inattentiveness behavior in comparison to myopic behavior.
5.5.3 Regression Analysis
As a robustness check we test the corollaries 1.a − 1.c and 2.a − 2.c also by
using a regression approach. We check the influence of information costs, the
process type, and the process length on the length of inattention by running
a Tobit regression. We use a Tobit regression because our depending variable,
the mean length of inattention, is a censored variable. The mean length of
inattention is bounded between zero and 20, meaning updating in every period
and no update at all. We run the regression on the following equation:
Ik = α0 + α1∆ck + α
′
XXk + k
The variable Ik is the mean of the length of inattention determined in the
experiment. We have 276 observations (46 participants in 6 treatments) that
are indicated by the index k. ∆c is a dummy variable and presents information
costs. The dummy is zero if the information costs are at their lowest level
(c = 20), the dummy is one if the information costs are at their medium level
(c = 26), and the dummy is two if the information costs are 35. All other
variables are summarized in vector Xk. These variables are: the length of the
process, the form of the stochastic process (five-realizations or two-realizations
random walk), gender, age, duration of study, smoking behavior, and past
participation in experiments. The error term is given by k.
The results of the Tobit regression are presented in Table 5.6.9 All estima-
tors of the control variables that are not shown in the table are statistically
not different from zero applying a significance level of 5%. The statistically
9The results do not change significantly if a measure derived from the Holt and Laury
test is used for the level of risk aversion and integrated in the regression. The measure for
risk aversion itself is statistically not different from zero.
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Different information costs (1.a+2.a)
Treatment Means p-value Rational Myopic
1 vs. 3 2.53 (0.32) vs. 2.92 (0.72) 0.6903 < <
3 vs. 5 2.92 (0.72) vs. 5.85 (0.97) 0.9897 / 0.0206 < =
1 vs. 5 2.53 (0.32) vs. 5.85 (0.97) 0.9982 < <
2 vs. 4 4.26 (1.28) vs. 4.08 (1.24) 0.9213 / 0.4606 = <
4 vs. 6 4.08 (1.24) vs. 8.09 (1.68) 0.9683 / 0.0634 < =
2 vs. 6 4.26 (1.28) vs. 8.09 (1.68) 0.9609 < <
7 vs. 9 1.71 (0.33) vs. 1.95 (0.44) 0.6689 < <
9 vs. 11 1.95 (0.44) vs. 5.75 (0.75) 1.0000 < <
7 vs. 11 1.71 (0.33) vs. 5.75 (0.75) 1.0000 < <
8 vs. 10 2.32 (0.77) vs. 1.85 (0.37) 0.2910 < <
10 vs. 12 1.85 (0.37) vs. 9.36 (1.48) 1.0000 < <
8 vs. 12 2.32 (0.77) vs. 9.36 (1.48) 0.9999 < <
Different process types (1.b+2.b)
Treatment Means p-value Rational Myopic
1 vs. 7 2.53 (0.32) vs. 1.71 (0.33) 0.9592 > >
2 vs. 8 4.26 (1.28) vs. 2.32 (0.77) 0.8985 > >
3 vs. 9 2.92 (0.72) vs. 1.95 (0.44) 0.8723 > >
4 vs. 10 4.08 (1.24) vs. 1.85 (0.37) 0.0983 / 0.9509 = >
5 vs. 11 5.85 (0.97) vs. 5.75 (0.75) 0.9360 = =
6 vs. 12 8.09 (1.68) vs. 9.36 (1.48) 0.5708 = =
Different process length (1.c+2.c)
Treatment Means p-value Rational Myopic
1 vs. 2 2.53 (0.32) vs. 4.26 (1.28) 0.2021 = =
3 vs. 4 2.92 (0.72) vs. 4.08 (1.24) 0.2117 / 0.4235 > =
5 vs. 6 5.85 (0.97) vs. 8.09 (1.68) 0.2577 = =
7 vs. 8 1.71 (0.33) vs. 2.32 (0.77) 0.4688 = =
9 vs. 10 1.95 (0.44) vs. 1.85 (0.37) 0.8590 = =
11 vs. 12 5.75 (0.75) vs. 9.36 (1.48) 0.0358 = =
Different to N (1.d)
Treatment Means and N p-value Rational Myopic
1 2.53 (0.32) vs. 12 1.0000 <
2 4.26 (1.28) vs. 20 1.0000 <
3 2.92 (0.72) vs. 12 1.0000 <
4 4.08 (1.24) vs. 20 1.0000 <
5 5.85 (0.97) vs. 12 1.0000 <
6 8.09 (1.68) vs. 20 1.0000 <
7 1.71 (0.33) vs. 12 1.0000 <
8 2.32 (0.77) vs. 20 1.0000 <
9 1.95 (0.44) vs. 12 1.0000 <
10 1.85 (0.37) vs. 20 1.0000 <
11 5.75 (0.75) vs. 12 1.0000 <
12 9.36 (1.48) vs. 20 1.0000 <
Equal to N if c > b (2.d)
Treatment Means and N p-value Rational Myopic
5 5.85 (0.97) vs. 12 0.0000 =
6 8.09 (1.68) vs. 20 0.0000 =
11 5.75 (0.75) vs. 12 0.0000 =
12 9.36 (1.48) vs. 20 0.0000 =
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 5.5: Pairwise comparison to test corollaries
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const ∆c 20 periods 5 realizations female smoker Pseudo R2 Obs.
-.16 2.64∗∗ 1.71∗∗ -1.11 2.44∗∗ .03 0.04 276
(0.75) (0.37) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62) (1.25)
** indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
Table 5.6: Tobit regression, depending variable: mean length of inattention
positive estimated coefficient for information costs indicates that the length of
inattention increases with higher information costs as predicted by the sticky-
information and rational-inattentiveness theory (test corollaries 1.a and 2.a).
An increase of information costs by one degree tends to increase the length of
inattentiveness by 2.64 periods. Thus corollaries 1.a and 2.a cannot be rejected
by the regression approach.
The Tobit regression indicates that the form of the process does not in-
fluence the length of inattentiveness. The regression analysis shows that a
more complicated process, a five-realizations random walk in comparison to a
two-realizations random walk, does not have a positive effect on the length of
inattentiveness while controlling for other possible influences on an aggregate
level. Corollaries 1.b and 2.b cannot be rejected by this approach.
The length of the process has a positive effect on the length of inatten-
tiveness (test corollaries 1.c and 2.c). The length of inattentiveness tends to
increase with a longer process. Therefore corollaries 1.c and 2.c have to be
rejected based on the regression approach.
The regression approach partly rejects the corollaries of the rationality
and myopic approach. No discrimination about what approach describes the
behavior in a better way is possible.
5.5.4 Individual Behavior Analysis
So far the analysis has dealt with the data on an aggregated level over all
treatments or between two treatments. This section presents results about
rational forecast behavior on an individual level. The highest probabilities of
a realization of the process, q∗t , indicate the optimal predictions in the following
periods after an information update.10 If information was acquired in period t,
10The values of q∗t and qt can be found in the probability tables Table 5.1 and Table 5.2.
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the value of pt is known. The optimal forecast behavior for the two-realizations
random walk is as follows. In the first period after an information update
t + 1 the optimal forecast is given by pet+1 = pt + e where e ∈ {−1, 1}. The
optimal forecast for the second period after an information update is pet+2 = pt.
The optimal behavior is as described for all following periods until the next
information update, separated into odd and even periods after an update.
For the five-realization random walk, the optimal forecast for the first period
after an information update is pet+1 = pt + η where η ∈ {−2,−1, 0,+1,+2} if
information was bought in period t. The optimal forecast is given by pt, the
know value from the last information update, in all following periods until the
next information update.
Figure 5.2: Deviation from optimal prediction: two and five-realization random
walk
The left histogram in Figure 5.2 corresponds to the two-realizations ran-
dom walk and the right histogram to the five-realizations random walk. The
histograms present deviations from optimal prediction and indicate that the
majority in both processes behaves in an optimal manner. But there are also
deviations from the optimal predictions. How often the participants deviate
from the optimal behavior is summarized in Table 5.7. The case that a partici-
pant bought information and made a forecast in the following period occurs in
519 cases in the two-realizations random walk. In these cases, the participants
made an optimal forecast in 505 cases. All other numbers in the table has to
be interpreted alike. The numbers indicate that deviation from the optimal
prediction is present. Therefore, the behavior can be described on average as
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rational but not on an individual level.
Process: Two realizations Five realizations
First period: cases 519 554
First period: optimal behavior 505 545
Second period: cases 313 300
Second period: optimal behavior 157 86
Third period: cases 178 170
Third period: optimal behavior 131 45
Fourth period: cases 86 87
Fourth period: optimal behavior 42 28
Fifth period: cases 54 56
Fifth period: optimal behavior 35 10
Table 5.7: Optimal predictions after information update
5.6 Conclusion
We find clear evidence in favor of rational-inattentiveness models. By evalu-
ating point estimators in most treatments we cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis that subjects update their information rationally. The result of a Tobit
regression also indicates that the length of inattention increases with rising
information costs as predicted by the rational-inattentiveness theory. Simple
myopic behavior is not a good description of subjects’ behavior. These results
hold in the aggregate, i.e. they describe average behavior of all subjects pooled
together. Individual behavior is less rational, but deviations from rationality
are not systematic.
Corollaries of the rational and myopic theory were tested with pairwise
comparisons between specific treatments and a regression analysis. The results
indicate mixed evidence but favor also the rationality approach in comparison
to the myopic approach.
The overall results show clear evidence in favor of sticky-information and
rational-inattentiveness models. On an aggregate level, agents behave ratio-
nally and seem to be able to calculate the optimal length of inattentiveness.
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Appendix
Appendix 5.A presents the derivation of the maximization problem of a ra-
tionally inattentive participant. Appendix 5.B shows the probability tables,
Appendix 5.C contains the instructions for the main experiment, Appendix
5.D shows the comprehension test and Appendix 5.E presents the instructions
for the Holt and Laury (2002) test. All text passages shown to the participant
are italicized.
5.A Derivations
This section presents the derivation of the maximization problem of the partic-
ipants that is presented in equation (5.3). The participants receive a payment
b if their forecast is correct, else 0. They can buy perfect information on the
current value of p for a price c. The decision for the participants is to choose
how long they want to stay inattentive. They decide that they want to update
each T periods. If they choose T = 1 they buy information in every period
and receive a profit of b − c in each period. Each treatments contains of N








If participants decide to update every second period (T = 2). They receive
(q∗1 · b) in expectation in periods 0, 2, 4, 6, and so forth and b− c in periods 1,
3, 5, 7, and so forth. Without remaining periods (N modT = 0), the expected
value for T = 2 is:
N
2












((b− c) + (q∗1b))
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Without remaining periods the expected value for T = 3 is:
N
3


















((b− c) + (q∗1b) + (q∗2b))
Without remaining periods the expected value for T = 4 is:
N
4
























((b− c) + (q∗1b) + (q∗2b) + (q∗3b))
Without remaining periods the expected value for T = 5 is:
N
5






























((b− c) + (q∗1b) + (q∗2b) + (q∗3b) + (q∗4b))
and similar for all other T ≤ N . This can be summarized in the following
equation:










If there is a remainder (N modT 6= 0), a profit maximizing agent chooses a
combination of updating and guessing for the remaining periods that yields the
maximal payoff. If there are for example four remaining periods until the end
of the treatment, a profit maximizing behaving agent compares all possible
combinations of guessing and updating: four periods guessing; one period
guessing and three periods of information updating; two periods guessing and
two periods of information updating; three periods guessing and one period of
information updating; four periods of information updating. The combination
with the highest expected payoff is chosen. The function ΨN modT delivers
the highest payoff of the remaining periods. These can be summarized in the
following equation that is the same as equation (5.3) presented in Section 5.2:




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Welcome to the experiment. Do not speak to any other participant from now
onwards and use only features of the computer that are necessary for the ex-
periment. The experiment is conducted to analyze decision behavior. You can
win money in this experiment. Your profit depends only on your own decisions
according to the rules described on the next pages. The data from the exper-
iment are anonymous and cannot be connected to the participants. Neither
the other participants nor the experiment conductors know your decisions or
your profit during or after the experiment. This experiment consists of two
independent sub experiments. At first, you receive the instruction for the first
sub experiment. After the first sub experiment you will receive the instructions
for the second sub experiment.
Sub Experiment 1
Task
In this experiment, you have to forecast a variable p which varies randomly.
Your profit in C= at the end of the experiment depends on how many correct
forecasts you have done.
Procedure
This sub experiment consists of six independent treatments. Each treatment
consists of a fixed number of periods. You have to forecast the value of the
variable p in the current period. The number of periods can vary between the
treatments and will be shown on the screen at the beginning of each treatment.
Random Process
Each treatment starts in period 0. The variable p starts with a value of 0
in period 0. The variable p follows a simple random process: the variable p
can change between the previous period and the current one by:
• rise by 1 (+1)
• fall by 1 (-1)
Both events will arise with the same probability. Therefore, the potential
events, +1 and -1, will arise with 50% probability. Changes of the variable
are independent over periods, i.e. both changes have the same probability in-
dependent of the change in the previous period. For illustration purposes, you
find a table with all possible realizations of variable p in the appendix. Please
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consider the tables. Each row in a table represents a period. The columns show
the value of p that can be achieved by the process during 20 periods. Each cell
entry represents the probability of the respective value in the respective period.
Example:
Please consider the following table:
Values of p








1 0.500 0 0.500
2 0.250 0 0.500 0 0.250
3 0.125 0 0.375 0 0.375 0 0.125
4 0.063 0 0.250 0 0.375 0 0.250 0 0.063
You can be certain that the value of the variable p in period 0 is 0, i.e. the
probability is 1. The variable will change from period 0 to period 1 by +1 or -1,
both with the same probability of 50% (=0.5), likewise for the change between
period 1 and period 2. The change of the variable is +1 or -1 between period 1
and period 2. Therefore, the values of p in period 2 can range between +2 and
-2.
The probability for a value +2 in period 2 is for example 25% (=0.25).
This is due to the fact that a value of 2 in period 2 can only be achieved if
the value of p was 1 in period 1 and rises by 1 between period 1 and period 2.
Therefore the probability is 0.5 · 0.5 = 0.25. The tables in the appendix present
all probabilities for each possible value of the variable p in each period - thus
you do not have to calculate the probabilities on your own.
Forecast
You have to enter your forecast about the value of p in the current period
into a box that you will see on the screen. Whether your forecasts were correct
or not will be shown after all six treatments at the end of the experiment.
Information
You know that the variable p starts with a value of 0 at the beginning of
each treatment. You can buy information about the current value of p in each
period. This information costs you c points. The costs c can vary between the
treatments but stay unchanged within a treatment. The costs of information
will be shown on the screen. If you buy information, you know the current
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value of p. Your forecast is automatically correct in this case and equal to the
true value without the necessity to enter a value.
Payoff
If your forecast of the value of p is correct, you will receive a payoff of b.
The payoff b can vary between the treatments but stays unchanged within a
treatment. The payoff will be shown on the screen. If your forecast of the value
of p is wrong, you will receive a payoff of 0.
All payoffs in each period will be summed up in each treatment. The costs
of buying information in all periods of a treatment will be subtracted from this
sum. Please notice that you can also make losses in each treatment if the sum
of costs of buying information is higher than the sum of payoffs.
Example:
Assume that a treatment consists of 10 periods, the payoff for a correct
forecast in each period is b = 5 and the costs of buying information is c = 1.
You bought information three times and in addition to that you made three
correct forecasts. Therefore you made six correct and four wrong forecasts out
of 10 forecasts. Your payment in this treatment is therefore 6 · b+ 4 · 0− 3 · c =
6 · 5− 3 · 1 = 27.
Profit
You earn 4 euros for your participation. Your profit in C= from this sub
experiment depends on the payment of a randomly chosen treatment. You will
be told how good your forecasts have been at the end of the first sub experi-
ment. The payments from your forecasts in each treatment will be shown on
the screen. One treatment will be chosen randomly to identify your profit. Your
profit will be determined by the following equation:
Profit =




Assume that the treatment from the last example is chosen to determine
the profit. In this case, the payment is equal to 27 and the number of periods
is 10. Your profit is therefore 6.75 euros.
Calculator
If you need a calculator, you can activate the windows calculator by using
the calculator symbol in the left part of the screen.
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Time
The time limit for each treatment is 5 minutes. The remaining time is
shown in the upper part of the screen.
Trial
There will be a trial before the experiment starts. The trial consists of 10
periods and the time limit is 10 minutes. The trial has the same structure as
the experiment, with the exception of the period length and the time limit. The
results from the trial do not affect your profit at the end of the experiment.
The instructions for the participants that have to deal with the five-
realizations process differ from the instructions already presented only in the
section ”Random process”. But participants were shown the full instructions
text. The altered section read as follows:
Random Process
Each treatment starts in period 0. The variable p starts with a value of 0
in period 0. The variable p follows a simple random process. The variable p
can change between the previous period and the current one by:
• rise by 2 (+2)
• rise by 1 (+1)
• stay the same (0)
• fall by 1 (-1)
• fall by 2 (-2)
All these events will arise with the same probability. Therefore, all five
possible events +2, +1, 0, -1, and -2 will arise with 20% probability. The
changes of the variable are independent over periods, i.e. all changes have the
same probability independent of the change in the previous period.
For illustrative purposes, you find a table with all possible realizations of
variable p in the appendix. Please consider the table. Each row in the table
represents a period. The columns show the value of p that can be achieved by
the process during 20 periods. Each cell entry represents the probability of a
specific value in the respective period.
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Example
Please consider the following table:
Values of p








1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
2 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.2 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.04
3 0.048 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.152 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.048
4 0.056 0.083 0.109 0.13 0.136 0.13 0.109 0.083 0.056
You know for sure that the value of the variable p in period 0 will be 0, i.e.
the probability is 1.
The variable will change from period 0 to period 1 by +2, +1, 0, -1, or -2,
all with the same probability of 20% (=0.2), likewise for the change between
period 1 and period 2. The change of the variable is also +2,..., or -2 between
period 1 and period 2. Therefore, the value of p in period 2 can range between
+4 and -4.
The probability for a process value of +3 in period 2 is for example 8%
(=0.08). This is due to the fact that a value of 3 in period 2 can only be
achieved if the value of p was 1 or 2 in period 1 and rises by 2 or 1 between
period 1 and period 2 respectively. Therefore the probability is 0.2 · 0.2 + 0.2 ·
0.2 = 0.08. The tables in the appendix present all probabilities for each possible
value of the variable p in each period - thus you do not have to calculate the
probabilities on your own.
5.D Comprehension Test
Please answer the following questions before the experiment starts. The ques-
tions will help you to understand the experiment. You are allowed to use the
instructions. If you need a calculator, you can use the window calculator or
your own calculator. Please raise your hand if you have any questions. The
time limit is 10 minutes.
1. What is the probability that p = 0 in period 3?
• Probability:
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2. What is the probability that p = 4 in period 8?
• Probability:
3. What is the probability that p = −2 in period 10?
• Probability:
4. Assume that the length of the treatment is 16, in each period the payoff
is b = 25, and the costs are c = 18. You bought information three times
and you made three correct forecasts in addition. What is your payment?
What is your profit?
• Payment:
• Profit:
5. Assume that you bought information in period 5. The current value was
2. What is the probability that the value of the process is -1 in period 7?
• Probability:
6. The payoff in each period is b = 30 and the costs c = 12. What is
the expected payoff (probability × payoff) in period 8 if you never buy
information and your forecast for period 8 is 0?
• Expected payoff:
7. A treatment consists of 16 periods, the payoff in each period is b = 30
and the costs are c = 12. What is the expected payoff in this treatment
if you buy information in each period?
• Expected profit:
8. A treatment consists of 16 periods, the payoff in each period is b = 30
and the costs are c = 12. What is the expected payoff in this treatment
if all forecasts are correct and you never bought information?
• Expected profit:
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5.E Holt and Laury Instructions




You have to choose ten times one lottery out of two lotteries X and Y in
this second experiment. You can win two different amounts of money in each
lottery.













Lottery X  I choose X  I choose Y  Lottery Y 
3/10, 2€  7/10, 1.6 €        3/10, 3.85 €  7/10, 0.10 € 





















erhalten Sie bei der Auszahlung einen zusätzlichen Betrag zwischen 0  und  1  
Euro. Dieser wird zufällig ermittelt  und  zu Ihrem  Experimentverdienst addiert. 
Each lottery consists of two differ t events that will be realiz d with a
given probability. A random draw determines which event is realized. Given
the example above, the probability of winning 2 euros in lottery X is 3/10 and
7/10 for winning 1.6 euros. The probability of winning 3.85 euros in the lottery
Y is 3/10 and 7/10 for winning 0.10 euros.
Your task is to choose one lottery in each of the ten lottery combination.
Whe all choices are made, pleas confirm by clicking the ”O.K.” button.
All lottery combinations are shown in Table 5.12 (not presented in the
instructions).
Lottery X    I choose X  I choose Y  Lottery Y   
1/10, 2€  9/10, 1.6 €        1/10, 3.85 €  9/10, 0.10 € 
2/10, 2€  8/10, 1.6 €        2/10, 3.85 €  8/10, 0.10 € 
3/10, 2€  7/10, 1.6 €        3/10, 3.85 €  7/10, 0.10 € 
4/10, 2€  6/10, 1.6 €        4/10, 3.85 €  6/10, 0.10 € 
5/10, 2€  5/10, 1.6 €        5/10, 3.85 €  5/10, 0.10 € 
6/10, 2€  4/10, 1.6 €        6/10, 3.85 €  4/10, 0.10 € 
7/10, 2€  3/10, 1.6 €        7/10, 3.85 € 3/10, 0.10 € 
8/10, 2€  2/10, 1.6 €        8/10, 3.85 €  2/10, 0.10 € 
9/10, 2€  1/10, 1.6 €        9/10, 3.85 €  1/10, 0.10 € 
10/10, 2€  0/10, 1.6 €        10/10, 3.85 €  0/10, 0.10 € 
 
Table 5.12: Holt and Laury paired lottery-choices
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Benefit
One out of the ten lottery combinations will be chosen at the end of the
experiment with probability 1/10. The lottery you have chosen (X oder Y ) is
played given the chosen lottery combination. Your profit in C= is calculated by
the randomly determined output of the chosen lottery.
End
Your total profit from both sub experiments will be shown on the screen.
You will be asked individually to receive your profit after you have completed
a short questionnaire. We ask you to bring the small card with your number
and the filled receipt with you. The outpayment will be done privately and
anonymously.
You get an additional profit between 0 and 1 euro to ensure that your
name cannot be linked to the data from the experiment. The additional profit




Acquisition in a Real-Effort
Experiment
6.1 Introduction
Recently, rational-expectations models that build on the assumption of fully in-
formed agents have been challenged by models which are based on the idea that
agents do not collect and/or process all available information (e.g. rational-
inattentiveness models). These two types of models are based on different
assumptions concerning information costs. Information acquisition is assumed
to be costless in rational-expectations models but it is considered as costly
in rational-inattentiveness models. This essay provides an empirical test of
these two assumptions about information costs by using data generated in an
experiment.1
The basic idea of rational-inattentiveness (e.g. Sims 2003, Reis 2006a, Reis
2006b) and sticky-information models (e.g. Mankiw and Reis 2002) is that
gathering and/or processing information is costly. To motivate these costs it
is argued that they occur in reality as time spent finding information or as men-
tal effort spent on e.g. calculations. Given the existence of information costs,
it may be rational for agents not to use all available information at any point
in time. Agents will update their information as long as the benefit of informa-
1This essay is based on Goecke et al. (2011a).
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tion exceeds the information costs. By contrast, rational-expectations models
assume that there are no costs of collecting and/or processing information. As
a consequence every individual uses all available information at every point in
time in these models. The hypothesis of costless information is an important
building block of rational-expectations models and distinguishes them from
rational-inattentiveness models. This essay tests these two hypotheses about
information costs with data that is generated in an experimental real-effort
environment.
The lab experiment enables us to control the benefit of information which
allows us to analyze directly the existence of information costs. In an individual
choice experiment, subjects have to perform a forecast about a number fixed
by the experimenter in advance. Subjects can gain information in a real-
effort experiment about the number to be forecasted via a task. For each
correct solution of the task, the range of possible numbers shrinks by a certain
amount. This amount of reduction, together with the payoff function which
decreases in the forecast error, allows to calculate the expected benefit of each
piece of information. In each period, subjects decide whether to forecast the
number fixed by the experimenter based on the already known information or
to collect more information about the fixed number. The experiment is finished
when the participant made a forecast in all treatments. So that solving the
task is equivalent with forgone leisure. In contrast to the expected benefit of
information, information costs are not directly observable. We test whether
information costs exist or not.
The task in the real-effort experiment consists of simple mathematical prob-
lems. The solution of the mathematical problems captures the processing of
information. Information is provided if the mathematical problems are solved.
We test whether the effort of solving the mathematical problems describe costs
to the participants. Given the existence of costs, participants should economize
on solving mathematical problems.
We analyze whether subjects acquire all information given different tasks
and different benefits of information. If subjects economize on solving the
simple addition problems, we conclude that they view this task as a cost. In
addition, we test how the time spent to solve the task influences the number
of calculations. We interpret the time spent on one calculation as a proxy for
the individual information cost.
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Our results show clear evidence for the existence of information costs and
therefore support rational-inattentiveness models. Processing of information
seems to induce costs for the participants and therefore they do not collect all
available information. By considering all treatments, subjects do not collect
all available information in 54% of all calculations. Furthermore, information
processing diminishes with rising information costs, measured as the individual
time that is needed to solve an addition problem. A participant who needs
10 seconds more for one block of calculation in a treatment, tends to do 0.6
rounds less of calculation.
Our methodological approach is closest to Abeler et al. (2011). These
authors use a task in a real-effort experiment to contribute to the theory
of reference-dependent preferences. The participants in their experiment are
faced with a table with 150 randomly ordered zeros and ones and the task is to
count the number of zeros. If the number of zeros is correct, the participants
receive a payoff that will be realized with 50 percent probability at the end
of the experiment. The participants are free to choose how many tables they
want to solve. The only limitation is a total time limit of 60 minutes. As in
our experiment, the end of the experiment is determined by the decision of
the participants about how long they want to work. The subjects, in their
and our experiment, arrived one at a time to avoid peer effects or a desire to
conformity. Another similarity between their and our experimental design is
that the task is chosen to be easy enough such that everybody is in general
able to solve the task. Thus, disability can plausibly be ruled out as a reason
for not solving the task. Our approach and the one of Abeler et al. (2011)
are very close to one another methodologically but the approaches are used to
address different research questions.
A number of previous papers have analyzed information costs in an experi-
mental environment. Huber et al. (2011) analyze the influence of endogenously
chosen information in an asset market but the information costs are moneta-
rized and do not depend on a task in a real-effort experiment. Gabaix et al.
(2006) test the directed cognition model with experimental data but their in-
formation costs are either monetarized or based on time restrictions. In the
experiment of Kraemer et al. (2006), participants have to forecast which state
will be realized and they can buy information about the future state but the
costs of information are again monetarized. Chapter 5 of this thesis analyzes
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the effect of information costs on forecasting behavior whereas information
costs are monetarized. Thus, these studies impose information costs on sub-
jects and study subjects’ reactions given information costs. By contrast, this
essay does not impose information costs directly but analyzes whether pro-
cessing information is indeed perceived as a cost by subjects.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. The theoretical back-
ground and the hypotheses are described in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents
the design of the experiment. The experimental procedure is described in Sec-
tion 6.4. The results of the analysis can be found in Section 6.5. Finally,
Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 Theory and Hypotheses
Rational-inattentiveness models are based on the assumption that information
is costly. The idea is that gathering and/or processing information produces
costs. To motivate these costs it is argued that they occur in reality as time
spent finding information or as mental effort spent on e.g. calculations. The
essence of rational inattentiveness is that subjects weigh the expected benefit
of new information against the cost of its acquisition. If the costs are higher
than the expected benefits, agents decide not to use the available information
and remain rationally inattentive. Thus, in these models, agents do not always
collect and process all available information. The determinants of the amount
of information acquisition are the marginal expected benefit bm of information
and the marginal cost of information cm. Agents collect information as long
as
bm > cm. (6.1)
Thus, rational-inattentiveness models also predict information acquisition
to fall when the marginal costs of information rise ceteris paribus. Models in
spirit of the rational-expectations approach assume that there are no informa-
tion costs at all. Therefore agents collect and process all available information.
We derive the following three hypotheses from the different approaches:
Hypothesis 1: Subjects can be described by the rational-expectation approach
and subjects collect all available information because information acquisition
does not involve costs.
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Hypothesis 2.a: Subjects are rationally inattentive and they do not collect
all available information because information acquisition is costly.
Hypothesis 2.b: Subjects collect less information the higher the costs of
information.
To test for these hypotheses, we chose a very simple forecasting test. Par-
ticipants can gain information about the value that has to be forecasted by
solving tasks. The amount of information is chosen by the participants.
6.3 Design
The main question that we are interested in is whether subjects’ behavior
in the given forecasting task is best predicted by the rational-inattentiveness
approach or best predicted by the rational-expectations approach. We test
the hypotheses (H1, H2.a, H2.b) described above by analyzing the information
acquisition behavior of the participants.
We kept the experiment design as simple as possible. The task for the
participants was to forecast a positive integer between 1 and 100 in each of five
independent treatments.2 The fixed number in each treatment was randomly
determined before the experiment. The probability of any number between 1
and 100 was the same. The participants had the possibility to gain information
about the fixed number by solving mathematical problems correctly. Each
mathematical problem consisted of two simple additions problems in three
treatments. In two treatments subjects had to solve five simple additions. We
vary the amount of mathematical problems between the treatments to control
for the influence of different levels of information costs. The solutions to the
mathematical problems were always lower than 100. The addition problems
consisted of two or three summands. See Table 6.1 for an overview. We kept
the mathematical problems very simple to ensure that every participant was
able to solve the mathematical problem. We interpret solving the addition
problem as a process of information. Information was available to subjects
but receiving it in a usable form involved some cognitive activity.
If the participants solved the mathematical problems correctly, they were
informed about some numbers not being the fixed number. These numbers
which were not the fixed number vanished from the screen. In the first infor-
2All information in this section was also known by the participants. For details of the
instructions see Appendix 6.A.
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Treatment number 1 and 2 3 4 5
Number of math problems 2 2 5 5
Number of summands 2 3 2 3
Examples 34+22 13+24+9 7+15 84+7+6




Table 6.1: Treatment numbers and corresponding mathematical problems
mation round (the first two or five mathematical problems) the quantity of all
possible numbers decreased from 100 to 19. Thus the first round of solving
mathematical problems eliminated 81 wrong numbers. Any following rounds
of solving mathematical problems eliminated another two wrong numbers. All
remaining numbers were in a consecutive row. Therefore the fixed number
would have occurred after ten rounds of solving mathematical problems. The
participants could collect as much information as they like. Thus the partic-
ipants faced a task and they could decide how many tasks they wanted to
solve and therefore how much information they wanted to acquire. The ex-
periment was finished when the participant made a forecast in each of the five
treatments.
The payoff depended on how far the forecast was away from the fixed
number. The maximum value of 2.00 euros was paid for a correct forecast.
The payoff diminished based on the following rule, whereas x is the fixed
number and y is the participant’s forecast. Loss:
0 Cent, if |x− y| = 0 32 Cent, if |x− y| = 4 128 Cent, if |x− y| = 8
2 Cent, if |x− y| = 1 50 Cent, if |x− y| = 5 162 Cent, if |x− y| = 9
8 Cent, if |x− y| = 2 72 Cent, if |x− y| = 6 198 Cent, if |x− y| ≥ 10
18 Cent, if |x− y| = 3 98 Cent, if |x− y| = 7
In each information stage, participants had to decide whether to acquire
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of the mean  
Expected benefit 
of information 
100 0 €0.02 €0.28  
19 1 €0.02 €1.40 €1.12 
17 2 €0.02 €1.52 €0.12 
15 3 €0.02 €1.63 €0.11 
13 4 €0.02 €1.72 €0.09 
11 5 €0.02 €1.80 €0.08 
9 6 €0.72 €1.87 €0.07 
7 7 €1.28 €1.92 €0.05 
5 8 €1.68 €1.96 €0.04 
3 9 €1.92 €1.99 €0.03 
1 10 €2.00 €2.00 €0.01 
 
Table 6.2: Information in the instructions
more information given the quantity of remaining possible numbers. This de-
cision is rationally based on their disutility of information acquisition (which
can in principle be zero) and the expected benefit measured as the increase
in expected payoff. Because we are not interested to test the ability of the
participants to calculate expected payoffs, we showed the minimum payoffs
(the payoffs in the worst case) and the expected payoffs of the means given a
quantity of possible numbers to the participants as presented in Table 6.2. We
showed the minimum possible payoff as a measure of the dispersion of payoffs.
The difference between the expected payoffs between two possible quantities
of possible numbers is the expected benefit of the next piece of information
for a risk neutral subject. Within a treatment, the information costs stay con-
stant because of the unchanged type of mathematical problems but the benefit
diminishes between the rounds of calculation within a treatment. With this
design we try to identify the point where the benefit of a piece of information
is lower than the costs. The participants will stop collecting information at
this point. The expected benefits of information and the rounds of calcula-
tions are also presented in Table 6.2 but were not shown to the participants.
Except these two columns, the respective line from Table 6.2 and the corre-




The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) at the
Ruhr-University Bochum and the TU Dortmund University in summer 2011.
The 37 participants were students from economics and other fields of the two
universities.
Subjects arrived one at a time for the experiment. We decided not to
conduct the experiment in a group of subjects to avoid peer effects (Falk and
Ichino 2006) or a desire for conformity (Bernheim 1994). The instructions (see
Appendix 6.A for details) were read aloud and subjects were encouraged to ask
questions at any point of the experiment. A comprehension test (see Appendix
6.B for details) was conducted to assure that the participants had understood
how to use the information and the tables presented in the instructions.
All subjects played the same five treatments as described in Section 6.3.
Before the first treatment started, a trial was played. The trial did not influence
the payoff at the end of the experiment.
Each forecast in the five treatments was paid. The payoff for each forecast
was determined as described in Section 6.3. In addition, the participants were
paid a 2 euros show up fee.
As risk averse agents might collect more information than risk neutral
agents to reduce the variance of the expected payoff, a standard Holt and
Laury (2002) risk aversion test was conducted at the end of the experiment
and paid separately (see Appendix 5.E, page 136, for details).
One session lasted on average 45 minutes, the average payoff (including the
2 euros show up fee and the payment for the Holt and Laury test) was 14.09
euros, the maximal payoff was 15.90 euros, and the minimal payoff was 11.60
euros.
6.5 Results
We test hypotheses 1, 2.a, and 2.b described in Section 6.2 by analyzing the
information acquisition behavior of agents.
Figure 6.1 shows the information acquisition of all participants in all five
treatments. The graphs indicate that, in each treatment, many participants
did not calculate all ten rounds of mathematical problems and therefore did not
collect all available information. Over all treatments, subjects calculated all
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of number of calculations
ten sets of addition problems in only 46% of the cases. This means that at most
46% of observations can be explained by the approach of rational expectations.
Probably, some of these 46% appear as if having rational expectations only
due to their low information costs. If information costs would be increased
exogenously, at least some of them are likely not to collect all information.
In 54% of the cases, subjects decided to submit their forecast without
considering some information for which they would not have to pay a monetary
cost. We conclude that subjects perceived the cognitive activity required to
receive more information as a cost. This behavior contradicts hypothesis 1.
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Treatment number 1 2 3 4 5
Means of calculations 8.68 8.65 8.68 8.35 7.73
Standard deviation of calculations 1.86 1.83 1.45 1.84 2.39
Means of calculation time 13 13 20 26 43
(in seconds)
Standard deviation of calculation time 6 6 8 6 11
(in seconds)
Table 6.3: Means of calculations and calculation time
The means of rounds of solved mathematical problems and the correspond-
ing standard deviations are shown in Table 6.3. The prediction of the rational-
expectations approach (test hypothesis 1) is that there are no information costs
and therefore all available information should be used. Thus the rational-
expectations approach predicts a mean of ten for the number of calculations.
The data in Table 6.3 show that the means in the different treatments are
lower than ten. The means are about one standard deviation lower than 10.
The data cannot be higher than 10 and therefore the distribution of the data
is not normally distributed. Therefore we apply a bootstrap technique and
not a t-test to check whether the data is different from 10. We draw 1.000.000
random combinations with replacement of the observed data for each treat-
ment (see Efron and Tibshirani 1998 Chapter 6). The results show that less
than 1% of the randomly drawn realizations have a mean of 10. Therefore
hypothesis 1 has to be rejected.
The results in Figure 6.1 show that even in treatments 1 and 2, in which the
easiest calculations had to be done, almost half of the participants (49% and
46%, respectively) did not calculate until only the fixed number remained. The
average time that was spend for one round of calculation in these treatments
was 13 seconds what represents a comparably low effort. Mean times needed
and the standard deviations for the calculations in all treatments are presented
in Table 6.3. On the other hand the marginal gain of information is quite low
at least after the first round of calculation. The expected marginal payoff is,
for example, only 1 Euro-Cent for the last round of calculations (see Table 6.2).
Thus, saving the disutility of solving the mathematical problem is worth more
than 1 Euro-Cent for almost half of the participants. The results show that
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not all participants collect all available information and therefore hypothesis
2.a cannot be rejected.
However, hypothesis 2.a is the weaker hypothesis of the two hypotheses
supporting the notion of rational inattention. If there are information costs,
subjects should economize on it in a rational way. Such rational behavior
would let us observe certain comparative statics. The amount of collected
information should decrease with higher information costs (hypothesis 2.b). To
test this hypothesis, we run a Tobit regression on the number of calculations.
We use a Tobit regression because the number of calculations is restricted to
integers between 0 and 10. We use two measures as proxies for information
costs: the number identifying the treatment (the higher the treatment number
the more difficult the mathematical problems, see Table 6.1) and the average
time spent for one calculation step (total time needed in a treatment divided
by the number of calculations). As a robustness check we perform the analysis
with and without the first treatment to control for possible learning effects.
We check the influence of information costs by running a Tobit regression
on the following equation:
Ck = α0 + α1Info Costsk + α2Smokek + α3Participationk + α
′
XXk + k
The variable Ck is the number of calculations chosen by the participants in
the experiment. Depending on whether we also use data from treatment 1, we
have 185 or 148 observations (37 participants in 4 or 5 treatments) that are
indicated by the index k. The Info Costs variable is the proxy for information
costs. To proxy information costs, either the treatment number or the average
time that is needed for each calculation step by the participants are used in
different regressions. Smoke is a dummy variable that is one if the participant
smokes and otherwise zero. Participation represents the number of previous
participations in experiments. Further control variables are summarized in
vector Xk. These variables are: gender, age, duration of study, field of study,
and a variable that measures the degree of risk aversion based on the Holt and
Laury test. α0 is a constant and the error term is denoted by k.
The results of the Tobit regression are presented in Table 6.4. All estimators
of variables that are not shown in the table are statistically not different from
zero applying a significance level of 5%. Columns (1) and (2) present the
results including the first treatment and columns (3) and (4) present the results
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.02)
Treatment number -0.35** -0.45**
(0.15) (0.21)
Smoker -2.23*** -2.38*** -2.36*** -2.55***
(0.77) (0.80) (0.82) (0.86)
Participation 0.65*** 0.77*** 0.63*** 0.75***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Terms 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.18**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Constant 6.97** 6.43** 8.19** 8.09**
(3.07) (3.21) (3.22) (3.45)
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07
noobs 185 185 148 148
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance to the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
Table 6.4: Testing the influence of information costs
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excluding this treatment. The results show that higher information costs,
independent of whether they are measured by the treatment number or by
the time spent for one calculation, lead to less information acquisition. All
estimated coefficients of higher information costs are negative and significantly
different from zero at least at a significance level of 5%. Therefore hypothesis
2.b cannot be rejected, higher information costs reduce informational activity.
The results let us conclude that the negative relation between information
costs and information processing holds in a cross-treatment (revealed by the
negative coefficient of treatment number) and a cross-subject (revealed by the
negative coefficient of time) perspective. The point estimator of −0.06 for the
time variable indicates that a participant who needs 10 seconds more for one
calculation in a treatment, tends to do 0.6 rounds less of calculation.
In addition, more participations in previous experiments tend to increase
the number of calculation rounds. This could capture the effect that people
participating more often in experiments have lower acquisition costs because
they could like solving mathematical problems or they like being part of an
experiment. Smokers on the other side tend to calculate fewer rounds. This
behavior could be explained by higher impatientness of smokers as found by
Khwaja et al. (2007). The duration of study has a statistically significantly
effect only if the first treatment is not taken into account.
The overall results show that the two hypotheses derived from the rational-
inattentiveness models cannot be rejected but the hypothesis derived from the
rational-expectations approach has to be rejected. Our results expose behavior
which is well in line with the notion of rational inattentiveness. Subjects
submit forecasts even though they could use more information without paying
a monetary cost. Furthermore, subjects tend to economize on information cost
in a rational way, i.e. they process less information when information costs
increase.
6.6 Conclusion
This essay provided experimental evidence on the endogenously determined
amount of information acquisition. Participants could gain information in a
real-effort experiment by solving tasks. We tested assumptions about informa-
tion costs underlying rational-inattentiveness models and rational-expectations
models. The analysis showed that many participants did not process all infor-
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mation. Therefore we rejected the hypothesis of costless information as used
in rational-expectations models.
The results showed clear evidence in favor of rational-inattentiveness mod-
els. Processing information induced costs for the participants and therefore
they did not collect all available information. The analysis showed further-
more that higher information costs, measured as e.g. time costs, led to less
information processing. Therefore we could not reject any of the two hypothe-
ses derived from rational-inattentiveness models.
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Appendix
Appendix 6.A presents the instructions of the main experiment and Appendix
6.B contains the comprehension test. All parts that were shown to the partic-
ipant are italicized.
6.A Instructions
Welcome to the experiment. Please use only the computer program which is
necessary for the experiment. The experiment is conducted to analyze decision
behavior. You can win money in this experiment. Your benefit depends only
on your own decisions accordingly to the rules described on the next pages.
The data from the experiment are anonymous and cannot be connected to the
participants. The experiment conductors do not know your decisions or your
benefit during or after the experiment. This experiment consists of two inde-
pendent sub experiments. First, you receive the instruction for the first sub
experiment. After the first sub experiment you will receive the instructions for
the second sub experiment.
Sub experiment 1
Task
In this experiment, you have to forecast a positive integer between 1 and 100
(including these two numbers). The fixed number in the respective treatments
was determined before the experiment. The fixed number in each treatment is
independent of past and future fixed numbers. All realizations between 1 and
100 have the same probability at the beginning of each treatment.
Procedure
This sub experiment consists of five independent treatments. You have to
make a forecast about the fixed number in each treatment. The fixed number is
always between 1 and 100. You can collect information about the fixed number
before you forecast. You can collect information but you do not have to. You
can collect as much information as you wish. This sub experiment is finished
as soon as you have submitted a forecast in each of the five treatments.
Forecast
You can type your forecast at the bottom right corner of the screen. Your
forecast can be any positive integer (between 1 and 100). A button labeled
”Submit forecast” is next to the forecast box. You submit your forecast by
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clicking this button. After the submission, the fixed number, your forecast
error, and your payoff in this treatment are shown on the screen. Afterwards
the next treatment starts. The sub experiment is finished as soon as you have
submitted a forecast in each of the five treatments.
Information
You know for sure that the value of the fixed number is between 1 and 100.
The probability of any number in this interval is the same at the beginning
of each treatment. All 100 possible numbers are shown on the screen at the
beginning of each treatment. Two or five addition problems, depending on the
treatment, are shown in the lower part of the screen. The number of addition
problems does not change within a treatment. If you want to acquire infor-
mation about the fixed number, you have to solve the mathematical problems
correctly. The solutions to the mathematical problems are never greater than
100. Push the ”OK” button if you have entered the solutions in the corre-
sponding boxes. A notice occurs if a solution is wrong. You can enter a new
solution in this case. A second screen output occurs if all solutions are correct.
This second screen output presents 19 numbers whereof one number is the fixed
number. These 19 numbers are in a row without missing a number. Beside
the 19 possible numbers, you find the same number of mathematical problems
as before. Two numbers out of the 19 numbers that are not the fixed number
disappear if all mathematical problems are solved correctly. These two num-
bers are always part of the two highest or lowest numbers out of the 19 possible
numbers. But this does not imply that the fixed number is always in the middle
of the row.
Afterwards you can solve other mathematical problems to get rid of an-
other two wrong numbers. The fixed number occurs after ten rounds of solving
mathematical problems. To summarize, 81 wrong numbers are dropped after
the first round of mathematical solutions. Afterwards two wrong numbers are
dropped for any other round of mathematical solutions.
Payoff
You get a payoff of 2.00 euros for a correct forecast. The worse your forecast
is the lower is your payoff. The decrease of the payoff is labeled loss. The
loss is calculated in the following way whereas x is the fixed number and y
is your forecast. The absolute difference |x− y| indicates your forecast error,
independent of whether your forecast is too high or too low.
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Loss:
0 Cent, if |x− y| = 0
2 Cent, if |x− y| = 1
8 Cent, if |x− y| = 2
18 Cent, if |x− y| = 3
32 Cent, if |x− y| = 4
50 Cent, if |x− y| = 5
72 Cent, if |x− y| = 6
98 Cent, if |x− y| = 7
128 Cent, if |x− y| = 8
162 Cent, if |x− y| = 9
198 Cent, if |x− y| ≥ 10
Therefore, your payoff depends on how far your forecast is away from the
fixed number. You receive the maximum value of 2.00 euros for a correct
forecast. Please note that the payoff and the loss are shown in Euro-Cent
on the screen. ”200” therefore correspond to 2.00 euros, ”163” corresponds to
1.63 euros and so forth. The payoffs in the worst case, the minimum payoffs
given a quantity of possible numbers, are shown in the following table. If you
do not want to collect any more information and you want to make a guess,
the mean of the remaining numbers represents the forecast with the highest
expected payoff. The expected payoffs of the means are also shown in the table.
The expected payoff is a statistical value, thus your payoff can be higher or
lower depending of whether the mean is close to the fixed number or not. The
means, the expected payoffs of the means, and the minimum payoffs are shown
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on the screen during the experiment.
Quantity of possible numbers Minimum payoff Expected payoff of the mean 
100 €0.02 €0.28 
19 €0.02 €1.40 
17 €0.02 €1.52 
15 €0.02 €1.63 
13 €0.02 €1.72 
11 €0.02 €1.80 
9 €0.72 €1.87 
7 €1.28 €1.92 
5 €1.68 €1.96 
3 €1.92 €1.99 





All payoffs from the five treatments are added and will be paid together with
the payoff of the second sub experiment at the end of the experiment.
Further screen information
Three values are shown at the right part of the screen, under the table that
contains all possible numbers:
• ”Mean” is the mean of all remaining numbers.
• ”Expected payoff of mean” is the statistical expected value if the forecast
is equal to the mean.
• ”Minimum payoff” is the minimum payoff that is realized if the forecast
and the fixed number have the maximum possible distance.
Time
There is no time limit. You can spend as much time in each treatment as
you like. You can collect as much or as little information as you like.
Trial
There will be a trial before the experiment starts. The trial does not affect
your payoff. The trial consists of one treatment with a time limit of 10 minutes.
The trial has the same structure as the experiment, with the exception of the
number of mathematical problems and the time limit. The fixed number in the
trial does not affect the fixed numbers in the following treatments.
Comprehension Test




Please answer the following questions before the experiment starts. The ques-
tions will help you to understand the experiment. You can use the instructions.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. The time limit is 10 minutes.
1. What is the payoff if your forecast is two numbers above the fixed number?
For example in case your forecast is 14 and the fixed number is 12.
• Payoff:
2. What is the payoff if your forecast is four numbers under the fixed num-
ber? For example in case your forecast is 78 and the fixed number is
82.
• Payoff:
3. What is the payoff if your forecast is 20 numbers above the fixed number?
For example in case your forecast is 75 and the fixed number is 55.
• Payoff:
4. Assume that you collect information until you know that the fixed num-
ber is one of the following numbers: 22; 23; 24; 25; 26; 27; 28; 29; 30; 31; 32.
What is the payoff if your forecast is 23 and the fixed number is 30?
• Payoff:
5. Assume that you collect information until you know
that the fixed number is one of the following numbers:
75; 76; 77; 78; 79; 80; 81; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 87; 88; 89. What is the pay-
off if your forecast is 77 and the fixed number is 87?
• Payoff:




7. What is the minimum payoff if the quantity of possible numbers is reduced
to 9?
• Minimum payoff:
8. What is the expected payoff if the quantity of possible numbers is reduced
to 15 and your forecast is equal to the mean?
• Expected payoff:
9. What is the expected payoff if the quantity of possible numbers is reduced





This thesis presents five essays that compare rational-inattentiveness models
and sticky-information models with rational-expectations models in several
respects. Assumptions about rationality in both types of models are tested
for, implications derived from rational-inattentiveness models are investigated,
models’ accuracies are evaluated, predicted information acquisition behavior
is tested, and assumptions about information costs are inspected.
Chapter 2 presents an empirical test of the two different concepts of ra-
tionality underlying rational-expectations models and rational-inattentiveness
models. The results support the concept used in rational-inattentiveness mod-
els.
Chapter 3 tests implications of rational-inattentiveness models with respect
to forecasting macroeconomic variables. Rational-inattentiveness models pre-
dict a negative correlation between the amount of news and the forecast de-
viation. A negative correlation between news coverage and forecast deviation
occurs empirically for inflation whereas a positive correlation is found in the
context of unemployment.
A comparison between the sticky-information and the sticky-price Phillips
curve is made in Chapter 4. The overall results of the empirical performances
allow no clear distinction between the two concepts. However, if one is predom-
inantly interested in matching unconditional moments of inflation dynamics,
sticky prices should be used. Researchers who focus on co-movements of infla-
tion with demand will obtain better results applying sticky information.
In Chapters 5 and 6, the information acquisition behavior predicted by
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rational-inattentiveness models and the assumptions about information costs
in these models and in rational-expectations models are tested in an experimen-
tal environment. The overall results in Chapter 5 indicate that the prediction
of information acquisition derived from rational-inattentiveness models cannot
be rejected. The analysis in Chapter 6 shows that assumption about informa-
tion costs of the rational-inattentiveness models cannot be rejected in contrast
to the assumptions in rational-expectations models.
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